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In this thesis four different topics in the field of health economics are ad-
dressed. In Chapter 2 the behavior of a vaccine monopolist is analyzed. 
At the heart of the analysis is the monopolist's incentive to reduce supply 
in order to increase the willingness to pay for the vaccine through the in-
creased risk of infection. Chapter 3 deals with physician competition when 
prices are regulated. Competition will then be in quality and location or 
specialization. The impact of the regulators commitment power on the mar-
ket outcome is analyzed. It is supposed that giving general practitioners a 
gatekeeper role in the health care system increases the efficiency of care. 
Moreover, it is usually argued that this contributes to cost containment. 
This conventional wisdom is challenged in Chapter 4, where the competi-
tive effects of gatekeeping are analyzed. Risk selection in the German Public 
Health Insurance System is analyzed in Chapter 5. After free choice of sick-
ness funds was made available in 1996 a significant distortion of competition 
occurred due to risk separation. We test whether some strategic aspects are 
operating in the background (adverse selection or cream skimming). Finally, 
Chapter 6 offers a summary in German. 
To better motivate these papers and to put them into a broader context 
this introduction is provided. The characteristics, or sometimes the pecu-
liarities, of the health care market are briefly described in Section 1.2. These 
characteristics often result in market failures which provide a motivation for 
public policy interventions. Guided by the content of the above mentioned 
chapters, in the following Sections 1.3 to 1.6 some of these characteristics 
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2 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
are described in detail. The contribution of the thesis to the economics 
literature and to the public policy debate is presented at the end of each of 
these sections. 
At the end of the introduction the most important trade offs identified 
throughout are summarized. We will conclude that it will be, in general, im-
possible for a regulator to account for all these trade offs such that efficiency 
will rarely be achieved. The amount of trade offs is not only challenging 
for a regulator but also for researchers. The number of trade offs that can 
simultaneously be analyzed is limited by algebraic tractability. This moti-
vates the partial approaches adopted throughout the thesis. The following 
table describes the organization of the thesis. 
Topic Introduction Contribution Chapter 
Vaccines 1.3 1.3.4 2 
Price regulation 1.4 1.4.6 3 
Gatekeeping 1.5 1.5.4 4 
Risk selection 1.6 1.6.6 5 
Table 1.1: Organization of the thesis. 
1.2 Characteristics of the health care market 
1.2.1 Welfare economics and market failures 
Health care systems are typically characterized by a (large) number of regu-
latory rules, including the organization of health care. This involves, among 
other things, the financing and the delivery of care. The international vari-
ety of systems is remarkable. The United Kingdom and Italy, for example, 
opted for a National Health Service coming along with little competition. 
Medical care is primarily provided by the state or state-owned companies. 
Financing is by general taxation. Germany and France are among those that 
have a social insurance. In Germany providers are private, state-owned, or 
operated by other institutions like the church. There is thus some competi-
tion on the providers' side. The German market for social health insurance 
is competitive. However, competition is subject to numerous rules so that 
this form of competition may well be labelled as 'regulated competition'. 
Finally, the United States is the example of a highly privatized health care 
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1.2. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE HEALTH CARE MARKET 3 
market. The vast majority of providers and health insurers are private com-
panies. Although competition is perhaps most pronounced in the United 
States there is nevertheless a large number of regulatory rules in 'managed 
care'. 
This brief overview demonstrates that there obviously is a fundamental 
trade off between competition and regulation and that there is no unique 
solution to it. In general, the introduction of some 'rules' by a regulator 
will have an impact on competition in the respective market. In most cases, 
competition will be dampened by such rules but it may well be that there 
are some particular measures that foster competition (see, e.g., Chapter 4). 
Economists should ask, and they do, what the reasons for regulation 
are or why the competitive market does not achieve an efficient outcome. 
An obvious starting point is the first theorem of welfare economics. Follow-
ing this fundamental theorem, the equilibrium of an economy is efficient if 
there are markets for all relevant commodities and if all these markets are 
competitive. 1 
Thus, to argue for public policy interventions at least one of the prereq-
uisites of the theorem must be violated. In the following we briefly discuss 
some violations and provide illustrative examples. 
1.2.2 External effects 
When there are external effects a competitive market will, in general, not 
arrive at an efficient outcome since there is usually no market for externali-
ties. The prime example for positive externalities in the health care market 
are vaccinations. Once an individual is immunized through vaccination, he 
or she can no longer communicate the disease and the risk of infection for 
all other individuals is reduced. However, if an individual is about to decide 
whether or not to be immune he or she weighs the individual costs that 
may, for example, arise from the price of the vaccine or the (potential) side 
effects against the individual benefit of immunization. The benefit to other 
individuals is not internalized and this leads to too low immunization rates. 
In the theory of vaccination, which is described in detail in section 1.3, the 
most prominent measures to correct for this market failure are subsidies and 
mandatory vaccination programs. 
Although Breyer et al. (2003, p. 169) argue that positive externalities 
are more relevant for the health care market, there are examples for negative 
externalities. Smoking not only damages the health of the smoker but also 
the health of individuals in the direct neighborhood, i.e., the own family and 
1 For a more formal definition see Gravelle and Rees (1992, p. 490). 
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4 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
colleagues. Moreover, there are some costs associated with smoking related 
fires (Santerre and Neun (1996, p. 246)). As smokers do not internalize 
these negative external effects, they smoke too much or, to put it differently, 
there are too many smokers in the society. As a response, there are usually 
considerable taxes on cigarettes and the like. Especially in the United States 
there are many rules that ban smoking in the work place and in public 
buildings, e.g., administrative offices, restaurants, and bars. 
Besides these 'physical' external effects there may also be 'psychological' 
external effects, e.g. altruism (see Breyer at al. (2003, pp. 170-171)). Con-
sider an individual with no access to medical care that is unresponsively 
in distress. Altruistic people would be willing to help. However, as help 
is a public good, i.e. an individual transfer benefits the entire (altruistic) 
population, and as the associated positive externality is typically not inter-
nalized, the willingness to transfer will be too low. Since a donor is usually 
interested in the consumption (of medical care) of the recipient and not in 
his actual utility this problem is likely to be more severe if transfers cannot 
be given in kind but in cash. Thus, to increase the willingness for redistri-
bution the social planner may have to distort relative prices and give the 
transfers in kind. 
1.2.3 Market transparency and the quality of care 
Another prerequisite of the first theorem of welfare economics is market 
transparency. In particular, patients or customers must be perfectly in-
formed about product quality. Before we address the observability of quality 
in health care markets note that there is no consensus about what quality 
actually is in such markets. Following Donabedian (1980, pp. 79-85) there 
are (at least) three dimensions: the structure, the process, and the outcome 
of care. Actual quality may be some arbitrarily weighted index of these 
dimensions. 
Consider that quality is well defined and measurable. 2 But quality is 
still hardly observable for the patient.3 As production and consumption 
of health care often occur simultaneously (uno actu principle) the patient 
has, prior to consumption, no own information about the product's quality. 
However patients may observe quality after consumption, and medical care 
then is an experience good (Nelson (1970)). However, there are cases where 
even this information cannot be obtained. Consider the case of appendicitis 
2This is one of our central assumptions in Chapters 3 and 4. 
3 In Chapter 3 we will nevertheless assume that quality is observable for the patient. 
This assumption is relaxed in Chapter 4. 
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1.2. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE HEALTH CARE MARKET 5 
and recommended appendix surgery. Once the appendix is removed the 
patient can no longer verify whether the surgery was actually necessary. In 
such cases medical care is a credence good (Darby and Karny (1973)). 4 
Irrespective of whether medical services are credence or experience goods 
there are obvious moral hazard problems. Physicians are, for example, usu-
ally not only the providers of medical care but also act as experts who, 
at least to some extent, determine the amount care of consumed. This 
may result in physician induced demand. How the lack of market trans-
parency may affect the market outcome, e.g., investment incentives and 
product characteristics, will be analyzed in some detail in Section 1.5. Reg-
ulatory measures to address these quality related problems are, for example, 
customer protection rules like (monitored) minimum quality standards or 
licences that are conditional on regular training. Moreover reimbursement 
rules may be designed to give providers the right incentives. In Section 1.4.3 
we will argue that physician induced demand, for instance, may be miti-
gated by proper price regulation. However, as Section 1.4 will demonstrate 
this may be in conflict with other objectives. 
1.2.4 Market transparency and health insurance 
Illness occurs irregularly and its occurrence is unpredictable. Consequently 
the demand for medical care is also irregular and unpredictable (Arrow 
(1963, p. 948)). As individuals are typically risk averse, the nature of the 
demand for medical care creates a demand for health insurance. 
Consider that there is a competitive health insurance market with no 
administrative costs. If insurers have perfect information, especially about 
the risk type of the insured, fair premiums would emerge and buyers will de-
mand full coverage. In such a case, patients are not responsive to the prices 
of the medical care providers. This has two important impacts. First, there 
cannot be any price competition on the providers' side if the insured have 
free choice of provider. Additionally, prices are often regulated. In the ab-
sence of price as a strategic variable, providers will resort to other variables 
to increase market share. These could include, for example, the location 
of a medical practice or its specialization. Under the constraints of the 
previous subsection, there may also be considerable quality competition. 
Second, on the patients' side moral hazard problems arise. These can be 
either the ex ante or ex post type. The consumer's lack of cost consciousness 
(a) means that they refrain from undertaking efficient prevention5 (ex ante 
4For the role of information in the medical care market see also Pauly (1988). 
5 Investments in health like preventive activities are usually unobservable to insurers. 
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6 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
moral hazard) and (b) results in over-consumption, i.e. in inefficient use of 
medical services ( ex post moral hazard). An optimal health insurance con-
tract therefore would, in general, involve some deductibles or co-payments. 
Both moral hazard problems would be mitigated and, in the absence of price 
regulation, there would be some room for price competition. 
Consider that there are two risk types in the society and that the in-
dividuals' information about risk type is private. Then health insurance 
contracts with full coverage at fair premiums would not be incentive com-
patible. The high risk types would imitate the low risk type in order to 
receive the low premium. Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976} have shown that 
there may be a separating equilibrium in the market where the low risks 
receive part coverage at fair premiums and the high risks full coverage at 
fair premiums. This phenomenon is known as adverse selection (see also 
Section 1.6). The asymmetry of information results in a welfare loss. This 
loss may be reduced by introducing a mandatory health insurance with part 
coverage and uniform premiums. 
For equity reasons, insurers may be mandated to offer uniform premi-
ums, i.e. premiums that are not conditional on the risk type (community 
rating), and a standard benefit package. This creates an incentive for in-
surers to select the low risks as they earn profits with them and incur losses 
with high risks. How these cream skimming incentives can be mitigated is 
at the heart of the analysis in Section 1.6. 
1.2.5 Market power 
The first theorem of welfare economics requires perfectly competitive mar-
kets. Once there is market power the theorem no longer applies. First, 
consider the providers of health care. There are several sources of market 
power. In the primary care market, for example, patients are often better 
informed about the quality of their general practitioner (GP) than about 
the quality of competing GPs, if we consider medical services to be experi-
ence goods. This gives the GP some (local) monopoly power lowering his 
incentives to provide high quality. There is thus a trade off between infor-
mation and competition. The same argument applies to the secondary care 
market.6 
Second, there may be market power in the health insurance market. In 
the most extreme case, there is a monopoly like in the United Kingdom 
and Italy where financing is, as already mentioned above, by general taxa-
tion. There are limited incentives to provide quality and to contain costs. 
6 Jn Chapters 3 and 4 we analyze monopolistic competition of health care providers. 
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1.3. COMMUNICABLE DISEASES AND VACCINES 7 
Moreover, responsiveness to consumer preferences will be lacking. But, on 
the other hand, there are no cream skimming incentives and the potential 
welfare losses from adverse selection can be avoided. Again, there is a trade 
off between competition and regulation. 
Third, to fuel technological progress it is, in general, necessary to allow 
the inventing firm to obtain monopoly profits in order to recover R&D 
expenditures. Without patent protection innovation incentives would be 
inefficiently low. Here the trade off is between competition and dynamic 
efficiency. How the technical progress is related to provider reimbursement 
and to the demand for health insurance was demonstrated by Weisbrod 
(1991) in his seminal paper on the "Health Care Quadrilemma". 
1.3 Communicable diseases and vaccines 
1.3.1 The vaccination externality and public policy 
As was already mentioned above, the most important characteristic of the 
vaccine market is the externality that is associated with vaccination. If 
an individual decides to become vaccinated, there are two effects. First, 
the vaccinated individual is immune and can no longer catch the particular 
disease. Second, (with most vaccines) the individual can no longer commu-
nicate the disease. The source of the externality is, of course, the second 
effect. When an individual thinks about immunization he or she weighs the 
individual benefits of immunity against the individual costs. The individ-
ual costs could be, for example, time costs, a disutility from expected side 
effects from the vaccine, or simply the price of the vaccine. The individual 
does not take into account the positive external effect on others that can no 
longer be infected from him or her. This will, in general, result in too low 
immunization rates and call for public health intervention. 
The two most important public policy measures are Pigouvian subsi-
dies and mandatory vaccination programs. However, due to the prevalence 
elasticity of demand, independent of market structure, these measures have 
limited impact on actual demand. Consider the case of Pigouvian subsidies. 
In the first place demand increases as the price is reduced by the subsidy. 
But the increased demand reduces the prevalence of the disease and thereby 
the risk of infection. This, in turn, reduces the benefits of vaccination and 
therefore demand. The prevalence effect also weakens mandatory vaccina-
tion programs. The reduced prevalence of the disease lowers the willingness 
to become vaccinated of those outside the program. This is why disease 
eradication usually cannot be achieved at participation rates below one. 
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8 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
The economic literature on epidemiology, infectious diseases or vacci-
nations is surprisingly young. The first paper that addressed these issues 
was Brito et al. (1991). They set up a static model to address the ap-
propriateness of compulsory vaccination and to derive the optimal public 
policy. A vaccine yielding perfect protection is considered. However, there 
is a disutility from vaccination, e.g., side effects. Given these costs it is not 
surprising that compulsory vaccination is, in general, not optimal. In fact, 
it is shown that the (competitive) laissez-faire outcome always dominates 
the compulsory (regulatory) outcome. Nevertheless, because of the vaccina-
tion externality, the laissez-faire immunization rate is too low. Subsidizing 
those who vaccinate and taxing the susceptible improves the allocation. If 
the marginal utility of income is constant, then the social optimum can be 
achieved. 
The form and optimality of public health interventions crucially depends 
on the assumptions made about agent heterogeneity, market structure and 
dynamics. The most obvious critisism of the Brito et al. (1991) paper is 
its static nature. However, we believe that the externality can be studied 
in a static environment and that the results carry over into a dynamic con-
text. Francis (1997) challenges this view. He shows that the vaccination 
externality disappears when a dynamic framework is considered. But this 
is a knife-edge result as he assumes identical individuals who also behave 
identically. The externality would not disappear if agent heterogeneity, as, 
for example, in Brito et al. (1991), had been considered. And indeed in the 
dynamic model of Geoffard and Philipson (1997) there still is an externality 
as the demand is prevalence elastic. At the focus of their paper is the diffi-
culty private markets have in achieving full immunization, i.e., eradication 
of a disease. As already discussed above, they show that the impact of pub-
lic programs aimed at increasing demand, for example Pigouvian subsidies 
and mandatory vaccination programs, is limited.7 
To summarize, the (individual) willingness to pay for vaccination in-
creases in the prevalence of the disease. Or, more generally, the willingness 
to pay increases in the risk of infection. Another important determinant of 
the willingness to pay is income. Empirical studies have revealed a positive 
income effect (England et al. (2001) and Philipson (1996)). Although these 
studies were at a national level (China and the United States, respectively), 
this relationship also holds in an international context. The developing 
countries are more likely to go without essential immunization and conse-
quently most of the disease burdens of vaccine preventable diseases fall on 
those countries. Some examples will be presented next. 
7 For a literature overview see Philipson (2000). 
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1.3.2 Examples and empirical evidence 
The World Health Organization (WHO) lists a number of vaccine pre-
ventable diseases, e.g., diphtheria, influenza, hepatitis A and B, measles, 
mumps, tetanus, poliomyelitis, rubella, and smallpox.8 
Consider poliomyelitis and the polio eradication initiative. Its existence 
provides clear evidence that, first, private markets fail to eradicate the dis-
ease and, second, that it seems desirable to eradicate polio internationally. 
There are basically two reasons for this: the externality of communicable 
diseases and charity. That infection probabilities are internationally linked 
was recently demonstrated by the outbreak of the Severe Acute Respira-
tory Syndrome (SARS) that originated in China and spread around the 
world, and especially to North America. So it is in 'everybody's' interest to 
contribute financially to the eradication initiative. However, contributions 
are, like vaccination itself, a public good. Private provision therefore comes 
along with underprovision. And indeed, the funding gap of the initiative 
for 2003 to 2005 as of December 2002 was US$ 275 million (WHO (2003, p. 
24)). Nevertheless, polio is close to eradication. 
The only disease that has ever been eradicated is smallpox. At the 33rd 
World Health Assembly on May 8, 1980, smallpox was declared eradicated. 
The prevalence of the disease is thus zero and so, too, was, until recently, 
the willingness to pay for the associated vaccine. But there may be an 
exogenous risk of infection, i.e., a risk independent of the prevalence of the 
disease. For the case of smallpox, this exogenous risk is the likelihood of a 
terrorist attack with the polio virus or laboratory outbreaks (small stocks 
of the virus were allowed to be hold in laboratories for research purposes). 
A positive willingness to pay resulted, leading the United States to buy 209 
million doses of the smallpox vaccine (USA Today, November 26, 2002). The 
threat posed by bio-terrorism was demonstrated by the anthrax attacks in 
2001. In response, the U.S. government bought 100 million Cipro doses 
(USA Today, October 29, 2001). 
Measles is a disease that is far from being eradicated. It is estimated 
that there are annually over 30 million cases (WHO (2001, p. iv)) resulting 
in about 770,000 deaths in 2000. More than 99 percent of the disease bur-
den of measles falls on developing countries (Kremer (2002, p. 71)). This 
is mainly due to the low immunization rates in those countries.9 In <level-
8 See http://www.who.int/vaccines/en/vaccprevdis.shtml. 
9 "Failure to deliver at least one dose of measles vaccine to all infants remains the 
primary reason for high measles morbidity and mortality. Many measles deaths may be 
preventable by utilizing existing immunization services more efficiently. Poor manage-
ment, logistical problems and missed opportunities for immunization are among the main 
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oped countries the vaccines are often free of charge, i.e., they are highly 
subsidized. Germany is one example where, however, vaccination is not 
mandatory. In the United States, where immunization typically is a pre-
requisite for school enrollment, it is mandatory (Brito et al. {1991, p. 70)). 
There is an initiative of the WHO and the United Nations Children's Fund 
(UNICEF) to reduce the mortality rates of measles (WHO (2001)). 
1.3.3 Monopoly power 
Currently monopoly power is a side issue in the vaccine market as the 
patents for most common infectious diseases have expired. However, biotech-
nological progress, together with the current patent policy, where living or-
ganisms can be protected, monopoly power will be of major concern in the 
near future. A vaccine monopolist basically has two incentives. First, he 
aims at keeping the disease alive, since once the disease is eradicated so 
is the monopolist. Second, to increase markups he reduces supply in or-
der to increase the risk of infection and thereby the willingness to pay for 
vaccination (Geoffard and Philipson (1997, p. 222)). 
In Chapter 2 we provide evidence that there already is monopoly power 
and that its importance has increased during the last few years. Here we 
will provide two illustrative examples for cases where currently no vaccine 
is available, namely, anthrax and the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) 
that causes the acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS). 
The terrorist attacks with anthrax in the United States in 2001 not only 
demonstrated that there is a non-prevalence related risk of infection but also 
that there is monopoly power and that monopolists fight for their profits. 
The antibiotic Cipro is the most appropriate anti-anthrax drug and Bayer 
holds the patent. The original price in 2001 was US$ 1. 77 a pill. After 
some threats of re-engineering, especially from Brazil and Canada, Bayer 
finally agreed to sell 100 million pills at US$ 0.95 each (The Associated 
Press, October 24, 2001). Thus there is (or at least there was) a consider-
able markup. Interestingly, there was a lawsuit in 1997. And "[ ... ) Bayer 
persuaded generic drug maker Barr Laboratories to drop a legal challenge 
to Bayer's patent on Cipro by agreeing to pay Barr about US$ 28 million a 
year until the patent expires in 2003" (USA Today, October 29, 2001). 
There was a similar but more pronounced battle about AIDS drugs in 
2001. South Africa, with more than 20 percent infected adults, faces the 
highest AIDS burden worldwide. Drug treatment costs for AIDS in the 
developed world are about US$ 15,000 per year and person. As the gross 
reasons for the underutilization of services [ ... ]" (WHO (2001, p. 4)). 
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domestic product per capita in South Africa is only US$ 6,800 it is not 
surprising that some pressure to cut prices arose. 10 At around US$ 1,000 
the price offered in South Africa by the patent holders of the AIDS drugs was 
already much lower than in the developed countries. However, the Indian 
generic drug maker, Cipla, announced it would break patent protection and 
make an offer of US$ 600. This threat resulted in a drop in prices (New 
York Times, March 8, 2001). 
The UN Accelerating Access Initiative supports differential pricing for 
AIDS drugs. In this context, Roche was more or less forced to increase 
the discount on its AIDS drugs for developing countries to roughly 90 per-
cent of the Swiss price (see Medecins Sans Frontieres (2003)). This ex-
ample demonstrates that, due to the enormous political pressure and the 
threat of re-engineering, firms cannot expect to earn good profits for AIDS 
drugs in the developing world. This will also be true for a future vaccine 
which is expected to be available in 10 to 15 years (Desmond and Greener 
(2003)). 11 Differential pricing improves access to vaccination and is there-
fore, in a static context, socially desirable. But the improved access reduces 
the prevalence of the disease and with it the willingness pay for vaccination 
in the developed world and thus monopoly profits. This may be a reason 
why R&D efforts to make an AIDS vaccine are relatively moderate. 12 
1.3.4 Contribution of the thesis 
Chapter 2 contributes to Brito et al. (1991) and Geoffard and Philipson 
(1997) by considering two important issues. First, we consider agent het-
erogeneity with respect to income. By making individual willingness to pay 
increasing in income we appropriately model this empirical fact. 13 Usually 
agent heterogeneity is introduced, as in Brito et al. (1991), through varying 
disutility of vaccination if at all. There may be indeed some heterogene-
ity in this respect, but it is difficult to observe. As there is clear evidence 
that income has a positive effect on the willingness to pay for vaccination 
(or on the probability of being vaccinated) it seems a natural step to in-
corporate agent heterogeneity through income into the theoretical analysis. 
Moreover, as public policy measures usually affect income, a model tak-
ing income effects into account will approximate the consequences of such 
10The numbers were taken from Reekie (2000). 
11 Desmond and Greener (2003) develop a strategy for how to use a potential HIV 
vaccine and whom to vaccinate. 
12 Philipson and Mechoulan (2003) analyze R&D incentives in the presence of consump-
tion externalities. 
13For empirical studies see England et al. (2001) and Philipson (1996). 
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measures better. 
Second, we concentrate on monopoly power on the supply side. As al-
ready mentioned above, a monopolist has an incentive to, first, keep the 
disease alive and, second, to increase the willingness to pay by cutting sup-
ply. In their dynamic model, Geoffard and Philipson (1997) address the 
first incentive, but, as a consequence of their steady state formulas, do not 
consider the second incentive. Using a static model, we provide the miss-
ing part of the analysis. Additionally, our reduced form approach enables 
us to come up with comparative static results. The amount of vaccines 
offered is, of course, lower than without the externality. Supply falls fur-
ther as the strength of the external effect increases. The willingness to pay 
becomes more responsive to the prevalence of the disease and fosters the 
monopolist's incentive to cut supply. 
In standard monopoly a perfect price discriminating monopolist is so-
cially efficient. We show that this is not necessarily true with this type of 
negative externalities. Selling vaccination to the marginal susceptible con-
sumer not only reduces the price at that margin, but also all other prices 
the monopolist can demand. The reduced prevalence of the disease reduces 
the willingness to pay of all other consumers. If the external effect is suffi-
ciently strong, there will not be an efficient allocation in the market, which 
for our model means that full immunization is not achieved. This result is 
new. It demonstrates that differential pricing may not be sufficient to guar-
antee access to vaccines for the developing world. Thus, although the UN 
accelerating access initiative supports differential pricing, it may not be suf-
ficient for disease eradication. Additional measures, for example, organized 
vaccination programs that reduce distributional costs, may be necessary. 
We also analyze the two most standard public health interventions, 
namely Pigouvian subsidies and mandatory vaccination programs. As al-
ready mentioned above, both these policies are limited in their impact since 
the prev-alence elasticity of demand counters the respective positive effects 
of these measures. For the subsidies things may be even worse. Consider 
that the subsidy has to be financed by taxation, then the positive price 
effect of the subsidy is opposed by two negative effects, the prevalence ef-
fect and the income effect. If the latter is sufficiently large, the market 
brings about a lower immunization rate than without the subsidy. However, 
in such cases--although counter intuitive-taxes would be the optimal re-
sponse. Nevertheless, this result strengthens Philipson's (2000) argument 
which states that "Pigouvian subsidies traditionally seen as resolving the 
under-provision problem of vaccines can be short-run, or out of steady state, 
arguments" (p. 1777), since these may fail even in static settings. If income 
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is observable to the social planner, then mandatory vaccination programs 
can be much more effective than usual. With the poor covered in such 
a program and the rich served by the monopolist, full immunization can 
be achieved at participation rates that are strictly below one. This result 
is also new and it offers an efficiency based rationale for the vaccination 
programs usually supported by the United Nations, the Worldbank, or the 
World Health Organization. 
1.4 Provider payment and incentives 
Following the seminal paper of Arrow (1963), uncertainty is one of the major 
characteristics of the market for medical care. For individuals, illness is not 
a predictable occurance, it is a random deviation from the natural cause of 
events. With risk averse consumers this uncertainty constitutes a demand 
for health insurance. 
Consider the case of full coverage, when the patient is not responsive 
to prices at all. He or she simply chooses the 'best' provider using all 
information available. The insurer is, as the third party payer, obliged to 
pay the provider's bill. In such a framework there is not much room for 
price competition. 1.4 Let us assume that health insurers are perfect agents 
for their members. 15 Moreover it seems reasonable to assume that insurers 
can offer contracts to providers as the market power of insurers compared 
to that of providers is usually much greater. There are simply far fewer 
insurers than providers. Then, as perfect agents for their members, insurers 
will offer optimal contracts. Thereby providers should be induced to make 
treatment decisions that are efficient from the patients' perspective. 
Some price competition could be easily introduced by making consumers 
responsive to prices, e.g., by demanding proportional co-payments. Asar-
gued above (see Section 1.2), the optimal health insurance contract will, in 
general, involve a deductible in order to mitigate moral hazard problems. 
Third party payments will nevertheless remain significant and so will the 
insurers' objective of giving the right incentives. 
14 Health insurers may introduce some aspects of price competition by selective con-
tracting. However, selective contracting may be forbidden as it can be used as a cream 
skimming device (see Section 1.6 and Chapter 5). 
15With a competitive health insurance market, firms are induced to be responsive to 
consumer preferences. 
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1 .4.1 A general payment formula 
As provider incentives crucially depend on the reimbursement scheme it 
is convenient for the analysis to consider the following general payment 
function, 
P = F+ pN + f3T+-yC. 
The overall amount the provider receives is denoted by P. F is simply a 
transfer. N denotes the number of treated patients and, thus, p is a flat 
rate per case. For a single treatment the amount f3 is paid. This fee-for-
service is paid for the total number of treatments performed T. Finally, the 
provider may be reimbursed for the share 'Y E [O, 1] of total costs C. Of 
course, both the flat rate and the fee-for-service imply some cost sharing. 
But as incentives differ substantially we treat these cases separately.16 
1.4.2 Cost sharing 
The question of whether providers should bear at least some of their costs 
received most attention in the literature on optimal provider payment. In 
the following two arguments are presented where optimal reimbursement 
involves cost sharing between providers and insurers, namely, cost reduction 
or cost containment objectives and selection incentives. 
1.4.2.1 Cost containment 
For this section we consider that the number of patients to be treated by 
a single provider is fixed, N = N. Then a flat rate per case is simply a 
transfer. This is why we can set p = 0 without loss of generality. As the 
focus is on cost reduction incentives, we also set /3 = 0. Thus the provider 
receives P = F + -yC. 17 
The provider has strong incentives to reduce treatment costs when 'Y = 0. 
The provider is the residual claimant and thus cost reduction incentives are 
high powered. There are low powered incentives to contain costs when the 
health insurer bears the entire costs of treatment, 'Y = 1 (Laffont and Tirole 
(1993, p. 6)). The optimal reimbursement contract now depends on the 
specific environment. 
16 Although Section 1.4.4 is most relevant for the thesis, we provide Sections 1.4.2 and 
1.4.3 in order to better motivate price regulation in the health care market. Even if there 
are no gains of price regulation in the models considered in Section 1.4.4, the price may 
nevertheless be regulated for one of the reasons mentioned in Sections 1.4.2 and 1.4.3. 
17The arguments presented here can be found in Breyer et al. (2003, pp. 353-368) and, 
in a more general context, in Laffont and Tirole (1993, Chapter 1). 
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Consider a risk neutral provider and a risk neutral insurer. By exerting 
costly effort the provider can reduce costs. Like in Breyer et al. (2003) let us 
assume that actual costs are random. This ensures that the insurer cannot 
infer the effort level from observable cost figures. The cost function and the 
distribution of noise are common knowledge. At the first-best effort level, 
the marginal disutility of effort equals marginal cost savings. The first-best 
could easily be implemented if effort were contractible. However, this is 
likely to be infeasible. The first-best may nevertheless be implemented. 
Optimal reimbursement then involves 1 = 0 and a transfer F that guaran-
tees participation of the provider. Thus, given risk neutrality, making the 
provider the residual claimant induces efficiency. 
This result relies on the assumption of risk neutrality and it no longer 
holds when providers are risk averse. If the provider were responsible for all 
costs the insurer would have to pay a large transfer in order to compensate 
the provider for bearing the entire risk, i.e., the insurer would have to pay 
a large risk premium to guarantee participation. In general, it pays for the 
insurer to distort cost reduction incentives and bear a fraction of actual 
costs. The inefficiency in effort is outweighed by the reduced risk premium. 
The optimal (second-best) reimbursement system with risk aversion thus 
involves cost sharing, i.e., 1 E (0, 1) (Breyer et al. (2003, pp. 359-362)). 
A similar result obtains when there is asymmetric information about 
costs. Consider that there are firms of different efficiency in the market. 
Efficiency is private information of the firm. The insurer only knows the 
distribution of the efficiency parameter. 18 For the health care market, ef-
ficiency may be reinterpreted as the 'case-mix' at a provider (Breyer et al. 
(2003, p. 365)). If a provider has to treat mostly high severity patients 
then average treatment is more costly than if mostly low severity patients 
were to be treated. It seems reasonable to assume that providers are better 
informed about the case-mix than the insurer. If there is no cost sharing, 
i.e. providers only receive a capitation payment F and 1 = 0, the first-best 
effort level can be implemented by giving the most inefficient type his reser-
vation utility. 19 As efficient providers can always mimic the most inefficient 
one, they receive a (large) informational rent. For the insurer, it pays to dis-
tort cost reduction incentives for the inefficient types by introducing some 
cost sharing. The optimal trade off between inefficiency in cost reduction 
effort and reduced informational rents yields the optimal contract. 
18In such a situation one has to deal with an adverse selection problem (efficiency 
types) and a moral hazard problem (cost reduction effort). 
19It is assumed that it pays to contract with all efficiency types. 
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1.4.2.2 Selection incentives 
Consider that the patients now differ in treatment costs as well as in the 
benefits of treatment. From a social planner's perspective, a particular pa-
tient should be treated if the social benefits of treatment exceed the social 
costs. 20 It seems reasonable to assume that providers can observe the ben-
efits of treatment and that the insurer cannot. Consider that the provider 
receives a flat rate per patient and a transfer, P = F + pN. As the treat-
ment costs of patients differ substantially, the provider has an incentive to 
reject patients with high costs. 21 
If treatment costs were observable to the insurer, the fee could be ad-
justed to costs and efficient treatment decisions could be induced. However, 
it seems at bit unrealistic to assume that insurers are fully informed about 
actual treatment costs. Substantial selection incentives will remain. These 
can be mitigated if insurers bear some of the actual treatment costs.22 For 
a formal derivation of this result see Breyer et al. (2003, pp. 365-368). 
Ma (1994) combines cost reduction efforts and the incentives to provide 
quality. When providers are able to reject patients, the optimal contract 
implementing the first-best effort is a mixture of prospective payment and 
cost reimbursement. Ellis (1998) does not analyze cost reduction efforts but 
adds monopolistic competition to the selection story. 
1.4.3 Demand inducement 
In Section 1.2.3 we already discussed the problems that arise when the 
quality of care is not observable or when it is ex post not possible to judge 
whether a treatment was actually necessary. Considering credence goods, 
Emons ( 1997) showed that, in the case of idle capacity, the provider will start 
to treat too much as long as the mark-up for treatments is positive. Consider 
that 1 = 0 then physician induced demand (PID) can only obtain when the 
fee-for-service f3 exceeds marginal costs (of treatment and effort). If /3 is 
below marginal costs, there is cost sharing and cost reduction incentives 
20 In this subsection we mostly follow Breyer et al. (2003, pp. 376-385) since they 
concentrate on selection incentives only. There is, of course, a more general literature 
beyond that, e.g., Ma (1994) and Ellis (1998). See the brief discussion below. 
21 This compares to the cream skimming incentives in sickness fund competition when 
there is community rating (see Section 1.6.2.2). 
22 Again, there is an analogue in sickness fund competition: the selection incentives 
stemming from community rating may be mitigated with a risk adjustment mechanism. 
As these are usually highly incomplete substantial selection incentives remain (see Section 
1.6.4). Cost sharing with the central sponsor may improve the market outcome. 
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arise. This could result in another from of inducement: the provider may 
induce the patient not to choose treatment, i.e., there may be rationing. 
There is a large debate about whether PIO is a serious problem for 
health care markets. This not only demonstrates that fee-for-service reim-
bursement is widely used but also that the fee seems to be sufficiently large 
and thus makes demand inducement profitable. For an overview on PIO 
and, especially, on the empirical literature testing for PIO, see McGuire 
(2000, Section 5). 
1.4.4 Non-price competition 
When prices are regulated, providers will resort to other variables to increase 
market share. Obvious dimensions are the quality of care and practice or 
hospital location. The provider's specialization is also likely to be affected by 
strategic concerns. Location and specialization refer to horizontal product 
differentiation. The health care market is thus characterized by monopolis-
tic competition. This is most easily analyzed in a Hotelling (1929) or Salop 
(1979) type model. Adding a vertical dimension, i.e. the quality of care, is 
straightforward (see, for example, Neven and Thisse (1990)). 
The Hotelling as well as the Salop model have some common peculiarities 
that require some discussion. First, there is unit demand, that is, each 
single buyer buys at most one unit of the good. There is no uncertainty 
what makes (health) insurance redundant. Moreover, there is no difference 
between capitation payment and fee-for-service reimbursement so that PIO 
plays no role. Second, there are typically exogenous constant marginal costs 
of production. We can therefore abstract from the moral hazard problem in 
cost reduction discussed above. Third, to providers, patients are typically 
identical. In fact they differ in the horizontal dimension, but the costs 
arising from a potential mismatch is usually entirely borne by consumers. 
Thus, there are no selection incentives.23 Fourth, in the circular model of 
Salop (1979) analyzing entry is straightforward. 
These nice features of the models enable us to concentrate on non-price 
competition and its (potentially) associated inefliciencies.24 Horizontal and 
vertical differentiation are usually analyzed in a sequential game where loca-
tion choices precede quality decisions. The interaction between quality and 
location choices has been investigated by Economides (1989) under price 
23One exception is Calem and Rizzo (1995) who consider that providers have to bear 
some costs of the mismatch. However, they do not address selection incentives. 
24 Of course, these features may also be viewed as a disadvantage as important di-
mensions of the health care market are neglected. However, a joint analysis is simply 
untractable. 
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competition and Brekke et al. (2002) under price regulation. A general 
result is that quality competition can be softened by locating further apart. 
Brekke et al. (2002) show that price regulation can be beneficial. The idea 
of price regulation can already be found in Ma and Burgess (1993). How-
ever, they only consider vertical product differentiation and take locations as 
exogenously given. Nevertheless, price regulation may reduce inefficiencies 
in quality. 
In models combining horizontal and vertical product differentiation like, 
for example, Gravelle (1999), Brekke et al. (2002), Chapter 3, and Chapter 
4, the optimal (uniform) price will not result in efficiency. An increase 
in price will tighten quality competition as the marginal patient becomes 
more valuable. To dampen costly competition, providers aim at making 
their products less substitutable, i.e. they locate further apart or they 
differentiate more. The second-best price is characterized by the optimal 
trade off between the net benefits derived from quality provision and the 
mismatch costs arising from horizontal product differentiation. In Chapter 
3 a circular model is applied. As a symmetric equilibrium is assumed, 
location is of minor importance. Instead the focus is on entry. The second-
best price is then characterized by the optimal trade off between quality 
and the number of firms, i.e., physician density. 25 
1.4.5 Reimbursement and incentives in practice 
There is some international variation in reimbursement rules. Hospital pay-
ment is nevertheless mostly prospective giving strong cost reduction incen-
tives to providers. One exception is Portugal where costs are mostly re-
imbursed. If providers receive a uniform prospective payment per patient, 
i.e. a flat rate per case, selection incentives may arise when patients differ 
in treatment costs. As argued above, cost sharing would then be an ap-
propriate response to mitigate risk selection. This, in principle, means that 
payments must be increasing in the severity of illness or in the costs of treat-
ment. One widely used approach are Diagnosis Related Groups (DRGs), 
where payment is contingent on diagnosis. To a different extent DRGs are 
applied, for example, in Sweden, Australia, the United States and, from 
2004 onwards, in Germany. A DRG payment system clearly reduces selec-
tion incentives but may induce manipulation of diagnoses. 
25 The analysis of location and quality in a Hotelling (1929) duopoly model and the 
analysis of entry and quality in a Salop (1979) model are very similar. Cl06e locations in 
the Hotelling model obtain when quality competition is relatively soft. Then there would 
be many firms in the Salop framework and consequently firms will be closely located. 
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In Denmark, Portugal, Sweden, Spain, and Italy, physicians are widely 
paid a salary. Physicians are thus not exposed to any financial risk. Another 
dominant form of reimbursement is fee-for-service. Although there may be 
incentives to induce demand, Belgium, Austria, Switzerland, and Germany 
opted for such a system. The German case provides some evidence for 
demand inducement. There is not only a fee-for-service but also a global 
budget since 1993, i.e., a relative value system is applied. Every service is 
scored with a certain number of points. The monetary value of one point is 
endogenous. It is determined by dividing the budget by the total number 
of points submitted for reimbursement by all physicians. Consequently the 
global budget is always met. The monetary value of one point dropped 
continuously while the number of services performed increased rapidly. This 
observation is well in line with the so called 'target income hypothesis' and 
PID.26 
It is tempting to compare national health care expenditures and identify 
the impact of the reimbursement system on aggregate expenditure. How-
ever, it is well known from the empirical literature on international health 
care expenditure comparisons (see, for example, Barros (1998)) that in-
stitutional details, including reimbursement systems, have no significant 
explanatory power. 
To assess the impact of reimbursement rules on expenditure ( or on 
provider behavior) one has to rely on natural experiments, like the German 
one mentioned above. Pauly (2000, pp. 556-557) reports some empirical ob-
servations. The switch of Medicare, the health insurer for the elderly in the 
United States, from cost reimbursement to fixed prices for hospitals in the 
mid-1980s resulted in lower growth rates of costs and in a reduced average 
length of stay. Hillman et al. (1989) found that capitation and salary leads 
to lower supply than under fee-for-service. Pauly (2000, p. 557) concludes 
that the incentive effects in the hospital sector are largely as expected but 
that results for physicians are more ambiguous. 27 
1.4.6 Contribution of the thesis 
Due to the peculiarities of the health care market, markets are typically 
highly regulated. This mostly includes some degree of price regulation. We 
discussed some objectives of price regulation above. Provider reimburse-
ment may, for example, be designed such that providers have proper cost 
reduction incentives. This generally requires some amount of cost sharing. 
26 In Chapter 3 we provide an alternative explanation for this phenomenon. 
27For an overview on health care utilization studies see also Glied {2000, pp. 731-739). 
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To prevent providers from favorable risk selection, reimbursement should 
be risk adjusted. Moreover, demand inducement can be mitigated by not 
rewarding the amount of treatments performed or invoiced. Although the 
scope of price regulation is quite different in the scenarios mentioned, there 
is one thing they have in common: the price is not under the control of the 
provider, i.e., there is no price competition. 
When there is no possibility of competing in prices, providers will resort 
to other variables to increase profits. In Section 1.4.4 we already argued 
that quality and location are obvious strategic variables. When a patient 
does not have to pay for treatment, the decision about which provider to 
consult will be based on other characteristics. If the patient can observe the 
quality of treatment, which is what we will assume in Chapter 3, providers 
have incentives to invest in quality. This quality may be interpreted as 
medical machinery since good equipment will typically be positively related 
to treatment quality. But quality also includes non treatment related cate-
gories such as catering quality or the size of hospital rooms. Consider that 
patients are indifferent after they have evaluated quality. Then a particular 
patient would approach the provider which is closest. Thus patients are not 
only responsive to quality but also to location. 
The effect of price regulation is analyzed in a 3-stage game of complete 
information where the providers of medical care have the following choices: 
entry, location and quality. The sequential structure is motivated by the 
different degree of irreversibility in strategic decisions (see Chapter 3 for a 
detailed discussion). As entry is analyzed, it is convenient to use the circular 
model of Salop (1979). In the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium the quality 
of care increases in price. With an increase in price the marginal patient 
becomes more valuable thus stimulating quality investments. However, to 
escape costly quality competition firms will locate as far apart as possible. 
In a circular model this basically means that providers will be arranged 
symmetrically around the circle. Taking symmetry as given, the increase 
in price feeds back to the entry stage. As quality competition is intensified 
there will be fewer entrants. Note, that the equilibrium distance of firms 
increases and that quality competition relaxes accordingly. 
We then analyze price regulation. And, as in most sequential games, the 
regulator's ability to commit to price policies is crucial for the outcome of 
the game. We consider two cases. First, we allow for perfect commitment. 
The regulator will set the second-best price and the market will end up with 
excess entry and too much quality. Second, partial commitment is consid-
ered. The regulator now sets the price after entry and location decisions 
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have been made, but prior to quality decisions. 28 Then excess entry would 
occur and total quality provision would be efficient. As social welfare is 
higher in the commitment case, the regulator would like to bind herself to 
the second-best policy. 
It is not possible to implement the first-best outcome, since there are 
two regulation goals (to induce the efficient number of firms and efficient 
quality of care} and only one regulatory variable (price). So the regulator 
might think of obtaining another instrument. In Section 3.5.2 we derive a 
number of policies that would yield efficiency. Licence fees are probably the 
most obvious instrument. The price could be used to induce efficient quality 
and the fee could be set such that the efficient entry occurs. Another option 
is to allow for more competition. If providers are also allowed to compete 
in prices, and if price and quality decisions are simultaneous, then the time 
consistent regulatory outcome would result. Thus, price competition does 
not mitigate the inefficiencies. Note, that this result may also be phrased 
differently: if the regulator has full commitment power, then restricting 
competition by regulating prices is socially beneficial. 
The chapter contributes to the literature on horizontal and/or vertical 
product differentiation, e.g., D'Aspremont et al. (1979), Novshek (1980), 
Salop (1979), Gabszewicz and Thisse (1980), and Neveu and Thisse (1990), 
by considering price regulation. In contrast, Ma and Burgess (1993) allow 
for price regulation. As they consider fixed locations, they cannot analyze 
the relationship between quality and location. Chapter 3 is closely related 
to Economides (1993) and Gravelle (1999). Both consider the same strate-
gic variables and the same sequential structure as we do. In their models, 
location choices have no effect on quality provision thus precluding (non-
price) competition in the presence of price regulation. Economides (1993) 
focuses on different sequential structures and their impact on equilibria. In 
contrast to Chapter 3, Economides (1993) does not consider price regula-
tion. Our model builds on both Economides (1993) and Gravelle (1999) in 
order to consider the important effects of location choice on quality choice, 
thereby capturing non-price competition in the health care market. In ad-
dition, we explicitly consider, as these and the other papers mentioned do 
not, problems of time consistency. With regard to Gravelle (1999), who 
applies a similar model to the health care market, Chapter 3 contributes to 
the understanding of the relationship between the second-best optimum, the 
28In Chapter 3 this variant of the model is labelled 'time consistent regulation'. This 
is justified as the regulator has no incentive to change the price after quality decisions 
have been made. Since there is no shadow price of public funds the regulator is ex post 
indifferent between all prices. 
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time consistent regulatory outcome and the equilibrium with price compe-
tition. Moreover, adding two more aspects to the Gravelle (1999) analysis, 
we explicitly derive a number of first-best efficient regulatory schemes and 
provide some empirical evidence. 
1.5 Market transparency and gatekeeping 
1.5.1 Credence goods and experience goods 
Consider the German public health insurance system. In a recent report to 
the federal ministry of health the so-called concerted action committee in 
health care (Sachverstandigenrat fiir die Konzertierte Aktion im Gesund-
heitswesen, SVRKAiG) found simultaneous occurrance of underprovision, 
overprovision, and inappropriate provision of health care (see SVRKAiG 
(2002)). If an individual suffers from a bad back, for example, which is 
a national disease in Germany, it is likely that there are taken too many 
x-ray images (overprovision). At the same time too little preventive care 
offered to avoid back problems (underprovision). Inappropriate provision 
is the rule rather than the exception. There may be inappropriate refer-
rals by general practitioners to specialists or hospitals (including no referral 
in cases where a referral would have been efficient). The prescription of 
drugs and aid is highly inappropriate. The current reimbursement rules for 
pharmacists involve a payment that is proportional to product prices giving 
clear incentives to recommend expensive drugs.29 
The quality of care could be improved by mitigating the under-, over-, 
and inappropriate provision problem. However, providers' incentives to im-
prove quality are limited as it is usually difficult for the patients to judge 
about the quality of care or, more general, about their valuation of medical 
care prior to consumption. As was already motivated in Section 1.2.3 pa-
tients may learn their valuation through consumption. Then medical care 
is an experience good (Nelson (1970)). However, it may well be that this is 
impossible even after consumption. In this case medical care is a credence 
good (Darby and Karny (1973)). To better understand market forces and 
incentives a formal analysis is required. 
In the simple example of Tirole (1988, p. 107) the market breaks down 
when there is a credence good monopolist.30 When there is a monopoly 
29The current health care reform plans include a switch from this type of payment to 
fiat rates per prescription. 
30 Emons (1997) studies a credence good market and allows for entry and price compe-
tition. There are two services, diagnosis and repair (or treatment). In cases where excess 
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supplier of an experience good and a one-shot relationship the market also 
breaks down unless there are some a priori informed consumers (Tirole 
(1988, pp. 107-108)). For the case of health care these informed patients 
could be, for example, the chronically ill. As they are responsive to quality, 
incentives to invest in quality are created.31 Higher quality benefits both 
the informed consumers and the uninformed ones. In Tirole's example, 
more information is always better as it favors efficiency. A social planner 
should thus increase information in the market, e.g., by allowing for con-
sumer reports. However, the impact of consumer reports in the health care 
market may be limited since individual quality may well differ for two pa-
tients even though they received the same treatments and suffered from the 
same disease. 32 Thus, the value of the own experience exceeds the value 
of the experience made by somebody else. Moreover the physician-patient 
relationship is an important component of the quality of care or, at least, 
in the perception of it (Breyer et al. (2003, p. 175)). 
With frequent diseases like, for example, infections, there are poten-
tially repeat purchases. The likelihood of a repeated office visit by a patient 
is higher the higher the quality learned from the initial treatment. This 
gives providers an incentive to provide high quality. To secure future de-
mand, building up a reputation pays. How well these reputation mecha-
nisms actually work depends on the accuracy of quality signals. Zweifel and 
Breyer (1997) state that "Frequently, the quality of medical service can-
not be judged correctly even after utilization, since the causality between 
treatment and change of health status may be blurred by other biological 
processes, such as the self-healing powers of the body" (p. 134) pointing to 
the considerable noise of these signals. Arrow (1963) is even more sceptical 
and states "Recovery from disease is as unpredictable as is its incidence" 
(p. 951). 
The empirical evidence from Germany suggests that reputation mech-
anisms seem to be too weak to induce proper quality provision. Thus, all 
measures ensuring a certain minimum quality level would be desirable. En-
try regulation and educational requirements are such measures. Strength-
ening liability rules (malpractice suits) for providers or the introduction of 
disease management programs may also help. As is clear from Section 1.4.4, 
price regulation may also be beneficial. 
entry occurs the specialists (or physicians) have idle capacity and start treating too much 
and induce demand. 
31The same mechanism is at work in Chapter 4 where the impact of gatekeeping general 
practitioners on specialist competition is analyzed. 
32In their empirical study, Dranove et al. (2003) showed that report cards worsen 
health outcomes. 
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1.5.2 Market transparency and product differentiation 
In Section 1.4.4 above we argued that, in the light of price regulation, 
providers of medical care will shift competition to other strategic variables. 
Basically, providers have two variables at their disposals, the quality of care 
and specialization (or location). From the preceding subsection it is clear 
that informational asymmetries will affect quality competition and, in gen-
eral, quality competition will be weaker than under complete information. 
Here we will briefly describe the potential impacts of imperfect information 
about the vertical dimension on the horizontal dimension of product dif-
ferentiation or on the number of varieties in the market. In Section 1.4.4 
we already motivated that horizontal product differentiation is most con-
veniently analyzed in a spatial model like the ones of the Salop (1979) or 
Hotelling (1929) type. 
First, consider the circular model of Salop. Riordan (1986) considers 
experience goods, i.e., consumers learn the quality through consumption. 
Higher quality thus induces more repeat purchases. The consumers' respon-
siveness to quality is nevertheless lower than under complete information 
resulting in less than optimal quality provision. As quality is costly, profits 
of firms are higher than in the perfect information case. With free entry 
the higher attractiveness of the market leads to more entrants, i.e., there 
are more varieties in the market than under perfect information. In the 
alternative location interpretation the equivalent result would be a higher 
physician density in the incomplete information case.33 
In the standard Hotelling (1929) model there are two forces at work. 
The market capturing effect is the centripetal force in the market pushing 
the firms close together. As products then are close substitutes, (price) 
competition is intense. To relax competition firms locate apart from one 
another. This is the centrifugal force in the market.34 D'Aspremont et al. 
(1979) have shown that the centrifugal force outweighs the centripetal force 
resulting in maximum product differentiation. Bester (1998) demonstrated 
that this might not hold when there is uncertainty about product quality. 
Like Riordan (1986), he considers an experience good and repeat purchases. 
As high prices signal high quality, prices become rigid relaxing price com-
petition. This reduces incentives for product differentiation and may result 
in 'minimum differentiation'. 
In Bester (1998), more information increases differentiation incentives. 
33 Wolinsky (1984) considers imperfect information about product variety and obtains 
ambiguous results, i.e., there may be too little or too many varieties in the market. 
34 This mechanism persists when prices are regulated and fimrs are engaged in quality 
competition (see, for example, Brekke et al. (2002)). 
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This is the other way round in Schultz (2002). There are, like in Chapter 4 
below, informed and uninformed consumers. An increase in market trans-
parency, i.e. an increase in the share of informed consumers, then leads 
to less product differentiation. However, as firms locate outside the unit 
interval in any case, there always is 'maximum differentiation'. 
Although this brief overview revealed ambiguous effects of information 
on product differentiation it nicely demonstrated that uncertainty along 
one dimension, in general, feeds back into other dimensions of competition. 
The lack of information and its impact on provider competition is carefully 
modelled in Chapter 4 below. 
1.5.3 The key position of gatekeepers in health care 
In his article for the Handbook of Health Economics, Scott (2000) addresses 
the 'Economics of general practice'. He. analyzes the general practitioner 
(GP) - patient relationship, the utilization of GP services, and GP behavior 
in general. Although all these issues are important, we neglect them as the 
gatekeeping GPs in Chapter 4 are assumed to be 'machines' acting perfectly 
on behalf of their patients. 
Scott (2000, p. 1177) mentions three positive effects that are attributed 
to gatekeeping. First, gatekeeping is said to reduce health care costs by 
reducing unnecessary treatments. Second, the secondary care sector is used 
more efficiently as the patients more appropriately treated by a GP are 
screened out. Third, GPs have better information about the quality pro-
vided in the secondary care sector. They can simply aggregate the experi-
ences over the patients referred. Better matches will result, increasing the 
efficiency of care. 
For the reasons mentioned, many countries have given general practition-
ers a central role in the health care system. In the National Health Service 
(NHS) in the United Kingdom, for example, people have to enroll with a 
GP. If they need specialist treatment or hospital care, they need a referral 
from their GP. There is thus no direct access to secondary or hospital care.35 
In the United States there are two public programs (Medicare for the elderly 
and Medicaid for the poor), the private health insurance market, and there 
is Managed Care. The most important form of Managed Care is the Health 
Maintenance Organization (HMO). HMOs have (few) contracted providers. 
Patients have to give up free choice of provider upon enrollment, i.e., they 
can only consult contracted providers. In several HMOs, free choice is fur-
35 For a brief overview on the NHS see Schulenburg and Greiner (2000, pp. 195-207). A 
detailed treatment is provided in European Observatory on Health Care Systems (1999). 
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ther restricted by gatekeeping.36 Finally, the Scandinavian countries have 
gatekeepers and there are some aspects of gatekeeping in the current health 
care reform proposal in Germany. 
The widespread enthusiasm for gatekeeping is a bit surprising as evi-
dence for the positive effects is lacking. International comparisons of aggre-
gate health care spending, for example, usually find no significant impact 
of institutional variables, including gatekeeping, raising doubts whether the 
first effect is actually important (see, e.g., Barros (1998)). 37 With the cur-
rent health care reform proposal, German sickness funds will be obliged to 
offer 'gatekeeper programs'. If a customer enrolls in such a program the 
insurer is allowed to offer a premium reduction. This natural experiment 
may provide some evidence in favor of gatekeeping if premium reductions 
occur. 
1.5.4 Contribution of the thesis 
Taking the third positive effect of gatekeeping literally the problems asso-
ciated with experience goods can be mitigated by giving GPs a gatekeeper 
role in the health care system. Putting it to the extreme, what we will do 
in Chapter 4, GPs are perfectly informed about the secondary care market. 
If one abstracts from agency problems and assumes that GPs truthfully 
convey their information, a patient can make informed choices once a GP 
is consulted. 
The conventional wisdom is that more information is better since con-
sumers can then make informed choices and end up in better matches. But 
this argument neglects the potential competitive effects. In Chapter 4 we 
fill that gap. 38 We consider a Hotelling (1929) model with two providers of 
specialist care. The vertical product characteristic is, like in Chapter 3, qual-
ity. The horizontal dimension now is the specialization of providers. There 
arc informed patients and uninformed patients in the market. Informed 
patients can observe their own disease and the quality and specialization 
of providers, i.e., they have complete information. Uninformed consumers 
cannot observe specialization and quality and are, additionally, unaware of 
their own disease. They only know that specialist treatment is required and 
36 For more information on Managed Care see Glied (2000). 
37 Glied (2000, pp. 740-743) summarizes some studies about managed care and cost 
growth and finds no unambiguous results. As gatekeeping is most widely applied in 
managed care there seems to be no clear impact of gatekeeping. 
38 For an oligopolistic market for experience goods, Kriihmer (2003) has shown that 
the value of information may be negative as the nature of competition is affected by the 
amount of information available. 
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therefore pick a secondary care provider randomly. 
We consider two versions of the basic model. In both versions we con-
sider that consumers have complete information once a gatekeeping GP is 
consulted. In the first part (Section 4.3) we consider the share of informed 
individuals to be exogenously given. In the second part (Section 4.4) we 
endogenize this share by modelling the decision to consult a gatekeeping 
GP. 
When the share of informed patients is exogenously given (this may, for 
example be the chronically ill who have obtained all relevant information 
through repeated consumption), the regulator can only demand compulsory 
gatekeeping, i.e., all patients have to consult a GP before accessing the 
secondary care market (strict gatekeeping). We refer to this variant of 
the model as 'direct gatekeeping'. Consider that the regulator imposes a 
strict gatekeeping regime, then the increased information in the market 
increases the responsiveness of consumers to investments in the quality of 
care. Quality competition thus intensifies. As already discussed in Sections 
1.4.4, 1.4.6, and 1.5.3, providers will try to escape costly quality competition 
by making their products less substitutable. In the framework considered 
in Chapter 4, this means that specialization in the market increases. If 
the mismatch costs to patients associated with specialization are relatively 
small, the quality of care is an important determinant of demand. Quality 
competition is then tight and thus very costly. Excessive specialization may 
result so that mismatch costs are higher with informed patients than when 
some patients are uninformed. So gatekeeping does not necessarily improve 
the matching of patients with providers. In these cases gatekeeping may 
be socially detrimental if the improved quality does not outweigh worsened 
matching. This result was not previously known and it holds even though 
gatekeeping is considered to be costless. We demonstrate that the negative 
effects of gatekeeping can be mitigated by proper price regulation. The 
increased quality competition induced by more information can be offset by 
cutting the price accordingly. As quality remains unchanged, there are no 
relocation tendencies. Matching improves and so does social welfare. Thus, 
with proper price regulation, imposing a strict gatekeeping regime is always 
socially desirable. 
In the second version of the model we endogenize the decision to consult a 
gatekeeping general practitioner. A patient consults a GP if the individual 
costs of a GP visit are at most as large as the (expected) benefits. The 
costs may simply be time costs. The benefit is the utility derived from an 
expected better match. The sequence of events is as follows: the regulator 
sets price, the providers choose specializations and then quality, the patients 
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decide whether to consult a GP, and, finally, the patients demand secondary 
care. As above, an increase in price fosters quality competition. To soften 
that competition, specialization increases. If specialization is already above 
the efficient degree, expected mismatch costs for the uninformed patients 
increase. Consequently more patients will go to a GP. The market becomes 
more competitive, resulting in higher quality and more specialization. An 
increase in price thus has a twofold impact. 
As the amount of gatekeeping in equilibrium can be influenced by price 
regulation, we refer to this variant of the model as 'indirect gatekeeping'. 
The welfare results are similar to those of the direct gatekeeping scenario 
and so is the intuition. If the parameters of the model are such that in-
formation has only little impact on the strategic variables, price regulation 
that yields strict gatekeeping is always socially desirable. But when the 
competitive effects are strong, the price optimally trades off three dimen-
sions: specialization, quality, and GP consultation. Not surprisingly, this 
will, in general, not result in efficiency as there are three regulation goals 
and only one regulatory variable. Strict gatekeeping is not optimal. As 
gatekeeping now involves a cost it may be not very surprising that strict 
gatekeeping can be socially detrimental. Nevertheless, this insight is new. 
In Chapter 4 we use a Hotelling {1929) model and combine horizontal 
with vertical product differentiation. In Chapter 3 we did the same for the 
Salop {1979) model. Since the models have many similarities, Chapter 4 
is related to the same set of papers as Chapter 3, e.g., D'Aspremont et al. 
{1979), Novshek {1980), Gabszewicz and Thisse {1980), Economides {1989), 
and Neven and Thisse {1990) and Economides {1993). None of these papers 
considered price regulation, imperfect information or gatekeeping. Gravelle 
{1999) also considers price regulation but not gatekeeping. Bester {1998) in-
troduces uncertainty about quality to the Hotelling {1929) model and shows 
that this may result in minimum product differentiation. This result is mir-
rored in Chapter 4 where we obtain no product differentiation when there 
are only uninformed consumers in the market. However, once some patients 
become informed, differentiation incentives are created. Another related 
paper is Schultz {2002). He analyzes price competition instead of quality 
competition but also considers a fraction of uninformed consumers. The 
specialization incentives are the other way round. Increasing the share of 
informed customers reduces product differentiation. However, firms always 
locate outside the market. Chapter 4 directly builds on Brekke, Nuscheler 
and Straume {2002). They analyze price regulation with horizontal and 
vertical product differentiation in the Hotelling {1929) model. However, 
they consider a game of complete information. The paper complements 
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Chapter 4 as it is equivalent to a strict gatekeeping regime, i.e., Brekke, 
Nuscheler and Straume (2002) study a corner solution of Chapter 4, though 
an important one. 
1.6 Sickness fund competition 
In the 1970s many countries began to introduce some aspects of market ori-
entation in their health care systems. These included intensified competition 
amongst providers of medical care, e.g., general practitioners and hospitals, 
as well as competition amongst health insurance companies. In this section 
we concentrate on the latter. Examples of countries that introduced or fos-
tered competition between health insurance companies (or sickness funds) 
are the Netherlands, Belgium, Israel, Switzerland and Germany. 
1.6.1 The benefits of competition 
The main motivation for allowing for (more) competition are efficiency 
gains. According to Van de Ven and Van Vliet (1992, p. 24}, there are 
three positive effects of competition: 
1. enhancement of the quality of care, 
2. improved efficiency of care, 
3. and more responsiveness to consumer preferences. 
These benefits can easily be obtained with selective contracting, i.e. when 
sickness funds can decide about the providers to contract with. Sickness 
funds may simply contract with providers that offer high quality at rea-
sonable prices. The trade off between quality and its costs may be driven 
by the preferences of their enrollees. Competition between sickness funds 
for (new) members thus induces competition amongst providers. When the 
possibilities of selective contracting are restricted, like, for example, in Ger-
many, a lot of the potential gains of sickness fund competition cannot be 
realized. Nevertheless, some gains can be realized even without selective 
contracting. All other things equal, inefficient sickness funds, i.e. funds 
with high administrative costs, have to demand higher contribution rates or 
premiums than efficient funds. As a result, the most inefficient firms will be 
driven out of the market. The third benefit of competition can, for example, 
be addressed by benefit packages. These can be tuned so that they meet 
the preferences of the target group. The quality of service and advice is 
another example. 
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1.6.2 Risk selection 
Allowing for competition in the health insurance market is commendable 
and it promises efficiency gains. However, there may be some serious draw-
backs of competition and the most important among these is risk selection. 
We distinguish two types of risk selection: adverse selection and cream 
skimming. Whether there is adverse selection or cream skimming crucially 
depends on the information available to insurers and consumers. 
1.6.2.1 Adverse Selection 
Consider there are two risk types in the population, high risk consumers 
(consumers with high expected costs of health care utilization) and low risk 
consumers (consumers with low expected costs of health care utilization). 
Then, at any premium level, the high risk consumers demand more health 
insurance coverage than the low risks consumers. If insurers can observe 
the risk type of consumers the market outcome will be efficient. Both types 
will receive full coverage and fair premiums, i.e., premiums that equal their 
individual expected health care costs. 
However, complete information is a heroic assumption. It seems more 
plausible to assume that consumers are better informed about their own 
risk type than the insurer. When the risk type is private information of 
consumers, adverse selection may obtain. 
Suppose that an insurer offers the efficient contracts without being able 
to observe consumers risk types. Then the high risk consumers would claim 
to be low risks in order to obtain full coverage at the reasonably lower pre-
mium. As the contract designed for the low risks will also attract the high 
risks (adverse selection), the insurer will incur a loss. The 'efficient con-
tracts' can thus not be the equilibrium of the competitive health insurance 
market. 
To prevent the high risks from mimicking the low risks the contract for 
the latter must be distorted. Incentive compatibility requires a reduction 
of coverage. As Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) have shown, there may be 
an equilibrium where this procedure results in an equilibrium. Assume 
that such a separating equilibrium exists. Then the high risks would be 
indifferent between the contract designed for them and the one designed 
for the low risks. 39 The informational asymmetry thus harms the low risks 
only. They receive only part coverage (at fair premiums) but the high risks 
get their efficient, full coverage, contract. 
39 Although they are indifferent it is assumed that the high risks choose the 'high risk 
contract'. 
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Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) have also shown that the separating equi-
librium is the only possible equilibrium. In particular no pooling equilibrium 
can exist, i.e., there is no equilibrium where risk independent premiums ob-
tain. Thus, there never is an equilibrium where the low risks subsidize the 
high risks. Nevertheless there may be a pooling contract that destroys the 
candidate separating equilibrium. This is the case when the share of high 
risk consumers is low. Then the health insurance market may break down 
or is inherently unstable. 40 
1.6.2.2 Cream Skimming 
To a large extent health status is not considered to be the responsibility of 
the individual (see, e.g., Kifmann (2002, p. 719)). For equity reasons the 
regulator mostly requires community rating, i.e., insurers must charge the 
same premium to all insured. Of course, given risk aversion, this could also 
be justified by an efficiency argument from an ex ante perspective. Prior 
to realization of the risk type each individual strictly prefers community 
rating over risk related premiums as it enables him or her to obtain an 
insurance against premium risk. Community rating creates considerable 
incentives for risk selection as sickness funds make losses with the high risks 
and earn profits with the low risks. Funds will thus try to select the low 
risks. Hence the incentive for favorable risk selection does not necessarily 
arise from asymmetric information, it may be a result of regulation (Pauly 
(1984) and Wilson (1977)). 
Barros (2003, p. 420) and Van de Ven and Ellis (2000, p. 773) define 
cream skimming as risk selection that occurs because insurers prefer low 
risks to high risks. As is clear from the above, community rating creates 
significant cream skimming incentives. Contingent on the insurers' infor-
mation, Van de Ven and Ellis (2000, pp. 773-774) distinguish three forms 
of cream skimming: 
1. If health plans can identify risk types, they can directly select the 
low risks ('direct cream skimming'). They could, for example, reject 
females and the elderly upon enrollment and thereby obtain a low risk 
40Wilson (1977) introduced a stronger than Nash equilibrium concept. Firms anticipate 
the consequences of their offers, i.e. they take into account the fact that contracts that 
become unprofitable through their offer will be taken from the market. In such an 
environment an equilibrium always exists. Hence the health insurance market is stable. 
Whether a particular health insurance market is unstable or not is thus basically an 
empirical question. Note, however, that a pooling equilibrium can exist in the Wilson 
model. This also applies contracting costs are introduced as in Newhouse (1996). 
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pool consisting of young males. Such a favorable risk pool can also be 
attained by, e.g., selective advertising and golden handshakes. 
2. Suppose insurers cannot observe the risk type but know about other 
non-observable but relevant, i.e. costly, risk factors. Examples are 
diseases like cancer or AIDS. Then insurers can prevent these high 
risks from enrolling by providing bad service and bad therapy to both 
cancer and AIDS patients. With selective contracting insurers may 
contract with providers with bad reputations in both fields. 
3. If the insurer cannot observe the risk type and has no idea about 
any relevant risk factor, he can still select the low risks by offering 
low-option plans with (high) deductibles or by reducing offices and 
information centers to a minimum. 
In the last two versions adverse selection is used as a cream skimming 
device. We refer to them as 'indirect cream skimming'. For some additional 
means of indirect risk selection see, for example, Breyer et al. (2003, p. 
298), Van de Ven and Van Vliet (1992, pp. 2&-31) and Van de Ven et al. 
(2003, p. 91). 
1.6.2.3 The adverse effects of risk selection 
Consider a separating equilibrium with full coverage at high premiums for 
high risks and part coverage for low risks at low premiums emerges. As low 
risk individuals prefer full coverage, there is an efficiency loss from adverse 
selection. Additionally, the high premiums may prevent non-affluent high 
risks from obtaining sufficient coverage. The health insurance market may 
be unstable coming along with real social costs (Van de Ven and Ellis (2000, 
p. 775)). 
Moreover, and maybe more relevant, risk selection counters the positive 
effects of competition. Van de Van and Van Vliet (1992, p. 24) and Van de 
Ven and Ellis (2000, pp. 775-776) mention three adverse effects: 
1. Competition in the health insurance market is supposed to increase the 
incentives to provide high quality. But when an insurer (selectively) 
contracts with high quality providers or invests in good service, e.g., 
by increasing the number of offices or by good access to call centers, it 
risks mainly attracting the high risks. This is why insurers do, or are 
at least tempted to do, the exact opposite: provide bad service and 
contract with bad providers. In the short run such a policy promises 
good profits. However, in the long run insurers risk their reputation. 
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High risks will nevertheless enroll with such an insurer when the nega-
tive effects of low quality are outweighed by lower contributions. Thus, 
in equilibrium, all insured may receive low quality. 
2. Inefficient funds that successfully engage in risk selection could drive 
efficient funds out of the market or at least capture some of their 
market. 
3. Cream skimming is itself costly. Since there are no positive welfare 
effects from reallocating individuals to funds this is pure waste. 
1.6.2.4 Empirical evidence 
There is a large empirical literature on risk selection. One of the most 
recent studies is Nicholson et al. (2003). For U.S. data they find that Health 
Maintenance Organizations (HMOs) successfully select the low risks. HMOs 
basically use their benefit package for selection.41 
One the most prominent examples of adverse selection is the 'Harvard 
death spiral' (see Cutler and Zeckhauser (1998, pp. 11-14), Cutler and Zeck-
hauser (2000, pp. 616-623), and Cutler and Reber (1998)). At the beginning 
of the 1990s, Harvard University offered its employees two insurance types, 
a generous Preferred Provider Organization (PPO) and a number of HMOs. 
The University paid about 90 percent of the contributions. Although the 
PPO was more expensive than the HMOs the additional costs to be borne 
by the PPO enrollees were relatively low. In 1995 Harvard decided to only 
pay a fixed percentage of the lowest cost plan. By fostering competition, 
plans should have had the right incentive to contain costs. The young and 
healthy switched from the PPO to an HMO. To break even, the PPO had to 
raise its contribution leading to further switches. Once again these were the 
(relatively) young and healthy. In 1998 the increase in the premium would 
have been too large so that PPO was closed down. Cutler and Reber (1998) 
estimate the associated welfare loss to people who would have enrolled with 
the PPO to be 2 to 4 percent of baseline premiums. 
1.6.3 Regulatory measures 
The adverse effects of risk selection are numerous and therefore public policy 
interventions are justified. In the following we describe measures that are 
taken or that can be taken to reduce incentives for risk selection. However, 
41 Cutler and Zeckhauser (2000, pp. 616-624) provide an excellent overview of the 
empirical literature on risk selection. 
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the benefit of each measure has to be weighed against the costs that may 
arise, for example, from reduced competition. 
The regulator usually requires open enrollment, i.e., insurers must not 
reject (high risk) applicants. The most straightforward form of direct cream 
skimming is thus not feasible. Insurers could be allowed to use their infor-
mation for risk rating premiums. Then, as was pointed out by Pauly (1984), 
there would be no cream skimming incentives. Instead premiums would de-
pend on observable risk characteristics. However, risk rating could make it 
difficult for high risks to obtain convenient coverage.42 
Individuals can be mandated to buy some basic health plan coverage. 
Thereby the most extreme form of adverse selection, where the low risks 
escape cross subsidization and go without any coverage, can be avoided. 
Depending on the coverage of the basic health plan, such a policy can yield 
a Pareto improvement. If the coverage is too large, the low risks may be 
worse off than without any health insurance. However, such a mandatory 
pooling contract may increase risk selection incentives in the supplementary 
health insurance market. If providers of the basic health plan are also 
allowed to supply supplementary insurance, Kifmann (2003) demonstrated 
that supplementary contracts can well be used as a selection device. Thus 
separating the provision of basic and supplementary health insurance is the 
imperative. 
Health insurers can skim the cream irrespective of the information avail-
able, i.e., for all three forms of cream skimming, by selective contracting 
or by the design of their benefit packages. This can be simply prevented 
by complete regulation of the benefit package and by forbidding selective 
contracting. But the costs may be substantial. Without selective contract-
ing insurers would be prevented from contracting only with cost-effective 
providers. So overall efficiency may decrease. The health plans are less 
able to respond to consumer preferences when a uniform benefit package is 
dictated. This clearly yields a welfare loss (Keeler et al. (1998)). 
As low risk individuals tend to choose contracts with higher deductibles, 
the regulator could restrict free choice of deductibles or forbid deductibles 
at all. Again, this yields a welfare loss from reduced responsiveness to con-
sumer preferences. Additionally (ex post) moral hazard problems become 
more severe distorting health care utilization. Selective advertising or ad-
vertising in general could be forbidden. If advertising is informative this 
may also result in a welfare loss. Van de Ven and Ellis (2000, pp. 778-779) 
42 As already argued above, community rating is imposed for equity purposes or rather 
efficiency reasons from an ex ante perspective. As community rating just creates cream 
skimming incentives this regulation induces demand for further regulatory measures. 
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mention some additional measures, e.g., risk adjustment and risk sharing. 
1.6.4 Risk adjustment 
The most prominent measure taken to prevent risk selection, or at least to 
mitigate the distortions caused by risk selection, is risk adjustment. Thereby 
contributions to every single fund should be adjusted so that they reflect 
the actual risk structure. Cream skimming or adverse selection may then 
occur within risk premium groups. An accurate mechanism results in rather 
homogenous groups. With an accurate mechanism the benefits of favorable 
risk selection are low and, as risk selection is more difficult, the costs are 
likely to be high. This measure is most prominent as it does not affect 
competition (Van de Ven et al. (2003, p. 78)). Good risk adjustment 
eliminates risk selection incentives and ensures tight competition.43 
In Figure 1.1 below we show how the payment flows can be organized. 
System A) may be called an external subsidy system, while B) is an internal 
subsidy system. Of course, the two systems are conceptually identical. The 
basic purpose of the figure is to emphasize that there is a central sponsor or 
solidarity fund involved in risk adjustment. If risk adjustment is incomplete, 
it may be complemented by risk sharing. With risk sharing the funds are 
not fully responsible for health care costs as the solidarity fund covers part 
of them. This obviously reduces selection incentives. Risk sharing also 
obviously reduces the incentives for efficiency (see also Section 1.4.2.2). 
A complete overview of risk adjustment and risk sharing is beyond the 
scope of this section. We concentrate on variables that can be used to adjust 
premiums, i.e., on risk adjusters and their predictive power.44 To assess the 
accuracy of risk adjustment, information is required about the maximum 
variance of health care expenditure that can be explained. Newhouse (1996) 
and Van Vliet (1992) found the predictable proportion to be around 20 
percent. In the following we concentrate on prospective risk adjustment 
mechanisms. 
Health care spending clearly increases with age. Spending patterns of 
males and females differ significantly. So the most obvious risk adjusters are 
age and gender. Pope et al. (1998) found that such a simple demographic 
model only explains roughly 1 percent of health care expenditures. 45 In-
43Cutler and Zeckhauser (2000, p. 625) and Van de Ven and Ellis (2000, pp. 780-783) 
mention some drawbacks. To some extent risk adjustment can be manipulated and can 
distort incentives. 
44For a comprehensive treatment of risk adjustment and risk sharing see Van de Ven 
and Ellis (2000, pp. 779-828). 
45 Concerning the predictive power we only refer to Pope et al. (1998) which is a 
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Figure 1.1: Risk adjustment systems in A) Belgium, Israel, and 
The Netherlands and B) in Germany and Switzerland. Source: 
Van de Ven et al. (2003, pp. 77-78). 
eluding prior year expenditures increases R2 to 4 percent. However, such a 
scheme is easily manipulated as an increase in expenditure increases subsi-
dies in the subsequent year. The same applies to the so-called Pharmacy 
Cost Groups (PCGs) where chronic conditions are inferred from prescription 
drug consumption. 
Diagnostic information may also be used to improve risk adjustment. 
There are several measures that could be taken, for example, Ambulatory 
Care Groups (ACGs), Diagnostic Cost Groups (DCGs), Major Diagnos-
tic Categories (MDCs), Hierarchical Condition Categories (HCCs), and the 
Disability Payment System (DPS).46 Pope et al. (1998) find an R2 of 7 
percent for an age, gender, DCG/HCC model. Adding diagnostic informa-
tion to age and gender thus increases the predicted variance by 6 percentage 
points. But there are also some efficiency costs as such a model may lead 
the plans to screen aggressively for certain conditions in order to receive 
higher subsidies. 
Including self-reported health measures is more a theoretical option as its 
application would require asking the entire population to fill out a health 
study about US Medicare. International comparisons of R 2 may be misleading as the 
predictability strongly depends on services that are subject to risk adjustment (Van de 
Ven and Ellis (2000, 792)). 
46 For an explanation of these concepts see Van de Ven and Ellis (2000, pp. 798-802). 
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questionnaire. This is simply not feasible. However, including the self-
reported health status into an age gender scheme increases R2 from 1 to 3 
percent. 
1.6.5 International experience 
In a recent special issue of Health Policy on 'Risk Adjustment in Europe', 
the experiences with sickness fund competition in 5 European countries, 
namely, Belgium, Germany, Israel, The Netherlands, and Switzerland, are 
summarized. The information presented here is taken from Van de Ven et 
al. (2003) which is part of that special issue. 47 
All countries introduced or fostered competition among health insurers 
during the 1990s. The premiums are risk adjusted in all countries. However, 
they use different risk adjusters and the complexity of the schemes also 
varies. The most incomplete risk adjustment can be found in Israel where 
only differences in age structures are offset. Switzerland additionally adjusts 
for gender and region. The risk adjusters applied in Germany are age, 
gender, disability, sick pay claim, and income (p. 87). All schemes have 
in common that they are highly incomplete, as should be clear from the 
previous section. As all countries except Israel have community rating, 
there are substantial incentives for risk selection (p. 87). 
These are softened by some degree of risk sharing in Belgium and The 
Netherlands. Together with the low mobility of consumers there is no se-
lection problem. There is no risk sharing in Germany and Switzerland, i.e., 
sickness funds completely bear the costs of health care. Together with the 
high mobility of consumers, especially in Germany, serious selection prob-
lems result (pp. 87, 89). There is anecdotal evidence from both countries 
that sickness funds try to select the low risks (p. 91). Risk selection in 
Switzerland may be driven by deductibles or by supplementary health in-
surance. Deductibles are more or less forbidden in the German public health 
insurance system. Moreover funds must not offer supplementary health in-
surance. Although there is a large contribution rate differential between 
funds in Germany, there is no evidence of any successful risk selection ac-
tivities (see Chapter 5). 
47The practice of risk adjustment and risk sharing in the US and for some other coun-
tries can be found in Van de Ven and Ellis (2000, pp. 829-835). 
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1.6.6 Contribution of the thesis 
Whether the sickness funds in the German public health insurance system 
actively (and successfully) try to select the low risks has not been tested so 
far. There is quite a lot of anecdotal evidence for risk selection activities 
but, up to now, whether these activities actually have any significant effect 
has remained unclear. Chapter 5 fills this gap. 
Of course, there is some literature on German sickness fund competi-
tion but none of these studies addresses risk selection. The two reports 
by Lauterbach and Wille (2001) and Jacobs et al. (2002), for example, 
use health care expenditure data and find that switchers have substantially 
lower health care costs. But this does not necessarily have anything to do 
with adverse selection or cream skimming. It may well be that the switchers 
in their samples are low risks and, as these typically have lower switching 
costs, their results may simply be explained by a transaction cost argument. 
The main empirical task is to separate risk selection activities from 
switching costs. This requires splitting the sample into two subsamples. One 
sample should consist of all funds that are suspected of actively selecting 
the low risks and the other subsample should consist of all remaining funds. 
The starting point is thus a hypothesis. When looking at the variation 
of (additional) benefits in Germany it turns out that the company-based 
sickness funds (Betriebskrankenkassen, BKKs) are more likely to provide 
services that healthy individuals demand and less likely to provide those 
meeting the preferences of the sick. Combined with the anecdotal evidence, 
the hypothesis must be that the BKKs try to select the low risks. The 
sample is thus split into BKK and non-BKK members. 
To identify risk selection the transitions of consumers between sickness 
funds must be analyzed. Obviously, there is risk selection by BKKs if the 
healthy switch from non-BKKs to BKKs and the sick from BKKs to non-
BKKs. Nicholson et al. (2003) take that approach and find that Health 
Maintenance Organizations (HMOs) practice risk selection. However, as 
they model the switching decision with a simple probit model for both 
subsamples, the impact of switching costs on transition decisions remains 
unclear. 
To assess the magnitude of switching costs one has to distinguish dif-
ferent switching decisions within each subsample. Consider, for instance, 
the non-BKK members. These have to make a choice from three alterna-
tives: no switch, switch to a BKK, switch to a non-BKK. This requires a 
multinomial model. If the fact of being a low risk rather than a high risk 
increases the probability of switching to a BKK more than the probability 
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of switching to a non-BKK, then the risk selection hypothesis is supported. 
The hypothesis is also supported when there is a stronger health effect on 
the probability of switching to a BKK than to a non-BKK among BKK 
members. Splitting the file and applying a multinomial procedure thus en-
ables us to test the risk selection hypothesis twice. This approach is new. 
To be able to obtain clear cut results, the variable measuring individual risk 
should be accurate and one dimensional. We fit an ordered probit model 
for the self-assessed health status and thereby create a health index summa-
rizing all relevant health information. The complete empirical model thus 
consists of two stages with an ordered probit model for health status at the 
first stage and a multinomial logit model for health insurance choice at the 
second stage. This strategy is also new. 
We find no evidence of any (successful) risk selection activities in the 
German system. The indications that BKKs try to select the low risks may 
nevertheless be true, but we show that these activities are not successful. 
The different (additional) benefit structures may simply reflect the prefer-
ences of the enrollees and complete regulation would yield welfare losses. 
Van de Ven et. al (2003, p. 89) nevertheless conclude that risk selec-
tion is a problem in Germany. With our result we can say exactly what 
they mean and what should be done: due to the much larger flow towards 
the BKKs and lower switching costs of low risk consumers there is indeed 
risk separation. This originates in the historically better risk structures 
of BKKs together with incomplete risk adjustment. Public policy should 
thus be directed towards mitigating comparative advantages stemming from 
this asymmetry, i.e. an improvement of the risk adjustment mechanism is 
required. Thus, good risk adjustment is important even if no successful 
cream skimming activities are found. This is an important policy message 
with international applications. A complete regulation of benefit packages, 
or forbidding any type of indirect selection in general, does not help. On 
the contrary, this would oppose the positive effects of competition. Since 
distortions do not originate in the behavior of sickness funds, competition 
should be strengthened. Obvious dimensions are deductibles and selective 
contracting. 
1. 7 Too many trade offs for efficiency 
Whether there is too much or too little competition in health care can not 
be answered in general. It depends on the industry under study and/or 
on the particular health care system and the market analyzed within the 
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system. As we have seen, a vaccine monopolist has perverse incentives. He 
not only aims at keeping the disease alive but also exploits the external 
effects to increase markups. The resulting twofold inefficiency cannot be 
socially optimal in a static setting like the one adopted in the following 
chapter. However, things are less clear in a dynamic context. The high 
monopoly profits stimulate R&D activities. These would be lacking with 
perfect competition. Ex post efficiency thus induces dynamic inefficiency. 
An important determinant of monopoly profits, or profits in general, is 
demand. So consider there is a number of innovating firms in a R&D race. 
The winning firm receives a patent and enjoys monopoly power for a certain 
period of time. The effort of participants depends on expected monopoly 
profits. Calculating expected profits is far from being straightforward. It 
not only depends on the probability of winning the race but also on, first, 
the expected price, second, whether the new product becomes part of the 
insurers' benefit packages, and, third, on the willingness of providers to 
adopt new technologies. 
The willingness of providers to adopt new technologies crucially depends 
on reimbursement rules and on treatment costs. With capitation payment 
(even if on a DRG basis) a very costly new technology will never be adopted 
although it might by efficient. So R&D effort into costly technologies will 
be scarce when a major part of the market is characterized by capitation 
payments. Of course, R&D incentives are higher with cost sharing or fee-
for-service such that, in a dynamic model, quality will be higher in these 
systems. But these systems distort cost reduction incentives and, conse-
quently, costs will be higher. 
However, technology adoption is not only driven by provider payment 
but also by competition amongst providers. When considering non-price 
competition in terms of quality and specialization, for example, providers 
can avoid the adoption of costly high quality technologies by increasing spe-
cialization of their clinics. Via this channel increased specialization feeds 
back into the R&D race. Another channel is patient information. If pa-
tients cannot observe the quality of providers, the providers willingness to 
adopt high quality technologies will be low. Increasing information in the 
market, for example by the introduction of a gatekeeper system, fuels R&D 
activities. 
Quality is not only an issue on the providers side but also in the health 
insurance market. Consider the health insurance market to be competitive. 
If insurers must not charge risk based premiums ( community rating) and if 
there is open enrollment, insurers have strong incentives to skim the cream, 
i.e. to actively select the insured with low expected costs of health care 
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utilization ( the good risks). As quality is more valued by bad risks ( they are 
more likely to demand health care), insurers can prevent the high risks from 
enrolling by offering low quality. This can be achieved by contracting with 
providers of low quality. The providers' incentives to adopt new technologies 
of high quality will be distorted and again reduced R&D expenditures will 
result. 
Since low quality may well be in line with consumer preferences, soften-
ing competition in the health insurance market, e.g. by forbidding selective 
contracting, may create a distortion. Additional inefficiencies may arise as 
softened competition amongst insurers also reduces competition amongst 
providers. Cream skimming incentives can be lowered by risk adjusting 
premiums. But risk adjustment schemes are typically highly incomplete 
such that significant selection incentives remain. Risk sharing is the second 
most prominent measure to mitigate inefficiencies arising from favorable 
risk selection. The equivalence to cost sharing mentioned above implies a 
distortion of cost reduction incentives. 
This brief summary of incentives and of conflicting regulatory goals 
demonstrates that it will be, in general, impossible for a regulator to design 
a set of regulatory rules that implement an efficient allocation. A regula-
tor thus has to optimally trade off a number of inefficiencies against one 
another. Moreover, it will also be impossible to simultaneously address all 
mentioned trade offs·-and the ones discussed are only a small selection. 
This is why we concentrate only on the most important aspects in each 
of the following chapters. Although 'partial models' have their limitations, 
we think that all chapters provide important insights and significantly con-
tribute to the scientific as well as to the political discussion on the optimal 
design of health care systems. 
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Chapter 2 
Monopoly Pricing in the 
Market for Vaccines 
2 .1 Motivation 
Traditionally, vaccinations were regarded as one of the prime examples of 
positive externalities. 1 Consequently, government intervention in the form 
of mandatory vaccinations and Pigouvian subsidies were considered to be 
appropriate policy responses to the distortions caused by the externality. 
More recently, this traditional view has been challenged by various contri-
butions that produced a number of somewhat conflicting results about the 
form and optimality of government intervention in the market for vaccines 
(see e.g. Brito et al. (1991), Francis (1997), and Geoffard and Philipson 
( 1997)). These results typically depend on the specific assumptions made 
in the models about agent heterogeneity, market structure and dynamics. 
This chapter contributes to this literature by considering strategic incentives 
and optimal government responses in the context of two hitherto neglected 
dimensions. First, individuals are assumed to differ with respect to income. 
Second, monopoly power on the supply side is considered. 
In the existing theoretical literature agent heterogeneity is usually intro-
duced, if at all, through the assumption that the disutility of vaccinations, 
e.g. side effects, varies. Empirically, disutility is difficult to observe. As 
empirical studies of individual vaccination decisions usually find a clear pos-
itive relationship between income and the probability of being vaccinated, 
introducing agent heterogeneity into the theoretical analysis through in-
1This chapter is almost identical to Kessing and Nuscheler (2003). 
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come differences would seem to be a natural step. Philipson (1996, Table 
2, p. 624), for example, finds a positive income effect on the probability of 
measles vaccination for children in the U.S. England et al. (2001, p. 19) 
report that, if there is a fee, as with hepatitis B in China, "poorer people are 
more likely to go without essential immunization". Moreover, since govern-
ment action usually affects people's incomes, such an analysis promises to 
be a better approximation of the consequences of different policy measures. 
The second key element in our treatment is its focus on monopoly power 
on the supply side. This assumption is motivated by recent developments in 
the vaccine industry. Important changes in U.S. legislation in 1986, which 
effectively shield manufacturers from the liability risk of new vaccines, re-
sulted in a substantial increase in R&D efforts and these have recently lead 
to a dramatic increase in the availability of a number of new vaccines (Busi-
ness Week Online (2002)). Russell (2002) points out that two developments 
have also increased monopoly power significantly. First, there has been a 
shift from commodity vaccines to vaccines which are heavily protected by 
intellectual property rights. The new Hepatitis B vaccine introduced in the 
late 1980s has for example about thirty associated patents. Similarly, Reiss 
and Strauss (1998) document that between 1980 and 1995 patent applica-
tions for vaccines at the European patent office rose by a factor of seven 
and that this development has been fuelled by the progress made in the 
field of genetically engineered vaccines in particular.2 Second, the ongoing 
concentration in the industry at all levels, from research and development 
to marketing organizations, has left only a few key players. Furthermore, 
as firms are increasingly specializing in specific diseases and their core fields 
of expertise, competitive pressure is being further attenuated. 
A vaccine monopolist has two main incentives: (i) to keep the disease 
alive and (ii) to increase the prevalence of the disease in order to increase 
the willingness to pay for vaccination.3 In their dynamic model Geoffard 
and Philipson (1997) address the first incentive, but remain silent about the 
second incentive. We provide the missing part of the analysis using a static 
model. On the demand side, we consider the case where the population has 
to pay for the vaccinations, i.e. the costs are not covered by health insurance 
companies or the state. Consequently, there is no bargaining either between 
2 "The four industry leaders (Merck, GlaxoSmithKline, Aventis Pasteur, and Wyeth) 
are estimated to spend more than US$750 million a year on vaccine R&D--as much as a 
fivefold jump at some companies since 1992." (BusinessWeek Online (2002)) 
3 Although not in a monopoly context, the case of measles offers some insights: more 
than 99 percent of the disease burden of measles fall on low and middle income countries, 
with more than 770,000 deaths in the year 2000. Full immunization could save roughly 
28 million disability adjusted life years (see Kremer (2002, pp. 70-71)). 
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insurance companies or state agencies.4 
We summarize both the income dependence of the individual willing-
ness to pay and the external effect of a reduced infection probability due 
to a higher number of vaccinated individuals using a simple linear aggre-
gate demand schedule faced by the monopolist. The linearity assumption 
allows explicit results to be obtained, but none of the results depend on it 
qualitatively. The decisive element in this setting is the monopolist's second 
strategic incentive mentioned above. This is most easily analyzed in a static 
environment. But the results will also apply in a dynamic framework, since 
the importance of the external effect increases.5 Although the emphasis of 
the analysis is on the case without price discrimination we also consider per-
fect price discrimination. All qualitative results, including the comparative 
statics, are robust. With price discrimination, vaccination discrimination is 
in fact reduced. But, in contrast to the standard model without external ef-
fects, the outcome may still be inefficient. The findings of the robustness of 
the strategic incentives are relevant for policy recommendations since multi-
tier pricing is pervasive in real world vaccine markets (Russell (2002}}.6 
In the theory of public goods, the problem of under-provision can be 
eliminated by Pigouvian subsidies. However, although vaccinations are an 
example of privately provided public goods, subsidies do not work very well. 
At first demand increases as the individual price is reduced. However, this 
increase lowers the infection probability and thus reduces the willingness 
to pay. This counteracting effect limits the effect of these subsidies (see 
Geoffard and Philipson (1997, p. 225)). We show that subsidies may make 
things even worse. We assume that the price subsidy is financed by lump-
sum taxation creating a negative income effect. If this effect is sufficiently 
large, the positive price effect is overcompensated and a smaller proportion 
of people are vaccinated. This contrasts with the classical regulation argu-
ments for Pigouvian subsidies and strengthens Philipson's (2000} argument, 
that "Pigouvian subsidies traditionally seen as resolving the under-provision 
problem of vaccines can be short-run, or out of steady state, arguments" 
(p. 1777), since these may even fail in static settings. Recently, Philipson 
4 For an empirical analysis that tests whether price discrimination or bargaining is 
present in the U.S. vaccine market see Kauf (1999). 
5 Francis ( 1997) showed that in his dynamic setting the extemality disappears. The 
allocation is efficient. But with heterogenous individuals this result does not generally 
hold. 
6 The UN Accelerating Access Initiative supports differential pricing for AIDS drugs 
(see http://www.unaids.org/acc_access/). In this context Roche was more or less forced 
to increase the discount on their AIDS drugs for developing countries to roughly 90 
percent of the Swiss price (see Medecins Sans Frontieres (2003)). 
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and Mechoulan (2003) have argued that subsidies are likely to distort R&D 
incentives. 
Another public policy usually suggested is mandatory vaccination. If 
mandatory vaccination programs do not cover the whole population, the 
people vaccinated lower the probability that the susceptible will be infected. 
The willingness to pay is reduced, i.e., mandatory demand crowds out volun-
tary demand. This is a standard argument for why it is difficult to eradicate 
a disease by mandatory vaccination if not the entire population is included 
in the program (see Philipson (2000, p. 1781)). However, such a program is 
much more effective with income-dependant demand: as people's incomes 
differ, the public program can cover the poor and the monopolist the rich. 
Of course the willingness to pay of the rich is reduced, but it remains rela-
tively high due to the income effect. Full vaccination can be achieved with 
a mandatory participation rate that is strictly smaller than one. Thus, our 
analysis provides an efficiency argument for public health vaccination pro-
grams that focus on the poor like those typically supported by the World 
Health Organization (WHO) and the Worldbank. 
The approach presented here is related to Brito et al. (1991). They 
consider a static model with a continuum of individuals whose disutility 
from vaccination differs. Since vaccines are provided free of charge, price 
discrimination cannot be studied in their setting. The first-best outcome 
can be implemented by subsidizing those who decide to vaccinate, or by tax-
ing those without immunization. But when the subsidy has to be financed 
through taxation, the first-best can only be attained under the strong as-
sumption of identical marginal utility of income across individuals. In their 
dynamic model, Geoffard and Philipson (1997) address the question of dis-
ease eradication. Both price subsidies and mandatory vaccination programs 
have limited impact, since the positive effects of the respective policies are 
partly offset by the negative effect of the externality. 
This chapter is also related to the literature on network externalities, 
e.g. Bensaid and Lesne (1996), Cabral et al. (1999), and Mason (2000). 
The main difference is the sign of the network effect. This is positive in 
these models but negative in ours, leading to completely different results. 
With a positive network effect, introductory pricing may occur to built up 
a certain critical network size. With vaccinations it is the other way round: 
in order to prevent the market shrinking or disappearing a critical mass will 
never be exceeded. 
This chapter is organized as follows: in Section 2.2 we present the main 
ingredients of our model. The monopolist's price setting problem and the 
comparative static properties of this solution are studied in Section 2.3. 
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Perfect price discrimination is analyzed in Section 2.4. In Section 2.5 we 
discuss public policies that may be used to reduce discrimination and thus 
increase social welfare. Section 2.6 concludes. The Appendix provides a 
generalization of the reduced form applied throughout the chapter. 
2.2 The model 
Consider a population of mass one with individuals who differ in income 
but are otherwise homogenous. Income is denoted a and is continuously 
distributed on the interval [aL, aHl, where O < aL :S aH. An individual's 
willingness to pay for vaccination depends on her income a and the expected 
share of individuals who get vaccination, 0e E [O, l]: 
(2.1) 
The higher the expected rate of immunization 0e, the lower the expected 
share of susceptible individuals l -0e. A high ee is associated with a low ex-
pected risk of infection 7re, 07re / a0e < 0. Clearly, the willingness to pay for 
vaccination increases in the risk of infection. We thus postulate op/ a0e < 0, 
which captures the external effect of vaccinations. Furthermore, in line with 
the empirical evidence, it is assumed that the willingness to pay increases 
in income op/oa > 0. While the external effect of vaccinations is a general 
feature of the market, a positive income effect is not so obvious. In the 
Appendix (see Section 2.7, interpreting vaccination as an insurance deci-
sion, we derive a sufficient condition on preferences for yielding a positive 
income effect. Finally, we assume p(l, a) > 0, implying the existence of an 
exogenous infection risk. While made for simplicity, this can be justified by 
infection threats from other countries7 , accidental laboratory outbreaks, or 
terrorist attacks8 . 
To simplify the analysis, and in order to derive explicit closed form 
solutions, we summarize the individual willingness to pay by the following 
simple linear scheme 
(2.2) 
where Za E (0, 1) measures the income effect and zo > 0 the importance of 
the external effect. The upper bound on Za is justified by normality, while 
7The way infectious diseases can spread around the world was recently demonstrated 
with the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) that originated in China. 
8 Although smallpox is said to be eradicated, there is a positive willingness to pay for 
vaccines. 
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the lower bound reflects our central assumption of a positive income effect. 
Furthermore we assume that the population is uniformly distributed on the 
interval [aL, aH]- None of these assumptions is necessary for the results we 
derive below. However, their use significantly eases the presentation of the 
main ideas. As will become clear, a downward sloping aggregate demand 
function is sufficient for most results. We discuss the conditions under which 
demand is downward sloping in the appendix. 
There is a monopolist who provides a vaccine that yields perfect pro-
tection against the disease and that has no side effects. His price setting 
problem is analyzed in a two-stage game. At stage 1 the monopolist sets 
the price Pm· We analyze two versions of the game, in Section 2.3 we study 
standard monopoly pricing. Here Pm is constant and denotes the price at 
which the monopolist is willing to sell to all consumers actually demanding 
vaccination. In Section 2.4 the case of perfect price discrimination is ad-
dressed. The price may depend on income so that Pm = Pm(a) is a price 
schedule. At stage 2 individuals observe prices, form expectations about 
the vaccination rate, and thus about the infection probability, and decide 
whether to vaccinate or not, i.e. aggregate demand is realized. 
Solving the game backwards leads to a subgame perfect Nash equilib-
rium. Deriving aggregate demand requires first analyzing the role of con-
sumers' expectations for vaccination decisions. As the analyses differ for 
the two cases studied they are relegated to the respective sections of the 
chapter (see Lemma 2.1 and Lemma 2.3 below). Once aggregate demand is 
derived, determining the monopolist's optimal policy is straightforward. 
2.3 Monopoly pricing 
Let us first consider the case of standard monopoly pricing where the monop-
olist only quotes a single price. In order to derive the stage two vaccination 
equilibrium we assume symmetric expectations and require expectations to 
be consistent, i.e. expectations must be fulfilled in equilibrium. The second 
useful property is the sorting of individuals by income. In particular, for 
a given expected infection risk, an individual who decides to be vaccinated 
knows that everybody richer than herself will also be vaccinated. 
Before we solve for the equilibrium of the vaccination subgame, we define 
the critical consumer 0. Let Pm > 0 be some fixed price for the vaccine, 
then 0 = 0 (Pm) solves 
(2.3) 
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where 6. := aH - aL, The income of the critical consumer is a:= a (0) = 
aH - 06.. Since the willingness to pay p (0, a (0)) strictly decreases in 0, the 
critical consumer is well-defined, i.e. 0 is unique. 
In Lemma 2.1 we show that there are unique expectations for every 
given price Pm· How consistency of expectations can be used to derive the 
aggregate demand is demonstrated in Lemma 2.2. 
Lemma 2.1 Individuals facing a price Pm will rationally expect 0 (pm) to 
be the immunization rate. 
Proof. The proof is by contradiction. So, suppose that individuals 
expect the immunization rate 0e > 0. Then, the willingness to pay for 
vaccination of type 0 is p ( 0e, a (0)) = Z(J (1 - 0e) + Za (aH - 06.) < Pm• 
Individual 0 will not demand vaccination and neither will all consumers 
with lower income than aH - 06.. Thus immunization with expectations 
0e > 0 will actually be lower than 0 so that expectations can never be 
confirmed. A similar reasoning applies to all 0e < 0 proving inconsistency 
of all 0e -/- 0. • 
The lemma implies that we can concentrate on cases where the two 
arguments of the willingness to pay function are identical. To ease notation 
we will thus write p (0) := p (0, a (0)). Notice that we also omit the bar. 
Lemma 2.2 The aggregate demand function the monopolist is facing at the 
first stage of the game is given by 
0 ( ) _ Z(J + ZallH - Pm Pm-------. 
Z(J + Za6. 
(2.4) 
Proof. Since the vaccination equilibrium at price Pm is fully character-
ized by 0 (Pm), deriving aggregate demand simply requires solving equation 
(2.3) for 0. • 
Given these lemmata, the game boils down to a game of complete in-
formation. By setting the price, the monopolist can directly influence ex-
pectations about the immunization rate and thus exploit the external effect 
associated with vaccinations. Alternatively the monopolist's policy may be 
derived by optimization with respect top or 0. For notational convenience 
we stick to the latter yielding the following objective function 
Il(0) = p(0)0 = (zo(l - 0) + zll(aH - 06.))0. (2.5) 
We consider constant marginal costs of zero, implying disease eradication, 
i.e. 0 = 1, as being socially optimal. The first order condition is derived by 
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differentiation yielding9 
0* = Z(J + ZaaH 
2(zo + za.6-) · (2.6) 
Without the externality, the monopolist would face the inverse demand 
schedule p (0) = zo + za(aH + 0.6.) yielding an optimal supply of ""l:"t« > 
0*. With the externality, the monopolist has an incentive to reduce supply 
in order to increase the willingness to pay and thus profit. The externality 
reduces the elasticity of demand and thereby amplifies monopoly power. 
This interpretation demonstrates that this result is very general. It holds as 
long as aggregate demand is downward sloping. 10 The price corresponding 
to 0* is 
(2.7) 
The price increases in all exogenous parameters except aL. The com-
parative static properties of()* are much more informative. First, note that 
80* /8za > 0. With an increasing income effect, the relative importance of 
the external effect of vaccinations is reduced and with it the incentive to 
cut the supply. More interesting is the effect of a change in the external 
effect parameter zo which is clearly negative, i.e. 80* / {ho < 0. The higher 
the external effect of susceptible individuals on the willingness to pay, the 
higher the monopolists' incentive to exploit this effect, i.e. to reduce the 
amount of vaccines sold. 
To study the effect of income inequality on equilibrium let aH = a+ .6./2 
and aL = a - .6./2. Then o• = "et:.:~! 2 . The income inequality effect 
is observed by differentiation with respect to .6. yielding 80* /8.6. < 0. The 
more unequally the income is distributed among the population, the more 
severe the problem of vaccination discrimination. Note that the average 
income a is not affected by changes in .6.. Now consider that the population 
as a whole becomes richer, but (absolute) inequality remains unchanged: 
80"' / 8a > 0. The income effect becomes more important relative to the 
discrimination effect. Consequently, a higher share of the population decides 
to vaccinate. To summarize, vaccination discrimination is more likely to 
occur in societies that are poor or face substantial income inequality. 
9 To avoid 8* exceeding one, it is assumed that z9 + Za (ti. - aL) 2: 0. 
10See the appendix for a condition for preferences that yield a downward sloping de-
mand. 
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2 .4 Perfect price discrimination 
In this section we consider the case where the monopolist can observe in-
dividual income. Without externality, this induces efficiency and enables 
him to obtain the entire rent. Although this represents a benchmark case, 
it nevertheless deserves particular attention because multi-tier pricing is 
pervasive in vaccine markets (Russell (2002)). This observation holds for 
national markets but even more so at the international level, where devel-
oping countries receive vaccines at significantly lower prices than developed 
countries. Of course, the mechanisms of our model are also valid in such an 
international context, if an international link exists between the infection 
probabilities.11 
Again, there is a two-stage game. Analyzing the impact of expecta-
tions on demand is little more involved with perfect price discrimination 
because demand has to be determined for every possible price schedule that 
may be offered. The following lemma demonstrates that there is a unique 
expectation for every relevant price schedule. 
Lemma 2.3 The monopolist offers a price schedule of the following type: 
for 0 :'.S 0 
for 0 > 0 (2.8) 
Given this schedule, individuals rationally expect 0 to be the immunization 
rate. 
Proof. Before addressing expectations we have to show that it is suffi-
cient to analyze price schedules like those mentioned above. First, note that 
the schedule will have a cut-off value of income a E [aL, aH] such that all 
individuals with incomes higher than a will demand vaccination and those 
with lower incomes will not. If this were not the case, the monopolist would 
benefit from reallocating vaccinations. At a the monopolist will demand 
the entire willingness to pay p ( 9e, a). For incomes exceeding a he simply 
adds the income effect Za (a - a) and again obtains the entire rent. Individ-
uals whose incomes fall short of a receive no offer. Using the relationship 
a = aH - 0/l, the relevant price schedules may be written as in equation 
(2.8). 
Given this schedule, the (symmetric) expectation 9e can never exceed 0 
but may be lower. So, consider that 9e < 0. Then the willingness to pay of 
11The recent outbreak of SARS in China and its spread to Europe and, in particular, 
North America dramatically demonstrates the correlation between infection risks. 
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type 0 isp (0e, 0) = zo (1 - 0e)+za (aH - 06.) > ZO (1 - 0)+za (aH - 06.) = 
Pm ( 0; e). Since this holds for all 0 $ 0, all individuals with income higher 
than aH - 06. will vaccinate contradicting 0e < 0. Thus, 0e = 0 results. • 
By offering a price schedule as shown in equation (2.8), the monopolist 
sets not only prices but also the quantity offered in the market. As 0 is 
unique, optimization over 0 completes the analysis. The objective function 
is given by 
11(0) = zo(l - 0)0 + Za 19(aH - 06.)d0. 
Optimization with respect to 0 yields 
0ppd = zo + ZaaH . 
2zo + 20 6. 
(2.9) 
(2.10) 
Qualitatively, the comparative static properties of 0wd compare with those 
of 0*. Comparing equations (2.6) and (2.10) unambiguously reveals 0vvd > 
0*. The monopolist's ability to demand prices that are conditional on the 
willingness to pay reduces the prevalence of the disease. This is well in 
line with standard monopoly theory. However, the following proposition 
contrasts with it, highlighting the peculiarity of the vaccine market, namely, 
the external effect. 
Proposition 2.1 For a sufficiently strong external effect, zo > z0 aL, a 
perfect price discriminating monopolist is socially inefficient, i.e. 0PPd < 1. 
As the proof is straightforward, we only provide the intuition and a 
graphical illustration: with negative network effects increasing demand not 
only reduces the price for the marginal consumer, it also reduces the willing-
ness to pay of all other consumers. Consider Figure 2.1. Instead of serving 
0vvd suppose that the monopolist covers the entire market. The additional 
rent he gains is given by area A. But, as the higher share of vaccinated indi-
viduals reduces the willingness to pay, all individual prices are reduced. He 
loses rent that amounts to area B. With full immunization the monopolist 
is clearly worse off. 
The results of this section may simply be summarized by 0* < 0vvd $ l. 
Both inequalities require some further discussion. First, allowing the mo-
nopolist to perfectly price discriminate improves access to vaccines and 
is thus socially desirable. In an international context price discrimina-
tion is the rule rather than the exception. However, when providing vac-
cines to developing countries at lower rates than to developed countries 
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Figure 2.1: The case of perfect price discrimination with vacci-
nation externality. 
53 
the monopolist risks undermining prices in developed countries, e.g. by 
re-imports. This may force the monopolist back to the uniform monopoly 
price. But developed countries have an incentive to prohibit re-imports since 
higher monopoly profits in the case of perfect price discrimination facilitate 
stronger R&D incentives in a dynamic framework (see Kremer (2002, pp. 
76-77)). Of course, the same argument holds for arbitrage prevention if price 
discrimination is employed at the national level. Second, although perfect 
price discrimination yields higher welfare than standard monopoly, public 
health intervention may still be necessary to correct for the externality. 
2.5 Public policy 
Obviously, within our setting of zero marginal cost, the socially optimal pol-
icy would be to have the monopolist cover the whole market. We now discuss 
the consequences of two standard public health interventions, namely price 
subsidies and mandatory vaccination programs. To evaluate their benefits, 
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we analyze their potential to increase the degree of immunization in society. 
2.5.1 Price subsidies 
Consider a policy of paying the monopolist a per unit subsidy of sizes > 0. 
This is usually a standard tool for alleviating the inefficiency caused by 
monopoly and a Pigouvian cure for the vaccination externality. U nfortu-
nately subsidies do not work very well in the market for vaccines since the 
positive effect of the subsidy is opposed by the prevalence effect: the in-
creased demand due to the subsidy reduces the prevalence of the disease 
and thereby the willingness to pay for vaccination. Things get worse when 
the subsidy is to be financed by taxation. Consider, for example, a head tax 
of size T. The income distribution in this case shifts to [aL - T, aH - T] 
creating a negative income effect. The government budget constraint is 
given by T = 0s. Thus the monopolist now faces a willingness to pay of 
p(0; s) = zo(l - 0) + Za (aH - 0s - OD.). (2.11) 
He actually receives p(0; s) + s. If there is a positive subsidy, the monopolist 
chooses the price such that 
(JS = Zo + ZaaH + s 
2(zo + ZaS + ZaD.) (2.12) 
Proposition 2.2 There exists a critical income effect z~rit E (0, 1) such 
that 08 < (=, >) 0* if Za > (=, <) z~rit_ 
Proof. In principle 0s = 0* could be solved for Za, Since the actual 
size of z~rit is of minor interest, we study two benchmark cases and apply 
a continuity argument. 12 To decide on the effectiveness of the subsidy we 
have to compare os with the laissez-faire share 0* of equation (2.6): 
0s _ 0• _ ~ zo (1 - Za) + ZaD. - z~aH 
- 2 (zo + ZaS + ZaD.) (zo + ZaD.) · 
(2.13) 
Since the denominator of the right hand side of equation (2.13) is always 
positive, the sign of 08 - 0* is determined by the numerator: if Za = 0 the 
numerator turns out to be z8 > 0. The problem of discrimination is reduced 
by Pigouvian subsidies, since there is no income effect to offset the positive 
effect of the subsidy. This coincides with the result when a public budget 
Robert Nuscheler - 978-3-631-75167-1
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 07:31:18AM
via free access
2.5. PUBLIC POLICY 55 
constraint is not considered. More interesting, if Za = 1, then 08 < 0*. 
Discrimination is further increased by subsidizing vaccines. This is due to 
the income effect caused by financing the subsidy. By continuity, there 
exists some value z~rit E (0, 1) such that the subsidies have no effect. In 
this case, the positive price effect of the subsidy on demand is exactly offset 
by the two negative effects, the prevalence effect and the financing effect. If 
the income effect is sufficiently large, i.e. Za > z~it, a subsidy makes things 
even worse. • 
This is in contrast with the classical regulatory arguments, where Pigou-
vian subsidies are applied to correct for the inefficiencies due to the ex-
ternality. This extreme effect was not previously known in the theory of 
vaccinations. Philipson (2000, p. 1777), for example, states that subsidies 
are limited in their impact in dynamic settings, but that they may have an 
effect in the short-run or out of steady state. In our static setting, we have 
shown--strengthening this result-that subsidies may have no effect or may 
even have a negative effect. In a related paper, Philipson and Mechoulan 
(2003) point to another pitfall of Pigouvian subsidies, namely, the distortion 
of R&D incentives. 
2.5.2 Mandatory vaccination 
Another public policy usually suggested is mandatory vaccination. If manda-
tory vaccination programs do not cover the whole population, the individ-
uals vaccinated reduce the infection probability of the susceptible. The 
willingness to pay is reduced, i.e. mandatory demand crowds out voluntary 
demand. This is a standard argument for why it is difficult to eradicate a 
disease by mandatory vaccination if not the entire population is included 
in the program (see e.g. Philipson (2000, p. 1781)). This argument also 
applies to the model presented here if the social planner has no information 
about individual income levels. But consider that income is observable, then 
a program is much more effective than usual. Since the individuals differ 
in income the public program may only cover the poor and the monopolist 
the rich. 13 
Let m E [0, lj be the share of mandatory vaccinated individuals. Con-
sider that these are the 100 times m percent poorest in the society. The 
13We assume that the social planner can observe income, while the monopolist can-
not, or does not, use this information. As mentioned above, perfect price discrimination 
yields the same results qualitatively. Since vaccination discrimination is lower, the op-
timal program with perfect price discrimination will be smaller in size, but may still be 
necessary. 
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willingness to pay (of the rich) is now given by 
p(0; m) = zo(l - 0 - m) + Za (an - 0/::1). (2.14) 
The optimum is obtained by differentiation with respect to () and is attained 
if 
0m = (1 - m) zo + ZaaH 
2(zo + ZaA) · (2.15) 
The overall share of vaccinated individuals is given by min { 1, m + om}. If 
m+om < 1, then the effect of extending the mandatory vaccination program 
on the share of vaccinated individuals is clearly positive: d (m + om) /dm > 
0. 
Proposition 2.3 With mandatory vaccination programs full immunization 
is achieved at participation rates strictly smaller than 1. 
Proof. Solving m + om = 1 for m yields 
zo + ZaA - ZaaL 
m=-------
zo + 2zaA (2.16) 
The equivalence m < 1 {:::} ZaaH > 0 proves the assertion. • 
Mandatory vaccination is more effective than in other models, e.g. Ge-
offard and Philipson (1997), since the negative effect of the externality is 
reduced by the still high income effect. As long as the income effect is pos-
itive, a residual demand om > 0 served by the monopolist remains. Note 
that the government's information about individual income heterogeneity 
enables it to counter the strategic pricing behavior of the monopolist orig-
inating precisely from such differences among individuals. The proposition 
provides an efficiency based argument for distribution-oriented public health 
vaccination programs like those typically supported by the WHO or the 
Worldbank. 
In line with our comparative static results on income inequality, the share 
of the population to be included in the program is higher, the higher income 
inequality. If a society has a high amount of inequality, it is accompanied 
by a serious amount of vaccination discrimination. Thus, the mandatory 
vaccination program must be relatively large for full immunization. Of 
course, if income inequality is relatively low, there is no need for a public 
vaccination program, since the monopolist already serves the entire market. 
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2.6 Conclusion 
We presented a simple static model to study the effects of monopoly power 
on the supply side in the market for vaccines. We highlighted the importance 
of income inequality when analyzing the monopolist's incentive to exploit 
the external effect of vaccinations to maximize profits. 
In the monopoly solution the poor are discriminated against, i.e., remain 
susceptible, in order to increase the willingness to pay of the rich. Inter-
preting individuals as countries, the developing countries are strategically 
left without immunization. Discrimination was found to be more severe if 
the prevalence elasticity of demand is high, i.e., when the income effect is 
low or the impact of the external effect is high. Societies with low average 
wealth or high income inequality are left with a high share of susceptible 
individuals. With perfect price discrimination the prevalence of the disease 
will be lower. But, in contrast to the standard monopoly model without 
external effects, the outcome may still be inefficient. 
If the social planner is not informed about the individual income levels, 
he is left with two policy alternatives-Pigouvian subsidies and mandatory 
vaccination. Unfortunately, subsidies are of limited use since the positive 
price effect is opposed by two negative effects, the prevalence effect and 
the income effect. In some cases subsidies make things even worse, raising 
doubts about whether Pigouvian subsidies are appropriate at all. As usual, 
mandatory vaccination programs fail to eradicate the disease if not the entire 
population is included in the program. Things change dramatically when 
the social planner is informed about individual income. The public health 
interventions may then be conditional on income. A mandatory program 
covering the poor only yields full vaccination at participation rates that are 
strictly smaller than one. Thus, when income is observable, mandatory vac-
cination programs strictly dominate Pigouvian subsidies. This provides an 
efficiency-based argument for public health vaccination programs directed 
towards the poor or, within an international context, towards poor coun-
tries, like the ones advocated and carried out by the Worldbank or the 
WHO. 
2.7 Appendix 
Here we provide a micro foundation for our reduced form approach. We 
argue that a vaccination can be seen as an insurance against the disease. 
Using this, we will derive a sufficient condition for the willingness to pay 
being increasing in income. Furthermore we show that under this condition 
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a unique equilibrium always exists. 
Vaccination as insurance. Consider an individual with an original income 
of a > 0, which reflects individual productivity or wage-earning abilities, 
and preferences which obey the von Neumann-Morgenstern axioms. The 
individual is exposed to the threat of becoming infected with a transmittable 
disease. The probability of infection is given by 7r E (0, 1], which is taken to 
be exogenous to the individual. 14 The monetary loss from infection depends 
on income, {3 = {3(a). It is sensible to assume that {3 > 0 and {31 E [0, 1], 
since illness will lead to absence from work for a certain time. Hence, a high 
income individual will lose (weakly) more than a low income individual. A 
vaccine is available that yields perfect protection against the disease and 
has no side effects. The price for being vaccinated is denoted p. Then, the 
utility for a vaccinated individual with income a is given by 
u = u(a - p). (2.17) 
The individual decides to vaccinate, if, and only if, the utility u exceeds the 
expected utility Eu of remaining without protection, where 
Eu= 1ru(a - {3(a)) + (1 - 1r)u(a). (2.18) 
The decision to vaccinate amounts to the choice between the certain out-
come and the original risky outcome. Thus, the willingness to pay for 
vaccinations p(1r, a) equals the sum of two components, the increase in 
expected income, 1r{3, and the risk premium. Applying the approxima-
tion formula for the risk premium derived by Arrow and Pratt (see Pratt 
(1964)), we have p(1r, a)~ 1r{3 - ::e::? Va~(X), where EX = a - 1r{3 and 
Var(X) = 1r (1 - 1r) {32 . Then, for a given infection probability, the will-
ingness to pay globally increases in income if for all a > 0 the following 
condition holds: 
u 111 u" u' / (u" (1 - 1r)) - {3 
u" - u' > 2(3' (1 - 1r{3') (32 · (2.19) 
The numerator of the right hand side is always negative while the de-
nominator is positive. In the case of constant absolute risk aversion, the 
left hand side is zero, implying a strictly increasing willingness to pay for 
14 0£ course, in equilibrium, this probability will depend on the number of susceptible 
individuals. This issue is addressed below. Like above, 1T can be interpreted as the 
(symmetric) expectation about the infection risk. 
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vaccinations if /3' > 0. If the utility function exhibits constant relative 
risk aversion, /3' must be sufficiently large for the willingness to pay to be 
non-decreasing in income. 
In the following we will assume that condition (2.19) holds. Furthermore 
we assume sorting of individuals, 80 / 8a < 0, and, reflecting the vaccination 
externality, 81r /80 < 0. The following two paragraphs compare to the 
treatment in Section 2.3 (see e.g. Lemma 2.1). 
Expectations. Consider that the price p is exogenous. Moreover assume 
that (n', a) solves u (a - p) - Eu (n', a) = 0, where 7i' = 1r ( 0 (a)). Then 
expectations will be such that 'lfe = n', i.e. ('if, a) is an equilibrium of the 
second stage game. 
Proof: We have u (a - p) - Eu (n', a) = 0, where 7i' = 1r ( 0 (a)). Suppose 
that 'lfe > n'. Then u (a - p) - Eu (1re, a) > 0. Given the price p, the former 
indifferent individual with income a now obtains a positive rent. Since the 
willingness to pay is increasing in income there exists an income level a < a 
with u (a - p) - Eu (1re, a) = 0. It follows that 0 > 0 and with it 7i' < n'. 
Thus expectations with 'lfe > 7f can never be confirmed. A similar argument 
applies when 'lfe < 'if proving 'lfe = n'. 
Uniqueness. Consider that the price pis exogenous. Assume that u (a - p) = 
Eu (a, 1r ( 0 (a))). Then a is unique. 
Proof: Consider an income a> a. We know from above that u (a - p) -
Eu(a,1r(0(a))) > 0. Since a> a# 0 < 0 # 1i' > 1i' # Eu(a,1r(O(a))) < 
Eu (a, 1r (0 (a))): u (a - p)-Eu (a, 1r (0 (a))) > u (a - p)-Eu (a, 1r (0 (a))) > 
0. Thus no income a > a can be a solution of our problem. As the same 
applies to every a < a, a is unique. 
Consequences. From our analysis above we know that those who demand 
vaccination are, as long as condition (2.19) holds, the rich. Of course, 
it is also possible to construct the theoretical case where the willingness 
to pay decreases with income, e.g. if /3' = 0 and constant relative risk 
aversion is assumed. However, this is contradicted by empirical evidence. A 
direct implication of the increasing willingness to pay is uniqueness. This is 
different from models with positive externalities where multiple equilibria 
may occur. Having these results it is straightforward to generalize our 
reduced form to some function p (0, a) with 8p/80 < 0 and 8p/8a > 0 
implying a downward sloping aggregate demand schedule. 
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Chapter 3 
Price Regulation, Physician 
Density and the Quality of Care 
3.1 Motivation 
In many countries the suppliers of health care services are compensated for 
medical treatments according to a fee schedule chosen by some regulating 
authority. 1 When there is no possibility of competing in prices, suppliers 
of health care resort to other variables to increase market share. Consider, 
for instance, competition between physicians. If a patient needs medical 
assistance two major factors influence his decision for a private medical 
practice (or private clinic): the quality provided by the physicians and the 
distance to the medical practices. Hence, the physicians aiming at higher 
profits will choose quality levels and locations strategically. 
There is a mutual dependency between location and quality decisions. 
Consider two orthopedists A and B, both with an X-ray unit. Assuming 
thai they are closely located, quality competition will then be intensive. 
This can be interpreted in two ways: first, physician B, for example, may 
view these locations as a handicap, because they have to compete in a 
small market. To increase his market share, B can improve his quality 
(e.g. by buying a computer tomograph). Second, assume that B has the 
quality advantage described above. Since A cannot react with price cuts 
to B's advantage he will lose market share. To avoid this, A will also 
buy a computer tomograph. To reduce quality competition, physicians will 
locate as far apart as possible. However, quality levels may still remain high 
1This chapter is a revised version of Nuscheler (2002). 
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62 CHAPTER 3. PRICE REGULATION AND QUALITY 
because of their deterrent effect on other physicians and potential entrants. 
The strategic importance of quality may lead to inefficiently high quality 
provision. 
We study the incentives and consequences of price regulation in a 3-stage 
non-cooperative game where the providers of health care have the following 
successive choices: entry, location and quality. The players' decisions are 
simultaneous at all stages. The sequential structure reflects the different 
degrees of irreversibility in the strategic decisions. Quality, interpreted as 
medical machinery or effort spent on treatments, is variable in the short 
run. Quality choices are strategic given the locations. These cannot be 
changed in the short run because of institutional barriers and high trans-
action costs of relocating. For example, in Germany the licences are only 
valid for small districts. If a physician wants to relocate he has to apply for 
a new licence. Finally, the entry decision is variable only in the long run 
because educational requirements are high. Alternatively, the model may 
be interpreted as competition among private hospitals. Quality in terms of 
medical machinery and size of the hospital rooms or beds per room are far 
more flexible than location. 
The game is solved by backward induction leading to a subgame per-
fect Nash equilibrium. The first finding is that the regulator is not able to 
implement the first-best efficient allocation when price is the only regula-
tory variable. This is not very surprising since it is in general not possible 
to achieve two goals (optimal quality level and optimal number of clinics) 
when only one policy variable is available (price). We consider two versions 
of price regulation with and without commitment. If the regulator can-
not commit herself to a price, the set of possible prices is reduced to time 
consistent policies. The symmetric non-cooperative equilibrium with price 
commitment is a second-best optimum with excess capacity in both quality 
and entry. The second-best price turns out to be not time consistent and 
thus cannot be an equilibrium in the game without commitment. The time 
consistent price policy leads to the first-best level of total quality provision, 
but also to excess entry. Since welfare is lower in the game without commit-
ment, the regulator would like to commit herself to the second-best price 
instead of applying the time consistent (quality-optimal) price. 
Of course, this problem can be solved by introducing a second regulation 
variable. The number of suppliers can be fixed by licences to the first-best 
optimal level. But, from the increases in physician density in all of the 
15 EU member states from 1989 to 1999 (see EUROSTAT (2001, p. 6)), it 
would appear that entry is not very much restricted. A "natural" suggestion 
for overcoming the inefficiencies and the commitment problem is to allow 
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physicians to compete in quality and prices at stage 3 of the game. Like 
the social planner, the physicians trade off the benefits of quality against 
its costs and use the price to reduce quality competition. Consequently, the 
(price-) competitive equilibrium coincides with the time consistent regula-
tory outcome. Introducing price competition has no effect. If the regulator 
is to be (re-) elected by patients the time consistency problem is more se-
vere. Once physicians have entered the market, patients care only about the 
net gain they derive from quality provision, leading to lower welfare than in 
the time consistent regulatory equilibrium. 
Our model is related to the wide range of quality competition ( or ver-
tical differentiation) and spatial competition ( or horizontal differentiation) 
literature, for example, D'Aspremont et al. (1979), Novshek (1980) and Sa-
lop (1979) for horizontal differentiation, Gabszewicz and Thisse (1980) for 
vertical differentiation and Neven and Thisse (1990) for both. But, due to 
the peculiarities of most of the health care systems, there is a major differ-
ence between these models and ours: the absence of the price as a strategic 
variable. The idea of price regulation is found in Ma and Burgess (1993). 
They show, in a vertically differentiated setting, that the introduction of 
price regulation reduces inefficiencies in quality. Since locations are exoge-
nous, their analysis stops where ours begins. The current chapter is closely 
related to Economides (1993) and Gravelle (1999). Both consider the same 
strategic variables and the same sequential structure as those in the model 
presented here. In their models, location choices have no effect on quality 
provision thus precluding (non-price) competition in the presence of price 
regulation. Furthermore, Gravelle (1999) assumes marginal costs to be in-
creasing in quality thereby introducing an adverse effect of quality provision. 
In contrast, we emphasize the public good property of the quality of medi-
cal care by considering zero marginal costs. Economides (1993) focuses on 
different sequential structures and their impact on equilibria. In contrast to 
this chapter, Economides (1993) does not consider price regulation. As we 
do, Economides (1993) concentrates on competitive equilibria where firms 
are direct competitors. Gravelle (1999) follows Salop (1979) and also ana-
lyzes monopoly and kink equilibria. Our model builds on both Economides 
(1993) and Gravelle (1999) in order to consider the important effects of lo-
cation choice on quality choice, thereby capturing non-price competition in 
the health care market. In addition, we explicitly consider, as these and the 
other papers mentioned do not, problems of time consistency. With regard 
to Gravelle (1999), who applies a similar model to the health care market, 
this chapter contributes to the understanding of the relationship between 
the second-best optimum, the time consistent regulatory outcome and the 
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64 CHAPTER 3. PRICE REGULATION AND QUALITY 
equilibrium with price competition. Moreover, adding two more aspects 
to the Gravelle (1999) analysis, we explicitly derive a number of first-best 
efficient regulatory schemes and provide some empirical evidence. 
The chapter is organized as follows: in Section 3.2 we introduce the 
model. The non-cooperative equilibrium is determined in Section 3.3 fol-
lowed by the welfare analysis in Section 3.4. Regulation and time consis-
tency is studied in Section 3.5. Price competition is introduced in Section 
3.6. In Section 3.7 empirical evidence found in the German health care 
system is presented. Section 3.8 concludes. 
3.2 The model 
Consider a population of a city which is uniformly distributed on a circle 
with circumference 1. Each inhabitant of this city has constant (inelastic) 
demand for one identical medical treatment. Location of a patient on the 
circle is denoted by x E [0, 1] and the location of physician i by li E [0, 1] for 
i = 1, ... , n. The physicians are indexed such that 0 S l1 S l2 S ... S ln S 1. 
A patient's utility from one medical treatment by physician i is 
(3.1) 
where qi 2'.: 0 is the quality of medical practice i. Quality is the medical 
equipment of an institution and is assumed to be measurable and observ-
able. Alternatively, quality may be interpreted as an index capturing dif-
ferent dimensions of quality. In the spirit of Donabedian (1980, pp. 79-85) 
these dimensions could be the structure, process, and outcome of care. The 
regulated fee for the treatment is denoted by p and is identical for all physi-
cians. Notice that p may also be interpreted as the premium of a health 
insurance with full coverage. Since we have assumed that the individu-
als have constant demand for one medical treatment, a health insurance 
is redundant. The third term measures transaction costs. These costs are 
quadratic in the arc-length distance from x to li with c > 0.2 The utility 
from not consulting a physician is assumed to be -oo. By this assumption, 
physicians are never local monopolists, their neighbors will always be direct 
competitors. The monopoly and kink equilibria studied in detail by Salop 
(1979) and Gravelle (1999) do not exist in the model presented here.3 For 
2Both Economides (1993) and Gravelle (1999) consider linear transaction costs. In 
consequence, marginal benefits of an increase in quality are independent of locations. 
This precludes an important issue of physician non-price competition. 
3This seems reasonable when analyzing the health care market since, at least in the 
developed countries, everybody has access to medical care. This is in contrast to Gravelle 
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simplicity, we do not allow physicians to compete with physicians who are 
not their neighbors. This is without loss of generality, because a situation 
of competition between non-neighboring physicians will never be an equi-
librium in an entry game. In the language of Salop (1979), there is always 
a competitive, but never a super-competitive, region. 
The patient who is indifferent between the two neighboring medical prac-
tices i and i + 1 is called the critical patient, xfit, and is implicitly given 
by u ( xrt, q;, li; p) = u ( xirit, qi+ 1, li+ 1; p): 
(3.2) 
Note that the critical patient is given by this equation if, and only if, physi-
cians' locations do not coincide. It can be shown that identical locations 
cannot be an equilibrium in pure strategies of the location subgame (see 
proof of Lemma 3.1 in the appendix). Given the critical patients, the mar-
ket share of physician i is Mi = xf it - xf?:_if. The regulator's reimbursement 
policy is designed as a fee-for-service p 2:: 0 generating benefits of pMi. We 
assume symmetry of the physicians' costs structures and that the cost func-
tion K (qi) for the provision of quality qi is quadratic, K (q;) = kq;, k > 0. 
Notice that these costs are fixed with respect to the number of treated pa-
tients. Without loss of generality, other fixed costs are assumed to be zero. 
Setting marginal costs to zero stresses the local public good character of 
medical institutions.4 Physician's i profit function is then given by 
(3.3) 
We do not address the problem of physician induced demand or quality 
elastic (total) demand in this chapter. Thus, the only incentive to provide 
high quality is an increase in market share. Since quality levels are only 
due to quality competition, they can be viewed as a lower bound for more 
realistic, but more complicated, elastic demand or supplier induced demand 
models. Regarding equations (3.2) and (3.3), the physicians' profits depend 
on their distance to their neighbors and their comparative quality advan-
tages. We assume the medical practices to be for-profit institutions. Their 
objective is to maximize profits with respect to location and quality. This 
(1999), where utility of not consulting a physician is normalized to zero. Consider, for 
instance, influenza or appendicitis for the hospital interpretation. In Gravelle's model 
the "patient" may prefer to not take pharmaceuticals or not have an appendectomy, i.e. 
the he may prefer to die. 
4 Economides (1993) assumes the same for private goods. Of course this is equivalent to 
the assumption of constant marginal costs MC> 0. Then pis the net-price: p = p-MC. 
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problem is analyzed in a three-stage non-cooperative game of complete in-
formation consisting of: 
• Stage 1: On the basis of the expected (or announced) price pe E 
[0, oo) the potential entrants decide simultaneously whether to enter 
the industry, and n physicians actually enter. 
• Stage 2: The n physicians simultaneously choose their locations li E 
[0, 1], i = 1, ... ,n. 
• Stage 3: The regulator chooses p E [0,oo) and then then physicians 
decide simultaneously on their quality levels Qi E !O, oo), i = 1, ... , n. 
The sequential structure of the game is argued by the differences in irre-
versibility of the strategic decisions. The entry decision is variable only in 
the long run, because of demanding educational requirements. Institutional 
barriers and transaction costs prevent locations being variable in the short 
run. Assuming that the medical practices have plenty of capacity, quality, 
interpreted as medical machinery, is variable in the short run. This also 
applies to the price set by the regulator. A theoretical, rather than real life, 
reasoning for the sequential structure is as follows: if the physicians choose 
quality and location simultaneously, then, by the same argument as in Gab-
szewicz and Thisse (1992, pp. 291-292), no equilibrium in pure strategies 
exists. Novshek (1980) solved this problem considering conjectural varia-
tions. With quality decision at stage 2 and location at stage 3, a symmetric 
equilibrium in pure strategies exists. Since the equilibrium quality provision 
is zero, quality competition cannot be studied in this setting. 
Since the regulator's price decision is at stage three and the entry deci-
sions on the basis of the expected price are at stage one, the question of the 
regulator's ability to commit herself is crucial for the outcome of the game. 
We consider two games, one in which the regulator can commit on p at stage 
1 and a time consistent choice of p without commitment. For clarification, 
put it differently: there are two four-stage games. The commitment game 
involves the following choices: price, entry, location, and quality. The game 
without commitment involves: entry, location, price, and quality. The sec-
ond game may also be labelled as 'partial commitment game' since prices are 
set prior to quality. We will nevertheless refer to the resulting policy as the 
time consistent regulatory policy as the regulator has ex post no incentive 
to deviate from that policy. Actually she is ex post indifferent between all 
prices. However, before addressing the regulator's price setting problem we 
have to determine the non-cooperative outcome and the first-best efficient 
allocation of the game. 
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3.3 The non-cooperative equilibrium 
3.3.1 Quality 
67 
We solve the game by backward induction leading to a subgame perfect 
Nash equilibrium. Note that we concentrate on pure strategy equilibria. 
At the third stage of the game each physician maximizes his profits with 
respect to quality, taking quality levels of the others and all location choices 
as given yielding 
q": = _P_ (--1- + __ 1_) 
i 4ck li+l - li li - li-1 ' 
i = 1, ... ,n. (3.4) 
We do not observe reaction functions connecting the quality levels of the 
medical practices directly.5 Since symmetry of the cost functions is common 
knowledge and locations are observable, each physician is able to calculate 
his rivals' equilibrium quality levels. Thus, the direct quality reaction can 
be viewed as being hidden in the locations. Besides this indirect reaction to 
others' quality levels, physician i directly reacts with his quality choice to the 
location choices of the neighboring practices. Locational disadvantages can 
be reduced by providing high quality. 6 In this sense, quality and location are 
aggressive strategic variables. Minimum quality is chosen when physician i 
locates in the middle of the practices i - 1 and i + 1. 
The zero slope of the reaction functions hinges on the assumption of 
separability of quality in the utility function. This is a standard assumption 
in these kinds of models to keep the analysis tractable. As long as the 
transaction costs are convex, the quality level depends on the own and on 
the neighbors' locations. That quality increases in price is fairly robust. 
When the utility function is given by f(q) - p - c(x - l)2 and the costs 
of quality provision by K(q), then it is sufficient to assume the following 
plausible properties: f' > 0, f" S 0, and K" 2'.: 0. More quality benefits the 
patient but at a decreasing rate.7 Improving quality gets more expensive 
the higher quality is. 
5This result may be surprising at a first sight. But it is theoretically appealing since 
the zero conjectural variation assumption of the Nash equilibrium is consistent with the 
slope of the reaction functions (see Bresnahan (1981)). 
6 Ma and Burgess (1993) found a similar strategic structure. In their model disad-
vantages in quality can be reduced by price cuts one stage later. Note that the effect of 
location choices on quality choices disappears when considering linear transaction costs 
as in Economides (1993) and Gravelle (1999). 
7The fact that more quality may harm patients can be precluded as physicians will 
never invest along such dimensions. Recall that quality was supposed to be observable. 
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Note that equation (3.4) is not an equilibrium for all possible locations 
as quality goes to infinity when practices' locations become close. Quality 
competition may be called 'ruinous'. In Chapter 4 we explicitly deal with 
that problem by defining an 'existence set', i.e., a set where locations imply 
qualities that yield at least zero profits (and a pure strategy equilibrium). 
This approach is also taken in Economides (1984, 1986, 1989), Hinloopen 
and Marrewijk (1999), and Lambertini (2001). As we study an entry game 
and let the number of firms be determined by a zero profit condition, the 
existence set might be a singleton for every provider. This is somewhat 
inconvenient as a relocation in equilibrium then immediately destroys the 
pure strategy equilibrium.8 However, this problem almost disappears when 
there is a sufficiently large cost associated with entry, e.g., (time consum-
ing) education. As these costs are sunk at the quality stage, firms will make 
positive profits resulting in an existence set with positive mass. To simplify 
the analysis we abstract from such fixed costs which is without loss of gen-
erality. For the moment, we assume that firms are sufficiently located apart 
guaranteeing existence of a pure strategy equilibrium. We are more precise 
on that in the proof of Lemma 3.1. 
3.3.2 Location 
To obtain the optimal location choices of the practices we have to study 
the relation between quality levels and locations in more detail. We have to 
bear in mind that, besides the own quality level, the optimal quality levels 
of the practices i - 1 and i + 1 also depend on the location choice of physician 
i according to equation (3.4). From the respective first order conditions it 




Consider the situation shown in Figure 3.1. Suppose practice i decides to 
locate closer to practice i + 1 (dli > 0) starting from a symmetric situation. 
8 Mostly this will not happen in an £-environment since the number of firms in the 
market is an integer while zero profits may require a non-integer number of firms. 
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The competition in this market area becomes more intensive. The intensity 
is further increased by the enhancement of quality of practice i according 
to equation (3.6). Practice i captures some of the market of practice i + 1. 
Since the location choices are simultaneous, and the optimization is with 
respect to given locations of the others, there is no reaction in location of 
practice i + 1. Physician's i + 1 response to the approaching (and quality 
improving) practice i is to increase his own practice's quality in the extent of 
(3.7). Competition between physicians i and i-1 is weakened because of the 
increased distance. Practice i-1 can lower its quality following (3.5) without 
losing much of the market, if any at all. We have dqt+i > dqt > 0 > dqt_ 1 
for dli > 0 and dqi+j = 0 for all j {/. { -1, 0, 1 }. The relocation's impact on 
quality provision leaves the market share of physician i unchanged. Since 
the quality level has increased, i's profit is reduced. 
q 
1,.2 di;> 0 
Figure 3.1: Starting from the perfect symmetric arrangement a 
relocation of physician i closer to i+ 1 ( dli > 0) alters equilibrium 
quality provision. 
Lemma 3.1 The perfectly symmetric arrangement of the practices is a 
Nash equilibrium of the location subgame. 
The proof is presented in the appendix. Assume that asymmetric equi-
libria do exist. If the number of entrants in an asymmetric situation equals 
the number of physicians in the symmetric case, total quality provision will 
be higher and some physicians will incur a loss. Therefore we will have a 
(weakly) smaller number of practices in asymmetric equilibria. Since we 
Robert Nuscheler - 978-3-631-75167-1
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 07:31:18AM
via free access
70 CHAPTER 3. PRICE REGULATION AND QUALITY 
want to study inefficiency in quality due to quality competition and not due 
to asymmetry, we limit ourselves to the symmetric case. 
In the symmetric equilibrium the optimal quality provision of equation 
(3.4) reduces to 
i = 1, ... ,n. (3.8) 
In equilibrium the quality increases linearly in the number of entrants and 
also linearly in price.9 Quality competition sharpens, the more physicians 
enter the market and the better paid the medical treatments get. Regarding 
the first mentioned effect, we see that this model tends to produce strong 
inefficiencies in total quality. An increase in the transportation cost param-
eter c leads to a decrease in equilibrium quality. The reason for this is that 
providing a high quality is less effective than before as patients' responsive-
ness to quality is reduced by higher transaction costs. The marginal benefits 
of quality are decreasing when c increases (this is like closing the umbrel-
las in Figure 3.1 a little). Increases in k directly drive the costs of quality 
provision up. All other things equal, the quality level has to be reduced to 
equalize marginal benefits and marginal costs. 
3.3.3 Entry 
Suppose that the profits earned outside the health care market are zero. 
Then the number of entrants is implicitly given by the zero profit condition 
~ - k(-¥,£ )2 = 0. The only real solution is 
n* = (4~k) ½ (3.9) 
For simplicity we ignore the fact that n* may not be integer valued. With 
a first brief look at equation (3.9), the result seems counter intuitive. Why 
should the equilibrium number of entrants be lowered by an increase in 
price? Initially, one would expect the opposite, since the benefits per patient 
are increasing. But we have seen in equation (3.8) that a higher price 
increases quality competition among the entrants. This higher intensity 
in competition is anticipated at the entry stage. Because of the quadratic 
9 When neglecting non-price competition as, for example, in Economides (1993) and 
Gravelle (1999), quality levels are independent of the number of firms. This seems un-
reasonable as the number of firms is a measure of competition intensity. Consequently, 
first-best efficient quality is in terms of individual quality levels in Gravelle (1999) where 
it is in total quality in our model. Thereby we stress the substitutability between quality 
and the number of practices, i.e., access to medical care. 
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quality costs, the higher price has a deterrent effect. 10 The argument for the 
parameters c and k works in the opposite direction. Quality competition 
becomes weaker with an increase in transportation costs or quality costs 
making the health market more attractive. The quality cost effect is weaker 
since the positive effect is accompanied by a negative cost effect of quality 
provision. Before studying welfare we summarize the results of this section. 
Proposition 3.1 The symmetric non-cooperative e,quilibrium of the sequen-
,,.,,• ( P2)J. tial 3-stage entry-location-quality game is given by: q• = 2ck = ~ 3 , 
l*-l* -.l... f ll'-l • d •-(4c2k)½ i i-l - n•, ,or a z - , ... , n an n - P . 
3.4 The first-best optimum 
In the presence of convex costs of quality provision and convex transporta-
tion costs, the first-best optimum is symmetric, i.e. the quality levels are 
equal, qi = q for all i = 1, ... , n, and the practices are arranged symmetrically 
on the circle. Then the welfare function is given by 
2 C W=q-knq ---. 
12n2 
(3.10) 
The first two terms measure the net welfare gain from quality provision. 
This is reduced by the expected (or average) transportation costs. When 
equal welfare weights are considered, the price does not appear in the welfare 
function, i.e. p is a welfare neutral transfer from patients to physicians. 11 
Welfare is indirectly, not directly, affected by changes in p. The first-best 
efficient outcome is obtained by differentiation with respect to q and n. 
Proposition 3.2 The welfare optimum of the sequential 3-stage entry-loca-
tion-quality game is attained iff (1) the number of entrants is nib= 2~k, and 
(2) the entrants are arranged symmetrically, i.e. with distance lfb - l{~ 1 = 
r,h for all i = l, ... , nib, and (3) the quality provided is qfb = 2n;bk = 4;k2 
for all i = l, ... , nib_ The associated welfare is Wlb = 16~k2. 
10This reasoning holds, for instance, for cost functions of the form K(q) = kq.,., where 
k > 0 and r > 1. For more complex cost functions the reverse may obtain. If marginal 
costs of quality provision are very low, then the costs incurred by the tightened compe-
tition are low, making the health care market more attractive. This also applies when 
marginal costs increase rapidly as the prohibitive costs prevent intensive quality compe-
tition occurring. 
11 This is why the optimal policy of the 'partial commitment game' is time consistent. 
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Note that total quality provision is independent of n and c and is equal to 
lk. Obviously, the higher quality costs are, the lower the welfare maximizing 
level of total quality. Increasing transportation costs drives the welfare 
maximizing number of firms up without changing total quality provision, 
i.e. physicians' quality and physician density are substitutes. 
3.5 Price regulation and time consistency 
In Section 3.3 we solved the 3-stage game with the flat-rate p seen as exoge-
nous or as the expected (equilibrium) fee. We now address the regulator's 
price setting problem. Her goal is to set the "welfare maximizing" fee such 
that the non-cooperative solution stated in Proposition 3.1 approaches the 
first-best optimum stated in Proposition 3.2. 
3.5.1 Two benchmarks and the first-best optimum 
Given that the fee influences the quality decisions of the physicians as well 
as the number of entries, we cannot expect to be able to implement the 
first-best optimum by just setting the welfare maximizing price. We have 
two regulation goals ( the first is to fix the number of firms to nib = 2~k and 
the second is to induce quality choice qfb = 4,;3p for all i = 1, ... , nib) and 
only one regulatory variable. To illustrate this, we study two benchmarks. 
The first benchmark is created by setting a fee such that the total quality 
provision is optimal (quality optimal price pq) and the second by setting a 
fee inducing optimal entry (entry optimal price Pn), 
Lemma 3.2 If the regulation authority chooses the fee Pq = ~ = 16!k2 
total quality is fixed to the first-best level. The number of entrants is nq = 
4ck > 2~k = nib and thus identified as excess oopacity. Welfare at Pq is 
W _ 11 ~ 0.057 
q - 192c.k 2 ~ cie2· 
Individual quality levels are qq = sc\2 and are thus not first-best efficient, 
while total quality provision is. The quality optimal benchmark differs from 
the first-best solution only by number of physicians who provide the first-
best efficient amount of total quality. 
Lemma 3.3 To induce the optimal number of practices, a fee of Pn = 2~k2 
is required. When faced with this price, physicians provide a quality level of 
qn = 2;k2 > 4,;3k2 = qlb which is identified as excess oopacity in quality. At 
this price welfare is Wn = - 1~~2 . 
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It is worth noting that we observe excess capacity in both benchmarks. 
This is because the quality level varies in price linearly, and the number of 
entrants varies inversely. Since pq < Pn, it is impossible to implement the 
first-best optimum by just choosing the correct price. 
3.5.2 First-best efficient regulation 
The above mentioned problem can be solved by applying a second regu-
latory variable or by non-constant compensation. Suppose the regulator 
could compensate on the basis of any non-constant reimbursement scheme. 
If marginal compensation increases with market share, optimal quality pro-
vision could be induced. Average compensation could be set to induce 
proper entry. 13 Let M be the market share of the physician. If, for in-
stance, individual compensation is based on Pind(M) = - 2;k2 + 1kM, the 
symmetric non-cooperative equilibrium will be first-best efficient (see ap-
pendix for a derivation). Licence fees are somewhat simpler. If the price 
induces the optimal quality level, the regulator has to charge an amount of 
16~gk3 to implement the first-best optimum. Introducing lower bounds for 
quality (q ?: qfb), like the minimum standard in Economides (1993), and 
controlling entry by a suitable fee (p = Bc3k 2 ) will also be first-best efficient. 
Disease management programs may be seen as such a minimum standard.13 
Licence fees can be seen as a tax imposed through demanding ( and time 
consuming) educational requirements. 14 Looking at the increases in physi-
cian densities in the 15 EU member states from 1989 to 1999 (EUROSTAT 
(2001, p. 6)), it would seem that the effect of the "tax" on entry is lim-
ited. Furthermore, as far as we know, neither non-constant compensation 
nor explicit licence fees have ever been considered in health care regulation. 
One reason may be that the assumption of a benevolent regulator is not 
always appropriate. Health care regulation may be viewed as the outcome 
of a bargaining game or as the outcome of a rent seeking contest where 
interest groups strategically interact. Another reason may be that prestige 
is a (major) factor in investments in health care. This especially applies to 
the financing of hospitals and to high-tech medicine. 
12We are indebted to Amihai Glazer for pointing this out. 
13In Germany the first disease management programs started on July 1, 2002. However, 
there is a large political debate about whether these guidelines introduce upper or lower 
bounds on the quality of care. 
14 We thank an anonymous referee for providing this interpretation. 
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3.5.3 The second-best optimum 
Suppose that the regulator can commit herself to price policies. Welfare 
is maximized with respect to the price. Substituting the non-cooperative 
solutions for q and n of Proposition 3.1, (3.10) simplifies to 
23 ( p2 ) ½ 
W = 24 2ck2 - p. 
Proposition 3.3 The second-best optimum of the sequential 3-stage entry-
location-quality game is attained iff the practices are arranged symmetrically 
and the price is set to p8 b = ( ;~) 3 2c~2 • The resulting equilibrium values are: 
sb _ 72 k sb _ ( 23 ) 2 1 I'. ll · _ 1 sb d wsb _ ( 23 ) 3 1 ~ 
~-065- 23c 'qi - 36 2ck2 ,or a i - , ... ,n an - 36 4ck2 ~ 
cf'l· 
These values are between the values of the benchmarks given by Lemma 
3.2 and Lemma 3.3, implying excess capacity in both entry and total quality 
provision. The deviation of these values from those induced by pq is small 
and consequently welfare is close to Wq as well. 
3.5.4 Time consistent regulation 
When the social planner cannot commit herself to a certain price, the time 
consistency issue arises. Whether the second-best outcome can be imple-
mented or not depends on the credibility of the announcement of p = p8 b 
prior to stage 1 of the game. If the regulator has an incentive to reopti-
mize after the entry and location decisions based on p8 b have been made, 
then p8 b is not credible. Differentiating (3.10) with respect to q we observe 
preop = ~ to be the welfare maximizing fee. Welfare increases from o~i~5 
to 0~~;1 . But, with rational physicians, it is impossible to have different fees 
at the different stages of the game. Physicians anticipate the regulator's in-
centive to reoptimize between stages two and three and base their decisions 
on preop. Since the functional form corresponds to the quality optimal fee, 
the decisions are based on Pq resulting in welfare o~i~7 as calculated above. 
Since wsb > Wq, the regulator would like to bind herself to p 8 b. Of course, 
this argument, and with it, the time inconsistency result do not rely on the 
second-best price. 
Proposition 3.4 When the regulator sets the price between stages 2 and 
3 the optimal price is given by Pq· As the regulator has no incentive to 
change price after quality decisions have been made, pq is the optimal time 
consistent policy. 
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3.5.5 The median voter equilibrium 
In a democracy it may be more appropriate to consider an elected regulator. 
Suppose the regulator wants to be re-elected, then the price will be set in 
favor of the electorate. If there is majority voting, the median voter decides 
on p. Assuming that the share of physicians relative to the share of patients 
in the population is small, the fee will be chosen to maximize the patients' 
utility function. Utility is obtained by replacing the quality cost term in 
the welfare function (3.10) by p. 
Suppose the voters take the effect of changes in p on firms profits and 
the equilibrium number of firms into account. If they can decide on the 
number of licences and the fee, they can implement the first-best optimum. 
The second-best optimum is the outcome if they can only decide on the fee. 
But the sequential structure of the game implies myopic patients. Hence, 
the voting behavior described above is not time consistent. Given a certain 
number of practices, patients care only about their net gain from quality 
provision q - p. Differentiating this expression with respect to p yields a 
first order condition of n = 2ck. If this equation holds, the voters have 
no incentive to change the price after entry and location decisions have 
been made. The price corresponding to n = 2ck characterizes the voting 
equilibrium. 
Proposition 3.5 The symmetric voting equilibrium of the sequential 3-
stage entry-location-quality game is attained iff the price is given by pv = 
2c~ 2 • The resulting equilibrium values are: qv = 2}k2 , nv = 2ck, and wv- 1 
- -48ck2 · 
Excess capacity in both entry and total quality is observed. The price 
exceeds the second-best price implying higher quality provision but fewer 
entrants than in the second-best equilibrium. Compared to the time con-
sistent regulatory equilibrium, price and quality are higher and the number 
of firms is smaller. Total quality provision doubled while costs are 8 times 
as high. Relative to the costs, the quality of care is poor. 15 The welfare 
derived from the values of Proposition 3.5 is lower than in the time consi&-
tent regulatory case, i.e wv < Wq (see Lemma 3.2). Thus, the commitment 
problem is more severe. 16 
15This is exactly what may be concluded from the World Health Report 2000 for the 
German health care system (see WHO (2000, p. 153)). 
16When precluding physician non-price competition as in Gravelle (1999), completely 
different results are obtained, since the voters no longer have the incentive to promote 
quality competition by increasing the fee. The voting equilibrium then has lower price, 
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3.5.6 A numerical example 
To illustrate the results of the welfare and time consistency analysis we pro-
vide a numerical example for c = 48 and k = f (see Table 3.5.6 below). The 
first-best optimum is attained if the total quality of 4 quality units is pro-
vided by 4 physicians. This can be done by setting p = 3 and demanding i 
as licence fee. In this case, expected welfare is 0.25. The benchmarks shown 
in the following two rows show excess entry in the quality optimal case and 
excess quality provision in the entry optimal case. In the commitment game 
(second-best) we observe excess capacity in terms of both entry and total 
quality. But this policy is not time consistent. The regulator's incentive 
to reoptimize is shown in the second last row where a price reduction af-
ter the entry decisions have been made (based on the second-best price) 
increases welfare from 0.09 to 0.10. The unique time consistent equilibrium 
is given by the quality optimal price policy. The commitment problem is 
more severe in the median voter equilibrium as indicated by the last row. 
p n q n•q w 
first-best - 4 1 4 0.25 
quality optimal 0.08 24 0.16 4 0.08 
entry optimal 18 4 6 24 -12.25 
second-best 0.17 18.78 0.27 5.11 0.09 
reoptimized 0.14 18.78 0.21 4 0.10 
median voter 0.66 12 0.66 8 -0.44 
Table 3.1: A numerical example for c = 48 and k = f. 
3.6 Price Competition 
In the presence of the commitment problem discussed in the previous sec-
tion, a natural suggestion would be to allow physicians to also compete in 
prices. Suppose that at stage 3 of the game physicians decide simultane-
ously on quality and prices. Then the critical patient, i.e. the patient who 
lower quality, and fewer firms. This changes implications for the movement of the health 
care market, especially for the quality of care, when exposing the health care market to 
price competition. 
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is indifferent between the practices i and i + 1, is given by 
x'?rit = qi - qi+l 
• 2c(li+1 - li) 
Pi - Pi+l + li + li+l 
2c(li+l - li) 2 
(3.11) 
The optimal mix of prices and quality is obtained by differentiating the 
profit function with respect to Pi and qi. 
Proposition 3.6 The symmetric equilibrium of the sequential 3-stage entry-
location-quality and price game is given by the quality optimal benchmark, 
i.e. by the optimal time consistent regulatory outcome. 
The proof is presented in the appendix. Since the competitive outcome 
coincides with optimal time consistent regulatory outcome, the commitment 
problem cannot be solved by introducing price competition into the health 
care market. This is not very surprising since both the regulator and the 
physicians trade off the benefits of quality provision against its costs, where 
price is used to reduce quality competition. 
3. 7 Reimbursement of physicians in Germany 
In recent decades, we have seen many health care reforms in Germany. But 
reimbursement of physicians has always remained on a fee-for-service basis. 
In 1993 there was a switch from cost reimbursement to sectoral budgets in 
the German health care market. The (regional) statutory sickness funds17 
bargain with the (regional) physicians' associations about a (regional) bud-
get for panel doctors. After the budgets are agreed, the physicians' asso-
ciations reimburse the physicians on a fee-for-service basis subject to the 
constraints given by the fixed budgets. More precisely: a relative value sys-
tem is applied. Every service is scored with a certain number of points. The 
monetary value of one point is endogenous. It is determined by dividing the 
budget by the total number of points submitted for reimbursement by all 
physicians. Consequently the budgets in Germany are always met. 18 
Our model can be applied to the German reimbursement system. The 
mass of patients was assumed to be equal to one. Then, total benefits of 
the market are p. This is why p can alternatively be interpreted as a fee-for-
service or as a budget for physician services. The point value in our model 
17In Germany health insurance companies are called sickness funds. 
18 For a more detailed description of the German physician reimbursement system see 
OECD (1992, pp. 57-72) and more recent European Observatory on Health Care Systems 
(2000, pp. 102-106). 
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is observed very easily. Every patient receives the same service independent 
of the physician he visits, and it is not possible for the physicians to treat a 
patient more than once. Hence, changes in p directly translate into identical 
changes in the point value. If one treatment is scored with one point the 
point value is p. 
From equation (3.9) we know that the equilibrium number of entrants 
is a decreasing function of p. This counter intuitive result was explained by 
equation (3.8): the quality increases linearly in price, and, in the presence of 
convex costs of quality provision, this has a deterrent effect. Or, the other 
way round, a drop in prices makes the health care market more attractive. 
The reduced quality competition encourages further entries. This inverse 
relationship is observed in Germany (see Figure 3.2). The point value was 
decreasing from 1993 to 1996. The improvement in 1997 is due to the intro-
duction of clinic budgets in 1997 (see SVRKAiG (1998, pp. 369-372)). Since 
the clinic budgets were introduced in July 1997, the 1998 value is higher. 
Without these changes the point value would have decreased further. 19 In 
the political debate it is argued that the increasing number of physicians 
caused the decline in the point value. This effect is called the treadmill 
effect in a fixed budget system. Applying the target income hypothesis, 
an expected decrease in the point value implies an increase in the number 
of (invoiced) treatments, i.e. supplier induced demand (see Benstetter and 
Wambach (2001)). This is very intuitive and is supported by Figure 3.2. 
Our model shows that, due to spatial and quality competition, this relation 
persists in the absence of supplier induced demand. 
Suppose that supplier induced demand is absent from the German health 
care market. Furthermore, assume that the point value in Germany is be-
tween the benchmarks studied in Section 3.5 and that the regulator cannot 
commit herself. Excess capacity in total quality and entry was identified 
in this price range. 20 To attain the first-best solution price cuts should be 
accompanied by a drop in physician licences. Since this is not observed in 
Germany, given that our model applies, the regulation of the health care 
market is not welfare maximizing. It seems as if the market converges to 
the time consistent equilibrium instead of to the first-best efficient outcome. 
Entry regulation is too weak. 
One may argue that applying our model to this question is not appropri-
19 We are indebted to Dr. Dahlhausen from the Kassenarztliche Bundesvereinigung 
(KBV) for providing the pointvalue data. For some of that data see KEV (2000, p. C6). 
20 The Sachverstandigenrat fur die Konzertierte Aktion im Gesundheitswesen 
(SVRKAiG) reports, depending on the disease, under-provision and over-provision of 
health care services in Germany (see SVRKAiG (2002)). Our model only explains over-
provision due to quality competition. 
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Figure 3.2: For the Western Lander a reciprocal relationship 
between the point value and licenced physicians is observed. 
Source: KBV (2001, p. A20) and BMG (1999, p. 260). 
ate since the point value was decreasing but the size of the budget was not. 
As a proxy for the budget's size we use the expenditure for treatments by 
panel doctors (see Figure 3.3). From 1993 to 1999 the expenditure increased 
by roughly 9 percent in 1991 prices. 21 Technical progress is one of the main 
drivers of that growth. Making this progress available to the insured im-
proves the quality of the medical treatments they receive. 22 This can be 
interpreted as an increase in voter influence on health care regulation. The 
increase in expenditure, i.e. in price, drives quality up from the time consis-
tent quality level to ( or in direction of) the voting equilibrium value. Our 
model cannot explain the increase in active physicians without changing 
the specification of the quality cost function. 23 However, approaching the 
21 We deflated the numbers for expenditure on treatments found in Bundesminiterium 
fiir Gesundheit, BMG (1999) and KBV (2001) by the CPI for all households. 
22 Alternatively, the expenditure for outpatient care per capita can be used for the same 
argument. The increase from 1993 to 1998 is about 11 percent. 
23 As argued in Section 3.3, if marginal costs of quality provision are low or prohibitive, 
then the number of practices increases in the budget. Since the quality provided in 
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- - expenditure for outpatient care per capita (left scale, in DM) 
- expenditure for treatments by panel doctors (right scale, in bill. DM) 
Figure 3.3: Expenditure for outpatient care per capita and for 
treatments by licenced physicians, both for the Western Lander 
and both in 1991 prices. Source: Statistisches Bundesamt (2001, 
p. 129), BMG (1999, p. 402), and KBV (2001, p. G2). 
first-best efficient outcome starting from the time consistent outcome, price 
increases should be accompanied by a drop in physician licences. We again 
conclude that licences are allocated too generously. 
3.8 Conclusion 
We presented a model of physician competition in a price regulated envi-
ronment. In the absence of price competition physicians resort to other 
variables to increase profits: location and quality. The problem was ana-
lyzed in a 3-stage entry-location-quality game. We restricted ourselves to 
inelastic demand and symmetric equilibria to obtain a lower benchmark case 
with respect to the level of quality provision. We found that quality is an im-
Germany is likely to be high, it may be reasonable to assume prohibitive or at least very 
high marginal costs. 
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portant strategic variable used aggressively to reduce locational handicaps. 
The closer two physicians are located, the tighter competition, and, conse-
quently, the higher the quality provided. An increase in the fee reduces the 
equilibrium number of entrants. The higher price sharpens quality compe-
tition to an extent that it has a deterrent effect. The inverse relationship of 
the point value and the number of licenced physicians observed in Germany 
is mainly attributed to the treadmill effect. This may indeed be the more 
reasonable explanation, but our model shows that the relation also persists 
in the absence of supplier induced demand due to quality competition. 
The regulator's goal is to set a welfare maximizing fee. We studied two 
prices resulting in two benchmarks, one in which the number of firms is 
first-best efficient, and the other in which total quality is. Since these two 
prices do not coincide, the first-best optimum cannot be implemented by 
just setting the correct fee. If the regulator can commit herself, she will 
apply the second-best fee which lies between the benchmark prices. But 
only the second of the two benchmarks was identified as being a credible 
price policy. Hence, in the game without commitment, the second-best 
policy is ruled out as time inconsistent. The regulator is limited to the 
quality optimal price. Since expected welfare is lower in the game without 
commitment, the regulator would like to bind herself to the second-best 
price. The commitment problem cannot be solved either by introducing 
price competition into the health care market or by letting voter patients 
decide on the price. The outcome of the price competition game corresponds 
to the time consistent regulatory outcome. In the voter equilibrium, the 
commitment problem is more severe. 
Theoretically, the first-best efficient outcome can be implemented by 
simultaneously limiting entry by means of licences. Studying the relation 
between the price and the number of physicians makes it possible to judge 
whether such a policy is being applied. In both the scenarios discussed in the 
previous section it was indicated that, although there is entry regulation in 
Germany, like need-related planning in the allocation of physician licences, 
entry regulation seems too weak. 
3.9 Appendix 
Proof. (Lemma 3. 1) Since we want to prove that the symmetric arrange-
ment of practices is a Nash equilibrium we take symmetric locations of all 
practices j -f- i as given and show that the best physcian i can do is to locate 
in the middle between practices i - 1 and i + 1. 
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We restrict the analysis to the existence set Q, where i's location decision 
yields a pure strategy equilibrium in the quality subgame. Q is non-empty 
if the distance between all frims, 1/n, is sufficiently large. In other words, 
n must be sufficiently low. Q is non-empty if n ~ n• (see equation (3.9)). 
To show that i's best response is locate in the middle between i - 1 and 
i + 1 we differentiate the objective function with respect to li. Substituting 
the expressions following the equations (3.5) to (3.7) into the first order 
condition and rearranging yields 
8c2k anp 1 1 
----
p2 oli (li - l;_1)3 (lt+1 - li)3 
1 1 + -------=,---- - -------=,----- (3.12) 
(l;+1 - li) 2 (li - l;_1) (l;+1 - li)2 (lt+ 2 - l;+1) 
1 1 + ---------- - ---------
(Ii - l;_1)2 (1;_1 -1;_2) (Ii -1;_1)2 (lt+1 - li). 
It is easy to see that, in the symmetric solution, the right-hand side of 
(3.12) is zero. To identify this decision as a global maximum on (1;_1, z;+1) 
we have to show that i is worse off when he deviates from the symmet-
ric location or that he is better off when he moves to the center, starting 
from any asymmetric location. Although (3.12) is hard to interpret, the 
sign is determined for all Ii E ( 1;_ 1 , z;+ 1) . Assume that the practices have 
symmetric locations except i which is closer to i - 1 than to i + 1, then: 
1;_1 - l;_ 2 = 1;+2 - li+l = ¾, li+l - li > ¾ and li - lt_ 1 < ¾- By making a 
small step to the midpoint, i can increase profits since the right hand side 
of (3.12) is positive. By the same argument, this is true when i is closer to 
i + l. Notice that, in this case, a movement to the center requires dli to 
be negative. Hence, given the symmetric location of the others, i cannot be 
better off when he deviates from the perfect symmetric solution, and he is 
actually worse off. • 
Proof. (The reimbursement p(M) = - 2,!2 + 45kM yields the first-
best solut·ion.) The average individual compensation is set such that the 
physicians exactly break even when providing the first-best quality level in 
a market with nib competitors: 
Pind( nib) = k( lb)2 
nib q . 
We obtain Pind(nlb) sct2 . Using the definition of the critical patient 
from equation (3.2), the market share of physician i is given by Mi = 
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lf-c(2qi - 9i+l - Qi-1) + .l_ When the individual reimbursable price depends 
- n 
on market share, the objective function is given by Ili = Pind(Mi)Mi - kq;. 
Assuming symmetry, the first order condition for profit maximizing quality 
provision is q; = 2~ (P~nd+Pindn). This equation must hold at nfb yielding: 
Inserting qfb and Pind(nfb) gives the solution for p': P~ninfb) = ik· There 
is an infinite number of reimbursement schemes satisfying the conditions 
Pind(nfb) = 8;k2 and P~nd(nfb) = ik. The easiest is the one mentioned in 
the text, i.e. p(M) = - 2c3k2 + ;kM, where Mis physician market share. • 
Proof. ( Proposition 3. 6) Substituting the expressions for the critical 
patients into the profit function yields the objective function for the third 
stage of the game: 
II· _Pi [qi - qi+l Pi - Pi+l _ qi-1 - qi+ Pi-1 - Pi] 
• - 2c li+1 - li li+l - li li - li-1 li - li-1 
+ ~i (li+l - li-1) - kq;, 
When solving for the symmetric equilibrium, the first order conditions are 
given by 
proving the assertion. • 
np 
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Chapter 4 
Gatekeeping and Secondary 
Care Competition 
4.1 Motivation 
The UK and the Scandinavian countries are examples of countries where 
general practitioners (GPs) have a gatekeeping role in the health care sys-
tem.1 Patients do not have direct access to secondary care. They need a 
referral from their (primary care) GP to get access to a hospital or a special-
ist.2 Restricting direct access to secondary care by giving GPs a gatekeeper 
role is currently on the political agenda in Germany, while in Sweden there 
has been some debate about whether patients should be able to approach 
a specialist or a hospital directly. The current chapter contributes to the 
discussion on gatekeeping by analyzing the competition effects that arise 
when GPs are equipped with a gatekeeping role. 
In general, there are three main arguments for introducing gatekeeping 
in health care markets {see Scott (2000)). Firstly, it is usually claimed that 
gatekeepers contribute to cost control by reducing 'unnecessary' interven-
tions.3 Second, efficiency in the health care system increases as the patients 
more appropriately treated by a GP are screened out. Third, it is argued 
1This chapter closely follows Brekke, Nuscheler and Straume (2003). 
2 In the US, several Health Maintenance Organizations also practice gatekeeping. Re-
cently, however, some HMOs have relaxed the restrictions on access to specialists (see, 
e.g., Ferris et al., 2001). 
3 Although this is a common argument for restricting access to secondary care, the 
empirical evidence that gatekeeping actually contributes to lower health care expenditures 
seems to be scarce (see, e.g., Barros (1998)). 
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that secondary care is used more efficiently since "GPs usually have better 
information than patients about the quality of care available from secondary 
care providers" (Scott (2000, p. 1177)). In the present model we focus on 
the third argument, highlighting the fact that making this information avail-
able to patients changes the nature of competition between secondary care 
providers, which in turn affects the social desirability of gatekeeping. 
As pointed out in a seminal paper by Arrow (1963), uncertainty and 
asymmetric information make health care markets different from other mar-
kets. Uncertainty generates demand for health insurance, implying that 
non-price strategies are important in attracting patients as the consump-
tion of medical care is paid for by a third party (see also Section 1.4). 
Asymmetric information is present in the sense that consumers (patients) 
are typically less informed about their health conditions, and thus the ap-
propriate treatment, than the providers of medical care. In this chapter we 
stress both these features of health care markets. 
Building on the familiar model of Hotelling (1929), we consider a sec-
ondary care market with two providers (hospitals). In order to attract 
patients, and thus obtain third party payments, the hospitals have two 
strategic variables at their disposal - location and quality of care. We refer 
to location as the specialization or service mix at a hospital, though it may 
also be interpreted in geographical terms. Thus, hospitals engage in non-
price competition in terms of both horizontal and vertical differentiation of 
services. 
The major aim of our model is to highlight the informational role of 
gatekeepers in such secondary care markets. Without gatekeepers, we as-
sume that at least some of the patients are uninformed about both their 
own specific diagnosis and the exact characteristics of the secondary care 
market. Thus, with direct access to secondary care, patients' choices may 
be subject to substantial errors. First, a patient may end up in a poor 
match, i.e., he may choose the hospital that is less able to cure his dis-
ease. Second, he may decide to go to the specialist who provides the lower 
quality of care. By introducing GP gatekeeping we assume that all rele-
vant information is transmitted to the patients, thereby enabling them to 
make informed choices.4 Thus, GPs observe the actual disease of a patient 
with certainty and know which specialist is more able to cure a particular 
disease. Additionally, we assume that GPs obtain perfect quality signals. 
Both features are in line with the above mentioned second argument for 
introducing gatekeeping. 
4 We abstract from agency problems by assuming that the GPs truthfully convey their 
information to the patients. 
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We analyze the informational role of gatekeepers by applying two dif-
ferent variants of the basic model. In the first part of the chapter we con-
sider an exogenously given number (fraction) of patients that are a priori 
fully informed about their disease and the most appropriate treatment for 
this condition. One possible interpretation is to think of these patients as 
the chronically ill who have obtained all relevant information through re-
peated consumption. Introducing GP gatekeeping is then simply equivalent 
to making the uninformed fraction of patients fully informed. Since gate-
keeping can only be regulated directly, we refer to this variant as 'direct 
gatekeeping'. Although we consider gatekeeping to be costless, we find that 
introducing strict gatekeeping, i.e., making it compulsory to get a referral 
to secondary care, is not necessarily socially desirable. The reason is that 
more informed patients lead to more intense quality competition between 
hospitals, amplifying the hospitals' incentives to differentiate their services. 
Consequently, gatekeeping may induce too much quality and differentia-
tion from the viewpoint of social welfare.5 However, we show that, under 
second-best price regulation, gatekeeping is always socially beneficial. Thus, 
gatekeeping should be accompanied by proper price regulation. 
One might ask, however, if an uninformed patient would not voluntarily 
consult a GP before seeking secondary care. We argue that consulting a 
GP may in itself involve costs for the patients, such as out-of-pocket pay-
ments, travelling and/or time costs. A patient would then have to compare 
the benefits of consulting a GP - in terms of reduced risk of choosing the 
less suitable hospital - against such costs. This situation is analyzed in the 
second part of the chapter, where we let the fraction of informed patients be 
endogenously determined by this trade off. A crucial feature of this variant 
of the model is that GP consultation can be indirectly influenced through 
price regulation. Consequently, we will refer to this mechanism as 'indirect 
gatekeeping'. The endogeneity of the consultation decision alters hospitals' 
incentives. Although differentiation relaxes quality competition, it also in-
creases the fraction of informed patients, since the (expected) benefits of 
consulting a GP now are higher. Thus, the incentives for differentiation of 
services are weakened. Moreover, there is now a real cost of introducing a 
strict gatekeeping regime, which is reflected in the individual costs of GP 
consultation. In this case, individual consultation incentives coincide with 
5This result is related to Dranove et al. (2003), who empirically analyze whether 
public disclosure of patient health outcomes at the level of the individual physician or 
hospital ('report cards') is beneficial to patients and social welfare. They find that report 
cards led to both selection behavior by providers and improved matching of patients with 
hospitals. However, on net this led to higher levels of resource use and to worse health 
outcomes (for sicker patients). 
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the social incentives, implying that there is no need to regulate gatekeeping 
directly. However, we show that second-best price regulation implies a de 
facto strict gatekeeping regime - in which every patient finds it beneficial to 
consult a GP before accessing the secondary care market - if quality costs or 
GP consulting costs are sufficiently low, or if mismatch costs are sufficiently 
high. 
The chapter relates to both the general literature on spatial competition 
and the literature on (imperfect) competition in health care markets. The 
interaction between quality and location choices has been investigated by 
Economides (1989) under price competition and Brekke et al. (2002) under 
price regulation. This chapter contributes to this literature by introducing 
imperfect information into the framework. As previously mentioned, we 
find that the hospitals' incentives to differentiate services are significantly 
altered by the presence of uninformed consumers. In particular, we find 
that uninformed consumers tend to soften the incentives for horizontal dif-
ferentiation. In this respect our findings are in the spirit of Bester (1998), 
who shows that quality competition may induce minimum differentiation 
- i.e., agglomeration at the market center - when consumers are uncertain 
about product quality and use observed prices to ascertain the quality of 
goods. 
In a related paper, Calem and Rizzo (1995) analyze hospitals' choices of 
quality and speciality mix (location) under exogenous prices. An incentive 
for closer locations is introduced by assuming that the hospitals cover a 
fraction of their patients' mismatch costs. Besides this particular assump-
tion, their paper differs from ours in two important ways. Firstly, they are 
not concerned with imperfect information and the issue of gatekeeping and 
how this affects the nature of competition in the market for secondary care. 
Second, they do not consider the implications of optimal price regulation 
on the hospitals' incentives with respect to quality and location choice.6 
The model also relates to the more general literature on transparency in 
imperfectly competitive markets.7 Increased transparency on the consumer 
side of the market typically leads to intensified price competition and thus 
6 Two other related papers applied to the primary care market are Gravelle (1999) and 
Nuscheler (2002), where the latter is Chapter 3 of this thesis. Both papers address the 
issue of competition between physicians by investigating the interaction between quality 
and location choices when prices are regulated. Building on the seminal contribution 
of Salop (1979), they apply a circular model with attention directed towards entry of 
physicians into the market, so the focus of these papers is clearly quite different from 
ours. 
7 See, e.g., Varian (1980), Burdett and Judd (1983), Schultz (2002, 2003), Lommerud 
and S~rgard (2003). 
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to a more socially desirable market outcome. This chapter contributes to 
this literature by analyzing the effects of improved transparency in markets 
that are characterized by non-price competition. In this case, more intense 
competition between firms does not necessarily improve social welfare. Im-
proved market transparency consequently has ambiguous welfare effects.8 
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. The basic frame-
work is presented in Section 4.2. In Section 4.3, we consider the case of 
'direct gatekeeping', where the fraction of informed patients is exogenously 
given. In Section 4.4, we analyze the case of 'indirect gatekeeping', where 
the fraction of informed patients are endogenously determined by individ-
ual GP consultation decisions. In both sections we derive the quality and 
specialization equilibria and analyze the social desirability of gatekeeping. 
We also discuss the issue of optimal price regulation. Section 4.5 provides 
concluding remarks. 
4.2 The model 
There is a continuum of patients with mass 1 distributed uniformly along 
the Hotelling line S = [0, l]. The location of a patient is denoted z E S 
and is associated with the disease he suffers from. A disease z can be 
seen as a realization of a random variable Z which is uniformly distributed 
on S. All patients need one medical treatment to be cured. There are 
two health care providers - henceforth called hospitals - both able to cure 
all diseases. However, they are differentiated with respect to the disease 
they are best able to cure. Specialization of a hospital is denoted Xi E R, 
i = 1, 2. Without loss of generality, we will assume throughout the chapter 
that x 1 :S x2 . Note that the degree of specialization is not restricted to the 
disease space S. Thus hospitals may locate outside S.9 
In addition to specialization, there is a second strategic variable used 
by the hospitals to attract patients, namely the quality of care Qi 2: 0, 
i 0 = 1, 2. Quality costs are assumed to be symmetric and quadratic, kq;, 
where k > 0. These costs are considered to be fixed, i.e., they are indepen-
dent of how many patients are actually treated. This implies that quality 
has the characteristics of a public good at each hospital. Examples of such 
8 Another related paper in this strand of the literature is Baye and Morgan ( 200 I), 
who analyze the competition effects of information gatekeepers on the Internet, where 
such gatekeepers create a market for price information by charging fees to firms that 
advertise prices and to consumers who access the list of advertised prices. 
9This assumption is made for convenience, but does not qualitatively affect any of the 
results presented here. 
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quality investments are the cost of searching for and hiring more qualified 
medical staff, additional training of existing medical staff, and investments 
in improved hospital facilities, which can be related to both medical ma-
chinery and non-medical facilities such as room standard or catering quality. 
Without loss of generality, other fixed costs are set to zero. Marginal produc-
tion costs are assumed to be constant and equal to zero. This cost structure 
stresses the importance of fixed costs which seems reasonable for the hos-
pital market. 10 The price for one treatment is denoted p ~ 0 and is set by 
some regulatory authority. 11 As the price is independent of which hospital 
is actually attended it may alternatively be interpreted as a premium for 
a health insurance with full coverage. The profit function of hospital i is 
given by 
Ili = pDi - kq'f, 
where Di is the demand for hospital i treatment. 
A patient's (ex-post) utility when going to hospital i is given by 
(4.1) 
Ui (z;p) := u(qi,Xi,z;p) = v + qi -p-t(z -xi)2 . (4.2) 
The maximum gross willingness to pay for hospital treatment, v, is assumed 
to be sufficiently large for the entire market to be covered. Thereby, we pre-
clude monopoly and kink equilibria and concentrate on competitive ones. 12 
Notice that this assumption essentially means that all patients have access 
to hospital or specialist care, which seems reasonable, at least for developed 
countries (without waiting lists). The last term measures the mismatch 
costs incurred when treated by hospital i = 1, 2. The parameter t > 0 de-
termines the importance of mismatch costs relative to the quality of care. 
Of course, mismatch costs would be zero if the patient suffers exactly from 
the disease for which the hospital he goes to is specialized. Mismatch costs 
are assumed to be quadratically increasing in distance. 
To evaluate the effects of gatekeeping we consider two different patient 
types. The fraction >. E [O, 1] of the population is fully informed when 
accessing the hospital market, i.e., these patients know their own location 
(diagnosis) and the specialization and quality provision of each hospital. 
10The assumption of production-independent quality costs is widely used in the liter-
ature on quality competition in health care markets (see, e.g., Calero and Rizzo (1995), 
Lyon (1999), Gravelle and Masiero (2000), Barros and Martinez-Giralt (2002)). 
11 All results we derive also hold for constant marginal costs MC > 0. Let ii denote 
the mill price, then the mark-up is given by p = ii - MC. 
12 In a circular model, Economides (1993) makes similar assumptions (see also Chapter 
3), whereas Salop (1979) and Gravelle (1999) study monopoly and kink equilibria in 
detail. 
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In the first part of the chapter (direct gatekeeping, Section 4.3) we will 
assume that the number of fully informed patients is exogenously given. In 
this case we can think of these patients as the chronically ill, who know 
exactly what disease they are suffering from and have obtained sufficient 
information about the hospital market through repeated consumption. In 
the second part of the chapter (indirect gatekeeping, Section 4.4) we will 
endogenize A by explicitly modelling patients' decisions about consulting a 
GP before accessing the hospital market. We will assume that the GP has 
a gatekeeper role in the system and that he or she obtains all significant 
information. This information is then truthfully conveyed to those patients 
consulting the GP, making them fully informed about all relevant variables. 
To simplify the analysis we assume that the fully informed patients are 
uniformly distributed on S. Members of the remaining part of the popula-
tion, 1 - ,\, only know v, the distribution of Z, and that hospital treatment 
is required. They cannot observe xi, qi, and z. For these patients secondary 
care is an experience good. Their ex-ante utility of attending hospital i is 
given by 
Eu1 (Z;p) := Eu (qf, xf, Z;p) = v + qf - p - tE(Z - xf)2, (4.3) 
where the superscript e denotes the expected value of the respective vari-
able. Patients learn their ex-post utility given by (4.2) only through actual 
consumption. 
For the direct gatekeeping scenario we will consider that the regulator 
can only influence A through direct regulation. In theory, it is possible to 
imagine that the regulator can influence the amount of information available 
to patients in the market through several different means. We will, however, 
focus on what is probably the most realistic regulatory instrument, namely 
introducing a strict gatekeeping regime, where all patients are required to 
consult a GP before accessing the hospital market. Thus, the scope for 
regulating A is restricted to setting A = 1. In the indirect gatekeeping 
scenario, the regulator can indirectly influence the endogenously determined 
value of A through price regulation. 
The impact of introducing gatekeeping to the market for hospital or 
secondary care is analyzed in a 5-stage game: 
• Stage 1: the regulator sets her available regulatory variables. These 
are one or both of p and A. Regulation on the latter variable is re-
stricted to setting A = 1. 
• Stage 2: the hospitals simultaneously decide on their specializations, 
x 1 and x2, where x 1 ,x2 ER, and X1 $ x2, 
Robert Nuscheler - 978-3-631-75167-1
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 07:31:18AM
via free access
92 CHAPTER 4. GATEKEEPING AND COMPETITION 
• Stage 3: the hospitals simultaneously set their quality levels q1 2: 0 
and q2 2: 0. 
• Stage 4: patient information about xi, qi, and z can be obtained by 
consulting a gatekeeping general practitioner who truthfully conveys 
information about the relevant variables. The choice of consulting a 
GP is reserved for the second version of the model (Section 4.4). In 
the first version (Section 4.3) the share of fully informed patients, .,\, 
is exogenously given. 
• Stage 5: the patients demand secondary care treatment. 
The sequential structure of the game is argued by the different degree 
of irreversibility of strategic decisions. Clearly, the decision of whether to 
consult a gatekeeping GP and/or which hospital to go to is the most flexible 
decision to be taken in the entire game. Changing quality or specialization 
requires more effort and investment. In both cases it may be necessary 
to replace some medical machinery and/or have the current staff undergo 
significant training, or even hire new staff. Although it may sometimes be 
hard to distinguish between quality investments and a change of specializa-
tion, it seems logically consistent to assert that hospitals first decide what 
to produce (their service or speciality mix), and then determine the quality 
of services. 13 This sequential structure is common in models that combine 
horizontal and vertical differentiation (see, e.g., Economides (1989), Calem 
and Rizzo (1995), Bester (1998), Gravelle (1999)). 
That the regulator can determine .,\ and p at the beginning of the game 
essentially means that we consider commitment power on her side. This 
assumption is, of course, crucial as in most sequential games. With respect 
to .,\, this may be justified since introducing a strict gatekeeping system 
( .,\ = 1) must be regarded as a major reform of the health care system. This 
may be less clear with the price. As in Brekke et al. (2002) and Chapter 
3 there will be an incentive to reoptimize after specializations have been 
chosen. Nevertheless, since commitment is valuable for the regulator, one 
could argue that she should be able to obtain such commitment power, either 
through reputation or by creating institutional mechanisms that makes it 
costly, or otherwise difficult, to change the regulated price. In any case, 
as price regulation is not the major focus of the present chapter we will 
concentrate on the commitment case. 
13Calern and Rizzo (1995) discuss this in some more detail. 
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4.3 Direct gatekeeping 
In this section we will consider that ,X E [0, 1] is exogenous and can only 
be regulated directly by setting ,X = 1. Hence, the regulator determines 
whether or not to introduce a strict gatekeeping system, and thereby make 
all patients fully informed. The game is solved by backward induction. 
4.3.1 The specialization-quality game 
4.3.1.1 The demand for secondary care 
The share 1 - .X of the population is uninformed about the actual qual-
ity levels and about specializations. Moreover, these people do not know 
the disease they suffer from. To make a decision about which hospital to 
consult, patients have to evaluate their expected utility, given by equation 
(4.3), for both hospitals. Imposing symmetry, these patients are indiffer-
ent between hospitals in expected terms. Both hospitals receive one half of 
these patients, (1 - .X) /2. 
This assumption is not necessary, but it eases the presentation of the 
main ideas dramatically. Actual demand depends on the patients' beliefs 
which influence expected utilities. Since these beliefs do not change the 
optimization problem of the hospitals (see below), they can be neglected at 
the earlier stages of the game. Nevertheless, beliefs have to be confirmed 
in equilibrium and, as we concentrate on symmetric equilibria, beliefs will 
also be symmetric. Our assumption that each hospital gets half of the unin-
formed patients is thus the outcome of a more general treatment. 14 Given 
the symmetry assumption, the decision about which hospital to attend re-
duces to flipping a fair coin - which seems not unrealistic. 
In contrast, the informed fraction of the population, .X, is responsive to 
quality investments and specialization decisions as both strategic variables 
and the own disease are observable. The informed patient who is indifferent 
between hospital 1 and hospital 2 suffers from disease z, which is obtained 
by solving u1 (z;p) = u2 (z;p) for z, where ui is given by equation (4.2), 
yielding 
(4.4) 
14 Although there is a game of incomplete information (the fraction 1- .>. of patients do 
not know their disease type) and imperfect information ( the fraction 1- .>. of patients can-
not observe qualities and specializations), beliefs are irrelevant for the outcome. Subgame 
perfection is thus sufficient to obtain a unique symmetric (perfect Bayesian) equilibrium. 
This changes when .>. is endogenized. 
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The demand for hospital 1 is thus D 1 = Xz + (1 - >.) /2. Hospital 2 receives 
the residual demand D2 = 1 - D1 = >. (1 - z) + (1 - >.) /2. 
4.3.1.2 Quality competition 
We look for an equilibrium in pure strategies in the quality subgame. 15 If 
a pure strategy equilibrium exists, it is found by inserting demand from 
equation (4.4) into the profit function (4.1) and optimizing with respect to 
Q1, which yields the optimal quality provision for both hospitals for given 
specializations: 
q"(Ll;>.,p) = 4::Ll' (4.5) 
where A := X2 - x1. The equilibrium quality levels depend only on the 
distance between hospitals' locations and not on their actual locations. An 
immediate implication is that optimal specializations will be characterized 
by some certain distance and not by absolute locations. 
From (4.5) we see that lim~_,0 q" (Ll;>.,p)--+ oo. Since quality invest-
ments are costly, this means that {4.5) yields negative profits if A is suf-
ficiently small. In other words, there exists a (small) range of A E [O, K) 
where investment incentives are so strong that hospitals are led into 'ru-
inous competition'. Thus, in order to secure positive profits - and thus pure 
strategy equilibrium existence - we have to impose a restriction that the 
hospitals are not located too closely. Let Q be the set of all location pairs 
(xi, x2) such that a Nash equilibrium exists in the quality subgame. Using 
(4.5), it is easily shown that (x1,x2 ) E Q if 
p>.2 
k > 8t2A 2 (1 - >. + >. (x1 + x2))' 
(4.6) 
Assuming that ( 4.6) is satisfied, the comparative static results are straight-
forward: the smaller product differentiation, i.e., the smaller A, the more 
intense is quality competition. Patients are more responsive to quality im-
provements when mismatch costs are small. Thus t is a measure of com-
petition intensity. Not very surprisingly, an increase in the quality cost 
parameter k has an adverse effect on quality provision. The better medical 
treatments are paid, the higher the benefits of capturing additional market 
shares from the competitor. At this stage of the game the only means of 
15The concept of mixed strategies does not seem to make much sense in the context of 
hospital quality investments, so we disregard this possibility by assumption. 
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competition is the quality of care and thus hospitals will improve their qual-
ity. The comparative statics with respect to >. are the same as with respect 
to p: more informed patients lead to higher quality provision. 
Because of its exogeneity, the fraction 1 - >. of the population cannot 
have any effect on competition, thus, >. can be interpreted as the density 
of patients that are distributed along the Hotelling line. When defining 
p := ,\p we obtain the same results as Brekke et al. (2002). 
4.3.1.3 Specialization 
At this stage of the game hospitals decide on their specialization, taking the 
effects on quality competition and demand into account. In order to obtain 
a perfect pure strategy equilibrium of the specialization-quality game, we 
follow the approach taken in similar location models16 and restrict the strat-
egy space of the specialization game to the set Q, for which a pure strategy 
equilibrium of the quality game obtains. Intuitively, it seems highly plau-
sible to assume that the hospitals will not consider locations which trigger 
incentives for 'ruinous competition'. Following Economides (1986), we de-
fine the direction in which 8Ild 8xi is positive as the 'relocation tendency' 
of firm i. An equilibrium of the specialization game must then be at the 
zero relocation locus, 8Ilif 8x1 = 8Il2/8x2 = 0, and a perfect equilibrium 
of the specialization-quality game is defined as the intersection between the 
zero relocation locus and the existence set Q. Formally, a specialization 
equilibrium (xi, x2) exists if 
8Ili (xi,x2) = 0· 
8xi ' (x~,x;)eQ; i=l,2. 
Inserting the optimal quality levels into hospital l's profit function, we 
obtain the following partial derivative with respect to x 1 : 
(4.7) 
As already mentioned, setting 8Ili/ 8x1 = 0 only yields !::,,. •. There exists a 
continuum of locations fulfilling x2 - x 1 = t::,.•. Imposing symmetry leads 
to a unique equilibrium of the game, provided that (xi, x2) E Q, where 
xi (,\,p) = ~ (1- !::,,.*) and x; (>.,p) = ~ (1 + !::,,.*), (4.8) 
16See, e.g., Economides (1984, 1986, 1989), Hinloopen and Marrewijk (1999), Lamber-
tini (2001 ). 
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and 
• ( p>-. ) ½ ~ (>-.,p) = 4t2k (4.9) 
It is easily shown that the second order conditions are met. However, it 
remains to identify the exact condition for equilibrium existence. According 
to the specification of the game, two requirements must be met. First, 
we need to have that (xi,x2) E Q. Second, it must not be a profitable 
strategy for either firm to deviate in the quality subgame by offering zero 
quality and only serve the uninformed consumers arriving in equilibrium. 
Using (4.9) and (4.5), and imposing symmetry in the profit function, it is 
straightforward to show that both requirements are met, thus guaranteeing 
the existence of a unique symmetric equilibrium, if 
p>-.4 
k > 32t2 . (4.10) 
For the remainder of the analysis, we will assume that this condition is met. 
The hospitals' location incentives are governed by two opposing forces. 
Ceteris paribus, each hospital can obtain a larger share of the market by 
moving closer to its rival. On the other hand, closer locations imply that 
quality competition is intensified, as can be seen from equation (4.5). 
Consider an increase in the price p. This will strengthen the market 
share effect, since hospitals now receive a higher mark-up on each treatment. 
However, a price increase also means that quality competition is amplified. 
From (4.9) we see that the latter effect always dominates: a higher price 
implies that hospitals aim at dampening the resulting increase in quality 
competition by locating further apart. Indeed, as long as the fee for sec-
ondary care treatments exceeds marginal costs (and >-. is strictly positive), 
quality competition among providers induces product differentiation. 
An identical mechanism determines the relationship between patient in-
formation and locations. More informed patients will result in stronger 
quality competition and hospitals will respond by differentiating more. 17 A 
social planner thus faces a trade off when setting the price or taking mea-
sures to improve information in the market. The improved quality has to 
be weighed against the change in aggregate mismatch costs. 
We have already identified the mismatch cost parameter t as a measure 
of competition intensity. A low t boosts quality provision and - to dampen 
17This result is clearly dependent on the mode of competition. IT we allow the firms 
(hospitals) to compete on prices, and not qualities, the opposite result would apply (see 
Schultz (2002) ). 
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this effect - hospitals locate further apart. Finally, an increase in the qual-
ity cost parameter k reduces quality competition, resulting in less product 
differentiation. When inserting (4.9) into (4.5) we obtain the equilibrium 
quality levels of the game: 
* ( p2 >.2) ! q (>.,p) = l6tk2 (4.11) 
4.3.2 Social Welfare 
Consider a social planner who aims at maximizing social welfare. Assuming 
symmetry in qualities and locations the social welfare function is given by 
2 t t ) W = v + q - 2kq - - + -D. ( >. - D. . 
12 4 
(4.12) 
Note that we consider that acquiring information about the market is cost-
less, i.e., gatekeeping involves no costs. 18 We will relax this assumption 
when endogenizing >. in Section 4.4. 
4.3.2.1 The second-best optimum 
Let us first consider the case where >. cannot be regulated by the social plan-
ner at all. In this sense the solution derived here may be called a 'constrained 
first-best', or simply the second-best. Quality provision is second-best effi-
cient when 
sb l 
q = 4k. (4.13) 
Maximizing the last term of equation (4.12) yields D.8 b = >./2, which deter-
mines the second-best efficient specializations 
sb l ). d sb l .,\ x1 = - - - an x2 = - + -. 2 4 2 4 
(4.14) 
The regulator faces the following fundamental trade off: on the one hand, 
the mismatch costs incurred by the informed patients are minimized when 
hospitals locate at ¾ and ¾, respectively. These locations would obtain 
when the entire population is informed, >. = l. On the other hand, as 
18Ifwe interpret pas a per patient (or per treatment) reimbursement from a government 
agency, this particular specification of social welfare also relies on the assumption that the 
third party (i.e., the regulator) is able to raise the necessary funds in a non-distortionary 
manner. 
Robert Nuscheler - 978-3-631-75167-1
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 07:31:18AM
via free access
98 CHAPTER 4. GATEKEEPING AND COMPETITION 
the uninformed patients choose a provider randomly, their mismatch costs 
are at a minimum when hospitals do not specialize and agglomerate at 
the market center, i.e., at ½- Minimum differentiation would obtain for 
>. = 0. Balancing these opposing effects leads to locations x!b E [ ¼, ½] and 
sb E [ 1 3] 
X2 2' 4 · 
4.3.2.2 The first-best optimum 
Now consider that the regulator has the available option of introducing a 
strict gatekeeping regime, which amounts to setting >. = 1. From equation 
(4.12) it is easily seen that 8W/8>. 2: 0 for all feasible values. The social 
planner would thus implement a strict gatekeeping regime whenever a > 0. 
The first-best solution is consequently given by19 
).fb = 1, fb - 1 xflb = ~ and xf2b = ~-q - 4k' 4 4 (4.15) 
4.3.3 Gatekeeping 
The aim of this subsection is to show that introducing strict gatekeeping, 
i.e., setting >. = 1, is not necessarily socially beneficial when the price is 
exogenously given. This may be surprising at first sight since strict gate-
keeping implies that additional information is acquired. Taking the com-
petitive effects into account it may turn out that - although gatekeeping 
is costless - strict gatekeeping is harmful from a social welfare perspective. 
The relationship between social welfare and the share of informed patients 
is given by the following proposition: 
Proposition 4.1 For an exogenously given price, social welfare is maxi-
mized at {i) >. = 1 if mismatch costs are sufficiently high, {ii) >. E (0, 1) if 
mismatch costs are sufficiently low and quality costs are sufficiently high. 
Proof. Inserting (4.9) and (4.11) into (4.12) yields a welfare function 
W (p, >.). We can easily calculate 
( 
1 1 ) aw 1 1 2p :r 1 >. :r
- = (2p)! -(-) --(-) (2p-t) 8,\ 8 >.tk2 6 t2 k 
(4.16) 
19 Notice that the solution A = 0 and .>. = 0 is always dominated by A = 1/2 and 
>. = l. 
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and 
(4.17) 
(i) We have that aar > 0 for all permissible values of -X if t > 2p. (ii) Assume 
that t < 2p. In this case we have that ~r > ( <)0 if k < (> )k := 32>.. 2%;t-t)". 
Since lim>,.__.0 k ---+ oo and a;>..'f < 0 it follows that social welfare is maximized 
for a unique value of -X that lies strictly between O and 1 if k > 32(~~F!._t)" . • 
Ceteris paribus, more informed patients lead to more intense competi-
tion between the hospitals, which implies a higher provision of quality and 
more differentiation. If mismatch costs are high, the degree of competition 
between hospitals is low, which further implies that the incentives for hori-
zontal differentiation are also low. In this case from a welfare point of view 
there is underprovision of quality and an insufficient degree of differentia-
tion. A larger share of informed patients would thus increase efficiency with 
respect to both quality provision and horizontal differentiation. 
However, more informed patients could lead to excessive competition if 
mismatch costs are sufficiently low. If, in addition, quality costs are suf-
ficiently high, so that first-best quality provision is relatively low, a fully 
informed market would lead to both excessive differentiation and overprovi-
sion of quality. This could be sufficient to outweigh the benefits of increased 
patient information on aggregate mismatch costs, implying that social wel-
fare is maximized in a situation where not all patients are fully informed. 
The welfare implications of introducing a strict gatekeeping regime fol-
lows immediately: 
Proposition 4.2 For an exogenously given price, introducing a strict gate-
keeping regime is detrimental to social welfare if (i) mismatch costs are 
sufficiently low, (ii) quality investments are sufficiently costly, or (iii} the 
fraction of a priori informed patients is sufficiently high. 
In other words, costless gatekeeping can reduce social welfare due to 
excessive competition between health care providers. In order better to 
illustrate the main mechanisms behind this result we provide a numerical 
example. 
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4.3.3.1 A numerical example 
Let p = 1 and k = 1. Then the remaining parameters of the model are t 
and ,\.20 We illustrate the case of fairly intense competition with t = 1/2 
(Case 1) and moderate competition with t = 3/2 (Case 2). In Table 4.1 we 
present the outcome of the location-quality game, with the associated level 
of social welfare, for different values of,\, 
Case 1, t = 1/2 Case 2, t = 3/2 
.X q* ~· w• -v q* ~· w• -v 
0.1 0.11 0.46 0.022 0.07 0.22 -0.072 
0.2 0.17 0.58 0.043 0.12 0.28 -0.043 
0.3 0.22 0.67 0.051 0.16 0.32 -0.021 
0.4 0.27 0.74 0.051 0.19 0.35 -0.002 
0.5 0.31 0.79 0.046 0.22 0.38 0.D15 
0.6 0.36 0.84 0.035 0.25 0.41 0.030 
0.7 0.39 0.89 0.021 0.27 0.43 0.043 
0.8 0.43 0.93 0.003 0.30 0.45 0.054 
0.9 0.47 0.97 -0.018 0.32 0.46 0.065 
1 0.5 1 -0.042 0.35 0.48 0.075 
Table 4.1: Equilibrium outcomes for p = 1 and k = 1. 
As can be seen from equation (4.5), quality competition is intense for 
low values of the mismatch cost parameter t. Thus, hospitals provide higher 
quality in Case 1 than in Case 2. To mitigate costly quality competition, 
hospitals aim at making their products less substitutable. This incentive is 
clearly higher in Case 1, partially offsetting the competition effect. In Case 
1, increasing the share of informed patients is beneficial for low values of 
,\. Besides the net benefits derived from higher quality provision, patients 
may also gain from reduced mismatch costs. As ,\ increases, though, the 
centrifugal force drives hospitals further away from the market center, com-
bined with an increase in quality provision. At,\= 0.4 we see that there are 
both overprovision of quality and too much differentiation, compared with 
the first-best solution, implying that a further increase in ,\ unambiguously 
reduces welfare. 21 In fact, since limA-+O (W* - v) = 0 we see that imple-
20 0£ course v is another not yet specified parameter. The actual size is irrelevant for 
the model (as long as v is sufficiently large), so we will keep this general. 
21 As hospitals still specialize within the disease space, our example shows that Propo-
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menting a strict gatekeeping system would be socially detrimental even if 
there are no informed patients to begin with. This changes when Case 2 
is considered, where moderate specialization incentives are at work. In this 
case it pays to generally demand a GP referral. 
4.3.4 Price regulation 
The results of the previous section hinge on the assumption that the price 
is exogenous. We will now consider the case where the regulator is able also 
to use the price as a regulatory instrument. Assuming second-best price 
regulation, the following result obtains: 
Proposition 4.3 With second-best price regulation, introducing a strict 
gatekeeping system always improves social welfare. 
Proof. Again, inserting (4.9) and (4.11) into (4.12) yields the welfare 
function W (p, >.). By defining fi := p>. we can define a new welfare function 
W (fi, ,\). Maximizing W (p, >.) with respect top and>. is then equivalent to 
maximizing W (fi, >.) with respect to fi and >.. Taking the partial derivative 
with respect to ,\ yields awJf•A) = ¼ ( 4t~k) ½ > 0. Thus, social welfare is 
maximized by setting >. = l. • 
From (4.9) and (4.11) we know that p and >. have identical effects on 
equilibrium differentiation and quality provision. Thus, by using the price 
instrument properly, the regulator can induce exactly the same location-
quality outcome for any given value of >.. Consider an increase in the share 
of informed patients in the market. The resulting effects - stronger qual-
ity competition and larger differentiation - can be exactly offset by reducing 
the price accordingly. This would, however, have an unambiguously positive 
effect on social welfare - even though differentiation and quality provision 
remain unchanged - since expected aggregate mismatch costs are reduced 
when fewer patients run the risk of attending the 'wrong' hospital. Thus, 
the regulator can maximize social welfare by introducing a strict gatekeep-
ing system in order to make all patients fully informed, and then use price 
regulation to correct for the potential negative effects of increased informa-
tion. 22 
sition 4.1 does not rely on the assumption that hospitals are allowed to locate outside 
the disease space. 
22 A more detailed discussion of the optimal second-best price in the case of a strict 
gatekeeping system is presented in Brekke et al. (2002). 
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4.4 Indirect gatekeeping 
In this section we endogenize the share of informed patients, >.. We assume 
that patients have the choice of consulting a gatekeeping GP, thereby ob-
taining all relevant information, before accessing the hospital market. To 
obtain an interior solution for >. we consider cost heterogeneity with respect 
to GP consultation. Let y E [O, 1] denote the cost type of a patient. The 
associated costs are assumed to be ay, where a> 0. This heterogeneity can 
simply be justified by an opportunity cost argument, e.g., by varying time 
costs due to different wage earning abilities. To simplify the analysis we 
assume that patient types are uniformly distributed on the disease space S. 
The GP consultation decision is based on the expected benefits of gate-
keeping relative to a patient's cost type. Benefits are in expected terms as 
prior to consultation none of the patients can observe specialization, qual-
ity and disease. So, in a game-theoretic sense, the consultation decision is 
simultaneous to specialization and quality decisions. Since hospitals can-
not observe patients' consultation decisions, and since they do not know a 
patient's cost type, they have to form beliefs about the actual consultation 
rate. We are solving for the perfect Bayesian equilibrium where expecta-
tions will be confirmed. Additionally, we require that beliefs have to be 
consistent out of equilibrium. This restriction is discussed in some detail 
below. 
4.4.1 The specialization-quality game 
4.4.1.1 The demand for secondary care and GP consultation 
The demand for hospital 1 is exactly the same as in the previous section for 
a given share >. of informed patients. So for this subsection it remains to 
determine the consultation decision. 
When deciding whether to approach a (randomly chosen) hospital di-
rectly or to consult a gatekeeping GP first, a patient has to weigh the 
costs of going to a GP against the benefits. Imposing the same symmetry 
assumption as previously, the quality of hospital care is unimportant for 
this problem. The quality received is independent of whether a GP was 
consulted or not. Determining the benefits of gatekeeping simply requires 
ascertaining the expected reduction in mismatch costs. This requires to 
forming expectations 6. e about the degree of product differentiation 6. in 
the market. We will assume that these expectations are symmetric, which 
seems plausible as patients are {except for consultation costs) ex-ante iden-
tical. As before we will assume that patients know that the equilibrium 
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will be symmetric, i.e., that hospitals locate equidistantly from the market 
centre, but on opposite sides. 
The expected mismatch costs when directly approaching a hospital are 
t 11 ( 1 ) 2 t 11 ( 1 . ) 2 M MCIJA = 2 0 z - 2 (1 - 6.e) dz+ 2 0 z - 2 (1 + 6.e) dz. 
(4.18) 
When consulting a GP first, expected mismatch costs are reduced to 
M MC0p = t 1½ ( z - ; (1 - 6.e) y dz+ t 11 ( z - ; (1 + 6.e) y dz. 
2 
(4.19) 
The expected benefit of gatekeeping, Be:= MMC'};A - MMC&p, is thus 
Be - ttl.e 
- 4 . (4.20) 
The equilibrium value of .>. is obtained by equating the expected benefits of 
gatekeeping to its actual costs, t6.e /4 = a>., and solving for.>., yielding 
t6." 
>. = 4a · (4.21) 
The comparative static results are intuitive: the higher the costs of 
consulting a GP, a, the lower the share of patients actually going to a 
GP. The benefits of gatekeeping are increasing in mismatch costs, since 
some costs may be avoided by obtaining information. Aggregate expected 
mismatch costs are determined by two different factors. For any given 
positive distance between the hospitals, these costs are obviously increasing 
in the mismatch cost parameter t. In addition, expected aggregate mismatch 
costs are increasing in the degree of horizontal differentiation. The further 
apart the hospitals are located, the more costly, in terms of mismatch costs, 
to attend the 'wrong' hospital. 
4.4.1.2 Quality competition and specialization 
We now assume that for any patient consultation strategy hospitals' ex-
pectations about the fraction of informed consumers is equal to the actual 
fraction induced by that strategy. In other words, we require beliefs to be 
consistent out of equilibrium. With this a hospital's best response against 
patients strategies can be written in terms of the fraction of informed pa-
tients. Notice that the restriction on strategies that the lowest cost types 
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demand GP referral, as used in equation (4.21), is irrelevant from a hospital 
perspective. Only the expected share of informed patients matters and not 
their actual composition. 
The equilibrium of the quality subgame is thus simply obtained by sub-
stituting >. by >.e in equation (4.5), yielding 
** (A ). e ) p). e q ' ;p = 4tkb.. (4.22) 
The comparative static properties are comparable to those with direct gate--
keeping. The same applies to product differentiation, which is obtained in 
a similar fashion: 
1 
b.**(>.e· )= (p).e)3 
,p 4t2k (4.23) 
4.4.1.3 The solution of the game 
Imposing rational expectations, we obtain the solution of the game. One 
requirement is that hospitals' expectations are confirmed, >.e = >., and the 
other that patients' expectations are confirmed, Ae = A. By inserting equa-
tion (4.21) into equation (4.23), and solving for A, we obtain equilibrium 
product differentiation 
b.** = 0 and b.** = ! (L)½ 
u s 4 tka ' (4.24) 
where the subscript 'u' indicates that the equilibrium is unstable, and 's' 
that it is stable. This will be shown in the proposition below. 
The corresponding quality levels are obtained by substituting equation 
(4.23) into (4.22), taking the relationship in equation (4.21) into account, 
yielding 
** 0 d ** P qu = an qs = 16ak. (4.25) 
Using the equilibrium product differentiation displayed in equation (4.24), 
we can solve for the share of GP patients by substituting the respective 
values into equation (4.21): 
l 
** 0 d '** 1 ( pt ) 2 ,\, = an "s = 16 ka3 (4.26) 
Proposition 4.4 With endogenous GP consultation there are two sym-
metric equilibria of the specialization-quality-consultation game. {i) s:• = 
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(A•• .... '"") d ('") S"* (A** ... '"") h A•• ** , .... Uu I qu , Au , an it s = U 8 , q8 1 A 8 1 W ere Ui I qi I Ai I t = U, S 1 
are given by equations (4.24}, (4.25}, and (4.26}. The equilibrium given in 
{i} is unstable and the equilibrium shown in {ii} is stable. 
Proof. (i) That s;• is an equilibrium of the game is straightforward. 
Consider that all patients expect that the hospitals will not differentiate, 
D.e = 0. Given these expectations, the benefits of gatekeeping are zero, 
Be = 0. Since there are positive costs of consulting a GP, nobody will 
actually go to a gatekeeper, i.e. ,\ = 0. Hospitals correctly anticipate these 
expectations: they know that patients are completely uninformed and thus 
not responsive to quality investments. Consequently, hospitals set q~• = 0. 
Hospitals do not incur any costs in this scenario so they cannot do better 
than confirm expectations on specialization and agglomerate at the same 
point. However, this equilibrium is unstable when expectations have to 
be consistent out of equilibrium. Then, wrong expectations on ,\ on the 
hospitals' side directly translate into wrong expectations on D. when taking 





Now consider that D.e E (0, D.:*). Since D."* (D.:") = D.:" and I:!.** is 
increasing and concave in D. e, this implies D. *" ( D. e) > D. e. As expectations 
are not confirmed, D.e cannot be an equilibrium of the game. Moreover, 
since actual differentiation exceeds expectations, there is no force driving 
expectations back to zero, proving instability. 
(ii) Here it remains to show that the equilibrium is stable. First, assume 
that D.e E (0, D.:"), then - as above - we have that D,.** (6.e) > D.e, driving 
expectations back to D.:*. Second, consider that D. e > D.:"; then we have 
D."" (D.e) < D.e. This not only proves that D,.e > D,.:* can never be an 
equilibrium, but also that expectations will be driven back towards D.:*. • 
Requiring consistent beliefs out of equilibrium enables us to prove insta-
bility of s~• and stability of s;•. Although it seems plausible to concentrate 
on s;• note that s;• can easily be supported as a stable equilibrium when 
consistency is not imposed. Consider that hospitals expect that nobody will 
become informed, _xe = 0, independent of what patients' strategies would 
actually suggest. Then hospitals do not differentiate and there are zero ben-
efits of gatekeeping. As patients correctly anticipate missing specialization 
incentives, _xe = 0 will always be confirmed. 
As we concentrate on the stable equilibrium, we ease notation by suir 
pressing the index 's' in the remainder of the chapter. In order to analyze 
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the comparative static properties of the equilibrium it is convenient to ne-
glect the restriction ,\"'"' E [O, l]. We will be more precise about that later. 
The share of the population going to a gatekeeping GP increases in the 
mismatch cost parameter, t, as this drives up the benefits of gatekeeping. It 
also increases in price. This is an indirect effect stemming from specializa-
tion. Price increases boost quality competition and, to dampen this effect, 
hospitals aim at reducing the substitutability of their products, increasing 
the benefits of gatekeeping. Obviously, ,\"'"' is a decreasing function of a. 
The higher the disutility incurred by consulting a GP the lower the share 
of patients who actually consult one. Finally, an increase in the quality 
cost parameter, k, reduces quality competition and thereby differentiation 
incentives. This, in turn, reduces the benefits of gatekeeping. 
Compared to the previous section, there are two major differences in the 
comparative static properties of quality. Firstly, the mismatch costs param-
eter has no effect. With direct gatekeeping, patients were more responsive 
to quality investments at lower values of t, amplifying quality competition. 
As can be seen from equation (4.22), this is also true here, but this effect is 
opposed by the consultation effect. A lower t reduces the benefits of gate-
keeping, resulting in a less competitive market. With linear costs of GP 
consulting these two effects exactly offset. Secondly, an increase in consult-
ing costs, a, lowers ,\"'"' and thereby softens quality competition. The latter 
effect is also present with respect to the specialization decisions: high con-
sulting costs weaken the competition effect, making product differentiation 
less desirable. 
4.4.2 Social welfare 
Subtracting the consulting cost term a f0>. xdx, the social welfare function 
can be rewritten from equation (4.12), 
2 t t 1 2 W = v + q - 2kq - 12 + 4~ (>. - ~) - 2a>. • (4.28) 
The first order conditions for the first-best solution are obtained by differ-
entiation, yielding 
A fb = ~ fb - _.!._ d \ fb - t~ 
u 2'q -4k'an,.. -4a' (4.29) 
First-best quality is identical to the previous analysis, and depends only 
on the costs of quality investments. Specialization is the second-best from 
Section 4.3.2.1, and is thus conditional on the share of GP patients. Most 
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importantly, although not surprising, the first-best A coincides with indi-
vidual decisions, so there is no need to regulate gatekeeping directly. 
Proposition 4.5 The first-best efficient solution of the game with endoge-
nous gatekeeping has quality qlb = ik and 
(i) !).lb = 0 and Alb = 0 for t < Ba, 
(ii) !).lb = Alb /2 and Alb E [0, 1] fort = Ba, and 
(ii·i) !).lb = ½ and Alb = 1 for t > Ba. 
Proof. The first-best solution in (i) is an interior solution where both 
first order conditions, t::,.lb = ½ and >,.lb = ~~, are satisfied. As A is restricted 
to the unit interval there are situations where Alb = ~~ does not hold, i.e. 
when parameters are such that A exceeds one. Considering the unrestricted 
Hotelling model the first order condition for I::,. can always be met. Inserting 
D. = ½ into ( 4.2B) and differentiating yields t'f = A (i - a). For t > Ba 
the regulator sets A to its maximum, Alb = 1, and t::,.lb = 1/2. Obviously, 
the regulator is indifferent between all feasible values of A when t = Ba. • 
The mismatch cost parameter has two opposing effects on the benefits 
of gatekeeping .. On the one hand, a higher value oft increases expected 
aggregate mismatch costs for every given pair of hospital locations. On the 
other hand, an increase in t reduces quality competition and leads to less 
differentiation, which reduces the benefits of gatekeeping. Using (4.20) and 
(4.24) it is straightforward to show that the former (direct) effect always 
dominates, i.e., 8Be /at > 0, implying that the benefits of gatekeeping are 
increasing in the mismatch cost parameter t. Consequently, when t is suffi-
ciently low relative to GP consulting costs, t < Ba, the benefits of increased 
information, in terms of reduced expected mismatch costs, are outweighed 
by the costs of going to a GP. 
4.4.3 Price regulation 
When setting the optimal price, the regulator trades off inefficiencies along 
three different dimensions: quality provision, horizontal differentiation and 
GP consultation. In general, this will not result in a strict gatekeeping 
regime. The objective function is obtained by inserting the equilibrium val-
ues of the specialization-quality-consultation game into the welfare function. 
The candidate second-best price is then found to be 
t 
pab = 8 + 3a. (4.30) 
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The following equilibrium obtains: 
~ 
l [ 2t(24a+t)] 2 
Asb_[2tka(t+24a)]~ sb_24a+t d sb_ ka3 
- 16tka ' q - 128ak ' an A - 64 (4.31) 
The price equilibrium given in (4.30) exists if (xt (p8 b) ,x;" (p8 b)) E Q. 
Using (4.31), the existence condition (provided that the solution is interior) 
is given by 
24a+ t 
k > 1024a2 . (4.32) 
It is straightforward to show that the second-best price given by ( 4.30) is 
an interior solution for a subset of the parameter values, defined by 
k =k ·= t (24a + t) 
> · 2048a3 · 
Thus, if k < k we have a corner solution with A8 b = 1.23 Given that 
8k/8t > 0 and 8k/8a < 0, the implications for indirect gatekeeping follow 
immediately: 
Proposition 4.6 Second-best price regulation implies a de facto strict gate-
keeping regime if quality costs or GP consulting costs are sufficiently small, 
or if mismatch costs are sufficiently high. 
The intuition is basically the same as before: gatekeeping is a way of 
reducing expected aggregate mismatch costs, and the social benefits of gate-
keeping are consequently linked to these costs that are increasing in t and 
decreasing in k. Of course, the role of GP consulting costs is straightfor-
ward: the smaller a, the larger share of the population consults a GP to 
obtain information. 
In the following we will only consider interior solutions. 24 Thus, GP 
consultation will generally be inefficient. The efficiency properties of the 
second-best interior solution are summarized as follows: 
Proposition 4. 7 The second-best (interior) solution of the specialization-
quality-consultation game has the following properties: (i} fort < 8a there is 
too much differentiation given A8 b and inefficiently low quality provision, (ii} 
23 From (4.32) it follows that an interior solution always meets the existence condition 
if a< t/2. 
24 For a discussion of optimal price regulation in the corner solution ( strict gatekeeping), 
see Brekke et al. (2002). 
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l 
for t = Ba the first-best optimum is implemented, 6sb = ½ ( ;k) 1 , q8 b = }k 
l 
and ,\sb = ¼ ( }k) 2 , {iii) fort > Ba there is insufficient differentiation given 
,\sb and inefficiently high quality provision. 
Proof. First-best specialization, conditional on the share of GP-patients, 
requires 6 8 b = A8 b /2. From (4.31) we find that 6sb_Asb /2 = 8~28t [ 2<~!:tt)] 
> (<)0 if t <(>)Ba.First-best quality is given by qfb = lk- From (4.31) 
we have that q8b - qfb = - <~;8~~ < (>) 0 if t < (>) Ba. • 
We have an interior solution if GP consultation costs are sufficiently 
high. From ( 4.25) we know that a high value of a implies that quality 
provision will be relatively low in equilibrium. We also know that a price 
above marginal costs is in any case a necessary condition to prevent under-
provision of quality. If, in addition, mismatch costs are relatively low, the 
value of obtaining information will be limited and, consequently, GP con-
sulting will be low in equilibrium. Since the first-best efficient level of quality 
provision is independent of mismatch costs, this implies that social welfare 
is maximized at a low degree of differentiation. In this case, t < Ba, the 
price that yields first-best differentiation is not high enough to generate ef-
ficient quality provision. Thus, higher quality can only be obtained at the 
expense of excessive differentiation, and these considerations are optimally 
traded off at a price which yields under-provision of quality and too much 
differentiation. 
On the other hand, if mismatch costs are high, the first-best level of 
differentiation will be higher - closer to ½ - due to higher GP consultation. 
In this case, t > Ba, the optimal degree of differentiation is obtained at a 
price that yields over-provision of quality. Consequently, optimal regulation 
implies accepting a less than optimal degree of differentiation in order to 
avoid too much over-investment in quality. 
4.5 Conclusion 
Equipping GPs with a gatekeeper role in the health care system is a major 
issue in the debate on health care reforms. Among politicians, the con-
ventional wisdom is that gatekeeping contributes to cost control. This is 
somewhat surprising since evidence is lacking, as was demonstrated in an 
empirical study by Barros (1998). Economists are more concerned about 
efficiency arguments rather than fiscal ones. As GPs are usually better in-
formed than patients about the characteristics of the secondary health care 
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market, e.g. about quality and specialization of hospitals, matching of pa-
tients to hospitals may indeed be improved by gatekeeping. However, this 
argument neglects the potential competitive effects in the hospital market. 
We presented a model that analyzes the competitive effects of gatekeeping 
in the presence of non-price competition. 
While prices were regulated, we allowed for competition in specialization 
and quality. We considered two versions of the basic model, one in which 
the share of ex ante informed patients is exogenously given (direct gate-
keeping), and another where the share of informed patients is endogenously 
determined (indirect gatekeeping). 
In the direct gatekeeping scenario we assumed gatekeeping to be cost-
less. We found that when the price is exogenously given strict gatekeeping 
does not necessarily improve social welfare. This is the case when the addi-
tional information acquired by GPs boosts competition to such an extend 
that excessive specialization of hospitals occurs. In these cases, due to the 
endogeneity of specializations, mismatch costs are higher with gatekeeping 
than without. This raises doubts about whether gatekeeping improves ef-
ficiency. Things change dramatically when allowing for second-best price 
regulation. We demonstrated that strict gatekeeping, i.e. GP consulta-
tion is compulsory before accessing the secondary care market, is always 
socially desirable. Thus, direct gatekeeping should always be accompanied 
by proper price regulation. 
Gatekeeping was endogenized by introducing cost heterogeneity with re-
spect to GP consultation. Since consultation decisions of patients are the 
same to what a social planner would implement, there is no need for direct 
regulation of gatekeeping. GP consultation can be indirectly influenced by 
price regulation. With second-best price regulation, a strict gatekeeping 
regime obtains if the benefits of gatekeeping are sufficiently high (improved 
matching outweighs the potentially negative competitive effects) compared 
to its costs. When the share of GP patients is below one, the second-best 
outcome will, in general, be inefficient. Depending on the parameters, there 
may be too much differentiation and too low quality or vice versa. Di-
rect implementation of a strict gatekeeping regime may again reduce social 
welfare. 
The analysis demonstrates that efficiency gains that are usually at-
tributed to GP gatekeeping cannot be taken for granted when non-price 
competition is incorporated into the analysis. In the short run, efficiency 
gains may be obtained by better matches. But quality provision may still be 
inefficient. In the long run, hospitals will adjust their specialization so that 
differentiation increases and this counteracts the positive short run effect. 
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Chapter 5 
Sickness Fund Competition • Ill 
the German Public Health 
Insurance System: Evidence for 
Risk Selection? 
5.1 Motivation 
There have been many health care reforms in Germany during the last 
decades. 1 Most of these reforms were aimed at cost containment. The 
movement towards more competition in the health care market began with 
the Health Care Reform Act 1989. The Health Care Structure Act 1993 
introduced more competition among the statutory health insurance compa-
mes. 
About 90 percent of the German population are insured with statutory 
sickness funds (in Germany the health insurance companies are called sick-
ness funds), most of them compulsorily. Essentially free choice of sickness 
funds has been available since 1996. Competition among sickness funds 
fosters quality competition and thereby improves the quality of care. In 
addition, patients may benefit from the funds becoming more responsive to 
their preferences and more cost conscious (Van de Ven and Van Vliet (1992, 
p. 24)). For equity reasons, sickness funds must not charge risk related pre-
miums, i.e., there is community rating. 2 With community rating, sickness 
1This chapter is a revised version of Nuscheler and Knaus (2003). 
2To a large extent health status is not considered to be the responsibility of the indi-
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funds have strong incentives to select the low risks as they make profits with 
low risks and losses with high risks. Note that these incentives stem from 
regulation rather than competition (Pauly (1984)). 
About 400 sickness funds are active in the market. These can be grouped 
into four categories: regional funds, substitute funds, company-based sick-
ness funds (Betriebskrankenkassen, BKKs), and other funds. The BKKs 
historically have had (and still have) a much better risk structure than all 
the other funds resulting in significantly lower contribution rates even after 
(incomplete) risk adjustment.3 They gained great many new members after 
free choice of funds was made available to the insured. A (major) part of 
that movement is likely to be due to transaction costs, healthy people sim-
ply have lower switching costs.4 We will refer to this form of selection as 
passive risk selection. However, there may be an additional effect over and 
above these transaction costs. BKKs have a substantially different benefit 
structure on top of regulated (standard) benefits. They are more likely to 
provide benefits that healthy individuals demand ( e.g. early cancer diag-
nosis) and less likely to provide those that sick individuals demand (e.g. 
cancer therapy). There is thus some room for active risk selection. We give 
more details on that below. 
Given the sharp increase in BKK members and the different (additional) 
benefit structures of the BKKs, the main research question is whether the 
BKKs actively engaged in risk selection. Although there are no health care 
cost figures, the data of the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) is 
well suited to answering that question. To disentangle active and passive 
risk selection we estimate a recursive two-equation model focussing on five 
transition years from 1995 to 2000. At the first stage we estimate the 
self-assessed health status using an ordered probit model. In this way we 
obtain a continuous health index that is used as an explanatory variable 
at the second stage, where a multinomial logit model is fitted for switching 
behavior. As the BKKs seem to be the main beneficiaries of competition, 
we separately analyze BKK members and non-BKK members. The latter 
have to make a choice from three alternatives: stay with their fund, i.e. 
not switching at all, switch to a BKK fund, or switch to a non-BKK fund. 
It turns out that better health significantly reduces the probability of not 
switching, or, in other words, the sick are more likely to stay with their fund. 
vidual (see, e.g., Kifmann (2002)). Community rating can thus be seen as an insurance 
against premium risk, increasing efficiency from an ex ante perspective. 
3 In order to emphasize that health insurance premiums are payroll taxes we refer to 
them as contribution rates throughout the chapter. 
4 Strombom et al. (2002) found that the price sensitivity is much higher for younger 
and healthier individuals than for elderly or sick individuals. 
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Health status has no significant effect on the probability of switching to a 
non-BKK fund. Thus transitions within the non-BKKs can be attributed 
to transaction costs. 5 Although the probability of switching to a BKK is 
positively and significantly affected by health, this provides no evidence for 
active risk selection by BKKs as both health effects are not significantly 
different. Switching behavior is thus only driven by switching costs and not 
by funds actively trying to select the low risks. 
To complete the analysis we also investigate the switching behavior of 
the BKK members. Again, the less healthy are less likely to switch and 
there is no significant difference in the positive health effects on switching 
probabilities. We thus find clear evidence that transitions are a result of 
switching costs. Active risk selection seems to be a negligible problem. The 
differences in the (additional) benefit packages are too small to have any 
significant effect. As the flow towards the BKKs is much larger than the 
flow towards the non-BKKs there is nevertheless a (passive) risk selection 
problem. Associated distortions are best reduced by improving the risk 
adjustment scheme, currently on the political agenda. 
With the two-stage estimation procedure we reduce the number of health 
status or health utilization variables from 10 to 1. This enables us to com-
pare the health effects of the different switching types what would otherwise 
be impossible. Introducing an ordered probit model at the first stage we 
summarize all health related variables in a single continuous index. Thus, 
although dimensions are dramatically reduced, we do use all available in-
formation. Using health indexes rather than the discrete variables obtained 
from surveys is common in recent research. Van Doorslaer and Jones (2003), 
for example, also obtain a continuous health index from an ordered probit 
regression and use this index to measure inequality in self-assessed health. 
For a similar approach see Wagstaff and van Doorslaer (1994). 
There is some literature on sickness fund competition in Germany. In 
their recent report, Lauterbach and Wille (2001) analyze whether those 
individuals who change their sickness fund entail lower health care costs 
than individuals who stay with their fund. They use micro data provided 
by several sickness funds and find that changers have a positive effect on 
profits after risk compensation is carried out. Using a different data set, 
Jacobs et al. (2002) also find that changers cause lower health care costs 
than non-changers. 
Andersen and Schwarze (1999) analyze the determinants of switching a 
5This interpretation requires homogeneity of non-BKK funds. Homogeneity among 
these and among the BKKs is assumed throughout the chapter. We discuss this in some 
detail in Section 5.6.3. 
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fund using, as we do, data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP}. 
They concentrate on 1997 and 1998. In their single equation probit model, 
individual health satisfaction affects the probability of changing positively 
and significantly. At the same time, they obtain a significant negative effect 
of self-assessed health on the probability of transition. As both variables 
are measures of the actual health status, the overall effect of health remains 
unclear. Moreover, the different signs raise doubts about the appropriate-
ness of the specification. In the more recent work of Schwarze and Andersen 
(2001), the effect of the contribution rate on the probability of switching 
is analyzed. Using 1999 and 2000 GSOEP data and matched contribution 
rates, they find that a higher contribution rate in 1999 significantly increases 
the probability of changing the sickness fund. Since contribution rate data 
is not available before 1999 we cannot include these in our analysis. As a 
proxy we use dummies for the different types of health insurance compa-
nies. For health status, the effects in Schwarze and Andersen (2001} are 
ambiguous and insignificant. 
All papers cited above have in common that they analyze all changers 
and do not distinguish between different types of switchers. The reports 
by Lauterbach and Wille (2001} and Jacobs et al. (2002} can thus only 
come up with lower average expenditures of switchers. They do not analyze 
switching behavior at all. This is what Andersen and Schwarze do in both of 
their papers applying a simple probit model. As they analyze all switchers 
they are unable to identify risk selection. This would require analyzing 
subsets of the data separately, i.e. BKKs and non-BKKs. Moreover, to 
identify active risk selection one needs a reference switching group where a 
multinomial procedure with at least three outcomes is needed instead of an 
ordinary probit model. Schut et al. (2003} consider, as we do, a multinomial 
logit model of health plan choice. Analyzing a different data set, they focus 
on price effects on switching behavior rather than risk selection and find an 
increasing price elasticity for the German market. This result is mirrored 
in our year dummies. 
Nicholson et al. (2003} apply the switcher methodology to analyze risk 
selection in the United States. They find that people who switched to a 
Health Maintenance Organization (HMO} use substantially fewer medical 
services than in the period prior to switching and less than people who 
stayed with a non-HMO. This is the other way round for switchers from 
HMOs to non-HMOs. They thus conclude that HMOs actively select the 
favorable risks. In our analysis the BKKs play the role of the HMOs. How-
ever, we find no evidence for active risk selection. 
Our approach contributes to the large literature on adverse selection in 
Robert Nuscheler - 978-3-631-75167-1
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 07:31:18AM
via free access
5.1. MOTIVATION 115 
health care markets, e.g., Ellis (1989), Cutler and Reber (1998) and Cutler 
and Zeckhauser (1998).6 Buchner and Wasem (2003, p. 30) state that "[ ... ] 
large-scale empirical evidence is missing for 'anti-selection' against bad risks 
[ ... ]". This is especially true for Germany, as, up to our knowledge, tests 
whether funds take measures to select the low risks have not been carried 
out so far. We fill this gap by modelling all relevant transitions between 
funds. 
Since the self-assessed health status plays a central role in our analysis, 
this chapter also relates to the literature using or explaining self-assessed 
health. Bound (1991 ), for instance, uses the self-assessed health status 
as an explanatory variable in a retirement model. Pohlmeier and Ulrich 
(1992) derive a health index using self-assessed health. In the recent work 
of Crossley and Kennedy (2002) the reliability of self-assessed health is 
addressed. For Australian data, they find a substantial error in rating and 
that this error is correlated with observable variables like age, gender, and 
income. If these findings also apply to the GSOEP data, the measurement 
error may bias the health index obtained from our ordered probit regression. 
There are few applications of recursive models in the field of health eco-
nomics. One exception is the literature on (ex post) moral hazard. Holly et 
al. (1998), for example, study the relation of health insurance coverage and 
health care utilization in the Swiss health care market. Their econometric 
model differs from ours in that they apply a bivariate probit model with 
an endogenous dummy variable while we consider a recursive model with 
an ordered probit model at the first stage and a multinomial logit model 
at the second stage. To ascertain the impact of deductibles on health care 
use, contract choice must be endogenized since low risks tend to choose con-
tracts with higher deductibles than high risks (see, e.g., Schellhorn (2001)). 
Another respect in which these papers differ from ours is that they use 
endogenous regressors, while our health index is considered exogenous. 
The chapter is organized as follows: Section 5.2 discusses the different 
forms of risk selection. Public policy measures taken to prevent risk se-
lection in Germany are described. Some more institutional background is 
provided in Section 5.3. In Section 5.4 the data set is introduced and de-
scriptive statistics are shown. The empirical model, explained in Section 
5.5, is followed by the results in in Section 5.6. Section 5.7 concludes. 
6 For an excellent overview see Cutler and Zeckhauser (2000). 
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5.2 Risk selection and regulation 
5.2.1 Active and passive risk selection 
We distinguish two different types of risk selection: active and passive risk 
selection. We will say that a fund actively engages in risk selection when it 
takes measures in order to attract the low risks, to prevent the high risks 
from enrolling, or to 'encourage' the high risks to disenroll. 
Active risk selection can take two forms: adverse selection and cream 
skimming. Consider that consumers know their risk type. Then, at any 
premium level, the high risk consumers demand more health insurance cov-
erage than the low risks. If insurers can only imperfectly observe risk types 
adverse selection obtains. As Wilson pointed out, adverse selection may 
also arise when insurers are not allowed to use their information (Wilson 
(1977, pp. 167-168)). Thus, adverse selection may be a result of regulation. 
Barros (2003, p. 420) and Van de Ven and Ellis (2000, p. 773) define 
cream skimming as risk selection that occurs because insurers prefer low 
risks to high risks. Consider that a single insurer has to charge the same 
premium to all enrollees (community rating) and that these premiums are 
not risk adjusted.7 In such an environment there are strong cream skimming 
incentives. Contingent on the insurers' information Van de Ven and Ellis 
(2000, pp. 773-774) distinguish three forms of cream skimming. First, if 
health plans can identify risks, they can directly select the low risks ('direct 
cream skimming'). They could, for example, reject females and the elderly 
upon enrollment and thereby obtain a low risk pool consisting of young 
males. Such a favorable risk pool can also be attained by, e.g., selective 
advertising and golden handshakes.8 Second, suppose that insurers cannot 
observe the risk type but know about other non-observable but relevant, 
i.e. costly, risk factors. Examples are diseases like cancer or AIDS. Insurers 
can prevent these high risks from enrolling by providing bad service and 
bad therapy to both cancer and AIDS patients. With selective contracting 
insurers will contract with providers with bad reputation in both fields. 
Third, if the insurer cannot observe the risk type and has no idea about any 
relevant risk factor, he can still select the low risks by offering low-option 
plans with (high) deductibles or by reducing offices and information centers 
to a minimum. In the last two versions adverse selection is used as a cream 
7 When premiums are risk adjusted, risk selection must be interpreted in terms of 
premium risk groups. Risk selection may then occur within these groups. 
8 lf insurers were allowed to use their information for risk rating premiums, there would 
be no, or at least weakened, (direct) cream skimming incentives (Pauly (1984)). 
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skimming device. We refer to them as 'indirect cream skimming'.9 
However, risk separation may obtain even if no fund actively selects the 
low risks, i.e., there may be passive risk selection. Consider two funds Land 
H with identical benefits. Moreover assume that L has a better risk structure 
and can therefore offer a lower contribution rate. Take two members of fund 
H who are identical except that one is healthy and the other is sick. Both 
consider switching to L and they would identically benefit from lower con-
tributions. Whether they actually switch to L depends on switching costs. 
These are likely to be higher for sick people. Sick people have better things 
to do than changing their fund, e.g. undergo treatments. Additionally, they 
are more likely to be bad risks. Through repeated consumption of medical 
services they know their fund quite well and, for example, know how to get 
costs reimbursed. This information would be lost if they switched (health 
care as well as health insurance are experience goods). Consequently, high 
risks are less likely to switch. If the (average) risk of the switchers is below 
the average of L members, the risk differential between the funds increases 
without any risk selection activities by L. 
Our empirical model disentangles active and passive risk selection but 
is unable to distinguish between the different forms of active risk selection. 
Whether adverse selection or cream skimming is present depends on the in-
formation available to insurers and consumers. As this is hardly observable 
for researchers, the distinction, although important, is mainly theoretical. 
5.2.2 Regulation of sickness fund competition in Ger-
many 
Risk selection has adverse effects which counter the positive effects of com-
petition. This is why there are usually a number of measures taken to 
prevent risk selection, to reduce distortions of risk selection, and to remove 
the incentives for risk selection. The adverse effects of risk selection in-
clude (see, e.g., Van de Ven and Van Vliet (1992, p. 24) and Van de Ven 
and Ellis (2000, pp. 77 4-776)): First, the chronically ill may get bad ser-
vice. Sickness funds will not contract with providers with good reputation 
in treating chronic diseases in order to prevent attracting these bad risks. 
They will nevertheless enroll when this negative effect is outweighed by 
lower contributions.10 Second, inefficient funds who successfully engage in 
9Breyer et al. (2003, p. 298), Van de Ven and Van Vliet (1992, pp. 28-31) and Van 
de Ven et al. (2003, p. 91) report some additional means for indirect risk selection. 
10This is of little relevance for Germany as there is essentially no selective contracting 
between insurers and providers. However, a similar argument applies when these funds 
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risk selection could drive efficient funds out of the market, or at least cap-
ture some of their market. Third, cream skimming is itself costly. Since 
there are no positive welfare effects from reallocating individuals to funds 
this is pure waste. Fourth, in a Rothschild-Stiglitz world (Rothschild and 
Stiglitz (1976)), the health insurance market may be unstable and, fifth, the 
equilibrium, if any exists, will have inefficient coverage. 
Annual open enrollment prevents sickness funds from rejecting females 
and the elderly. The most straightforward version of direct cream skimming 
is thus not feasible. By contracting with bad gynecologists and shabby 
sanatoriums favorable risk selection may still be possible. However, selective 
contracting is pretty much restricted. Funds may engage in activities to 
indirectly select the low risks. They could, for example, discourage high 
risks from joining by reducing the number of offices and information centers. 
Additional means are, e.g., selective advertising, informing high risks about 
the possibility to switch, and the design of benefit packages. 
To reduce the sickness funds' means for selection, there is a standard 
benefit package that all funds have to provide (Social Code Book V). This 
amounts to roughly 95 percent of the services (Buchner and Wasem (2003)). 
It is therefore usually claimed that sickness fund competition is in terms of 
contribution rates rather than benefits (see e.g. Lauterbach and Wille (2001, 
p. 29)). 
The major measure taken to prevent risk selection is the introduction 
of risk adjustment schemes. Contributions to every single fund should be 
adjusted to make it reflect its actual risk structure. Such a scheme was 
introduced in Germany in 1994, i.e. two years prior to competition. This 
scheme reduces the incentives for risk selection and, additionally, should 
prevent sickness funds having comparative advantages from (historically) 
better risk structures. Moreover, stability of the health insurance market 
increases. Income, age, gender, sick pay claims, and incapacity to work 
are used as risk adjusters. As is well known from the literature on risk 
adjustment, a scheme relying only on simple demographic variables is highly 
incomplete. 11 Thus substantial incentives remain for risk selection. Not 
surprisingly, the fear of risk selection as a consequence of sickness fund 
competition has been expressed quite often (see Lauterbach and Wille (2001, 
p. 209)). Van de Ven et al. (2003, p. 89) conclude that risk selection is a 
problem in Germany. 
cut down their benefit packages. As there is some room to vary the (additional) benefits 
in Germany this may be more relevant. 
11 See Van de Ven and Ellis (2000) and, for the German case see, Breyer and Kifmann 
(2001) 
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5.3 Institutional background 
In 1977 the rapid growth of health care expenditure was stopped by the 
Health Insurance Cost Containment Act. With this reform, an advisory 
body to the government, the so-called Concerted Action Committee in 
Health Care, was created. Its major task is to keep contribution rates 
constant. This essentially means that the increase in health care expen-
diture is limited to the increase in contributory income (contributions are 
payroll taxes). Nevertheless, in the 1980s the contribution rates increased 
from 11.4 percent of gross income to 13 percent.12 This pressure led to 
several additional health care reforms. 1989 can be seen as a starting point 
for introducing more competition into the health care market. Blue collar 
workers were put on par with white collar workers. They were now allowed 
to opt out of the statutory health insurance if a certain threshold income 
is exceeded and to buy private health insurance. 13 At that time, there was 
no free choice of sickness funds within the public health insurance system. 
Depending on their profession, members of the regional based funds were al-
lowed to change to substitute funds and other funds (including guild funds, 
farmers' funds, the miners' fund, and the sailors' fund). 14 They were only 
allowed to change to a company-based fund (BKK) if they were actually em-
ployed in the company the fund was designed for. As a result of this limited 
competition, the contribution rates of the regional funds were significantly 
higher than those of the BKKs and the substitute funds (see Figure 5.1). 
Sickness funds are not for profit organizations. They have to hold re-
serves of at least 2 percent and at most 8.5 percent of annual expenditures 
(Van de Ven et al. (2003, p. 89)). Within that frame, funds are free to 
set their contribution rate, however, these are subject to approval by the 
German Federal (Social) Insurance Authority (Bundesversicherungsamt). 
Note, that employers and employees equally share contributions. 
With the Health Care Structure Act of 1993, competition in the health 
insurance market was intensified. All insured people were allowed to choose 
their sickness funds freely from 1996 onwards (annual open enrollment). To 
offset comparative advantages due to risk structure and to reduce selection 
incentives, a risk compensation scheme was introduced in 1994. Competi-
tion and risk adjustment led to an adaptation of the contribution rates of 
12See Bundesministerium fur Arbeit und Sozialordnung, Federal Ministry of Labour 
and Social Affairs (2001, Table 7.7). 
13The information presented here and in the following is mainly taken from European 
Observatory on Health Care Systems, EOHCS (2000, pp. 21-37, 107-116). 
14The Techniker Krankenkasse (technicians sickness fund), for example, was designed 
for technicians and engineers only. 
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Figure 5.1: Percentage contribution rate averages for the differ-
ent types of sickness funds. Source: BMG (2001, p. 396). 
the non-BKK funds. Unfortunately, we are not able to separate the com-
petition effect from the compensation effect. In 2001 the BKKs departed 
substantially from the average contribution rate of all other funds. Since 
1993 the BKKs have, on average, the lowest contribution rates. As is shown 
in Table 5.1, competition between the sickness funds has led to a consolida-
tion of the health insurance market. Due to mergers and market exits, the 
number of funds fell from 1,209 in 1991 by more than two thirds to 396 in 
2001. 
More interesting for the question addressed here are the transitions from 
one sickness fund to another. For the sake of presentation, we only show the 
trend for the members of the three main types of sickness funds, namely, 
regional funds, substitute funds, and BKKs (see Figure 5.2). The regional 
funds continuously lost members from 1991 onwards. This trend actually 
started much earlier. In 1970, 52.4 percent of the statutory insured popu-
lation in Western Germany were insured by regional funds. This number 
dropped to 42.8 percent in 1991 and 37.0 percent 2001. This was due to 
the higher average contribution rates (see Figure 5.1). Members facing high 
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year overall regional company- substitute 
funds based funds funds 
1991 1,209 276 721 15 
1992 1,223 271 741 15 
1993 1,221 269 744 15 
1994 1,152 235 719 15 
1995 960 92 690 15 
1996 642 20 532 15 
1997 554 18 457 14 
1998 482 18 386 13 
1999 455 17 361 13 
2000 420 17 337 12 
2001 396 17 318 12 
Table 5.1: Number of active sickness funds in the German statutory health 
insurance market, other funds are omitted. Source: BMG (2001, p. 342). 
contributions changed to substitute funds when they were allowed to do so. 
In 1970, 22.9 percent of West Germany's statutory insured population were 
insured in substitute funds. The share increased to 34.0 percent in 1991, 
peaked in 1997 (37.1 percent), and then dropped back to 33.9 percent in 
2001 (all numbers were taken from BMG, 2001, p. 345). 
The increase in members in BKKs, together with the drop of the aver-
age BKK contribution rate from 1998 onwards, may be interpreted as an 
indication that risk selection favors the BKKs. From Figures 5.1 and 5.2 
one may conclude that the risk compensation scheme does not fully control 
for the different risk structures. 15 However, even if the conclusion of risk 
separation in favor of the BKKs is correct, this is not necessarily due to 
active risk selection (see Section 5.2). Once again, the main empirical task 
is to divide up risk selection into active and passive parts. 
One of the most straightforward selection instruments is the benefit 
package. On top of the regulated standard benefits, sickness funds may 
provide additional benefits. Comparing these for the three main types of 
15 In fact, it is well known that such a simple scheme as that applied in Germany is very 
incomplete (van de Ven and Ellis (2000)). The federal government plans to improve the 
scheme by including some morbidity measures in 2007. Risk adjustment is beyond the 
scope of this chapter. The only thing we need for our interpretation is incompleteness. 
For more details about risk adjustment in Germany see Buchner and Wasem (2003). 
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Figure 5.2: Members in 1,000,000 (without their dependants) of 
the different types of sickness funds. Source: BMG (2001, p. 
344). 
sickness funds reveals substantial differences (see Table 5.2). Take, for ex-
ample, health checkups and early cancer diagnosis. Roughly 25 percent of 
the BKKs provide additional benefits in these fields, fields that are of more 
interest when actually healthy. Here less than 10 percent of the substitute 
funds and regional funds provide better than standard care. Things change 
when looking at benefits that are more likely to meet the preferences of the 
sick, e.g. chiro therapy, cancer therapy, and homeopathic medicine. The 
share of BKKs providing these benefits is well below the ones of the regional 
and substitute funds. These observations are in line with the hypothesis of 
active risk selection of BKKs by benefit packages. There is anecdotal evi-
dence that funds also use means other than the benefit package for selection, 
e.g., selective advertising and delaying payments. By explicitly modelling 
all relevant switching decisions we are able to test whether there are any 
(successful) selection activities. 
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Benefit Percentage of funds providing the benefit 
regional funds substitute funds BKKs 
Acupuncture 18.18 16.67 20.79 
Anthroposophic medicine 72.73 50.00 12.50 
Chiro therapy 90.91 83.33 33.33 
A utohemotherapy 9.09 33.33 3.16 
Homeopathic medicine 70.00 83.33 25.51 
Cancer therapy 63.64 50.00 13.98 
Phytotherapy 81.82 63.64 9.68 
Oxygen therapy 20.00 25.00 2.ll 
Naturopathy 75.00 41.67 22.58 
Health checkups 9.09 8.33 25.49 
Early cancer diagnosis 0.00 8.33 24.51 
Health seminars 72.73 36.36 47.37 
Logopedia 100.00 63.64 32.35 
Nutrition consultancy 90.91 41.67 12.24 
Yoga/meditation 30.00 33.33 12.24 
N ll (of 17) 12 (of 12) 103 (of 318) 
Table 5.2: Additional benefits (or better than standard benefits) provided 
by sickness funds in percent of funds that generally provide it. Source: 
AFW Dienstleitungsgesellschaft, April 2002, own calculations. 
5.4 Data 
To explore health and health insurance choice in Germany after the natural 
experiment in 1996 we use the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP). 
The GSOEP is a representative longitudinal study of private households in 
Germany. The same private households, persons and families have been 
surveyed annually since 1984. This micro data panel provides extensive 
information on the individual characteristics needed to analyze health and 
health insurance choice in Germany. 16 
The empirical results presented in this study are based on the waves from 
1995 to 2000. In 1998 the GSOEP was extended by the Supplementary 
Sample E. The Sample F was a major extension of the GSOEP in 2000. 
Both samples are included in our analysis. The different waves are pooled 
16For more information on the GSOEP see Wagner, Burkhauser and Behringer (1993) 
and also Projektgruppe Sozio-oekonomisches Panel (1995). 
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into one sample. 
The two dependent variables to be explained by our empirical model 
are (self-assessed) health status and the switching decision. Health status, 
y1 E {O, 1, 2, 3, 4}, is of ordinal scale with 5 outcomes, where O is bad health 
and 4 is very good health. To save space we reduce the analysis of the 
switching behavior of BKK members to a minimum. This is justified as 
non-BKK members account for the vast majority of switches. For now, the 
second dependent variable is the switching behavior of the latter. They have 
to make a choice from three alternatives, y2 E {O, 1, 2}, where O indicates no 
switch, 1 a switch to a BKK and 2 a switch within the non-BKKs. y2 equals 
1 if an individual was enrolled in a non-BKK in one year and in a BKK in 
the following year. All other switchers in this group must have switched 
within the non-BKKs. We can therefore use the variable 'change of health 
insurance' from the GSOEP. Thus y2 equals 2 if this variable indicates a 
switch and the individual was not enrolled with a BKK before the switch 
and thereafter. The switching variable for BKK members is constructed 
accordingly. 
As a sub-sample of these six waves of data we selected only individuals 
who were not privately insured. Only individuals who were members of 
the statutory health insurance are included, since they were the only ones 
who had new incentives to change to a BKK after the 1993 reform. Since 
family insured members have only limited freedom to choose their health 
insurance, they were excluded. Finally, we restricted our sample to the 
working population aged between 25 and 54. This is done in order to exclude 
special incentives for individuals in the education system and for those close 
to retirement. For non-BKK members the sample sizes before and after 
selection are shown in Table 5.3. In this table we also show the percentage 
of switchers in every year, calculated from the selected sample. From 1995 
to 1996, 6.5 percent of the insured switched. This number continuously 
increased to 10.l percent in 1999 revealing the remarkable dynamics in the 
German system. The increase may reflect the fact that the information 
about the possibility of switching has spread over time. This pattern is 
mainly due to the increasing flow towards the BKKs. The incentives to 
enroll with them increased over time, i.e., the contribution rate differential 
increased (see Figure 5.1). In the transition equation, taking 1995 as the 
reference year, positive coefficients for the year dummies that increase over 
time would be expected for the switchers towards the BKKs. Explanations 
of the variables (Table 5.8) and the entire sample statistics based on the 
pooled selected sample (Table 5.9) are shown in the Appendix . 
In Table 5.10 (see Appendix) we provide some more details about the 
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year N full N after Percentage of switchers 
saznple selection toBKK to non-BKK overall 
1995 13,768 1,713 1.23 5.31 6.54 
1996 13,511 3,571 1.96 5.15 7.11 
1997 13,283 3,431 2.80 4.93 7.72 
1998 14,670 3,463 3.03 6.32 9.36 
1999 14,085 3,550 4.17 5.94 10.11 
overall 69,317 15,728 2.80 5.56 8.35 
Table 5.3: Sample selection and the percentage of changers, non-BKK mem-
bers. Source: GSOEP 1995-2000, own calculations. 
relationship between health and switching behavior. Take, for example, 
the non-BKK members with health status 3 (good). 7,975 out of 15,728 
individuals (or 50.71 percent) rate their health as being good. 7,225 people, 
or 90.6 percent, with good health status did not switch. 50.12 percent of 
the 14,414 stayers rate their health as being good. 
The stayers at the non-BKK funds have substantially worse average 
health (2.57) than the switchers, where health of out switchers, i.e. switch-
ers to BKKs, have better health (2.76) than within switchers (2.71). There 
seems to be a stronger health effect for out switchers, which would be in 
line with our hypothesis of (active) risk selection by BKKs. Individuals with 
good or very good health are more likely to switch since their proportion of 
stayers is below the average of all stayers. The likelihood of switching clearly 
increases with health. 17 Essentially the same is true for the BKK members. 
Switching out here means that an insured switched to a non-BKK. In con-
trast to our hypothesis, the health effect is stronger for out switchers. We 
fitted the same empirical model for BKK members as for non-BKK mem-
bers. The results show no significant difference in the respective positive 
health effects on switching probabilities, rejecting not only the (active) risk 
selection hypothesis for BKKs but also for non-BKKs. As Table 5.4 shows, 
risk selection may nevertheless obtain. 
Finally, we want to shed some more light on the relationship between 
age, health and switching behavior. Consider, for example, the non-BKK 
members shown in Table 5.5 below. As already argued above, healthy people 
17We neglect the numbers obtained for bad health status in our interpretation. Due to 
the few observations, numbers are very noisy. 
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Non-BKKs BKKs 
Member type Members Health Members Health 
Non switchers 14,414 2.57 1,878 2.58 
Within switchers 874 2.71 78 2.73 
New members 156 2.81 440 2.76 
15,444 (-284) 2.58 (- .00) 2,396 (+284) 2.62 (+.02) 
Table 5.4: The market after 5 years of transition activity. Source: GSOEP 
1995-2000, own calculations. 
are more likely to switch. This may (to are large extent) be due to lower 
switching costs. A similar argument applies for age. Medical consumption 
increases with age. So old people are likely to be much better informed 
about their fund than young people. If they need advice they might know 
whom to ask and how to get costs reimbursed. This information would be 
lost when changing the fund, creating higher switching costs for the old. 
Furthermore, young people may have better access to information. As age 
is negatively correlated with the probability of switching and as it is one 
of the main determinants of health, it is not clear whether there is still an 
effect of health on switching behavior after controlling for age. 
Age Average Percentage of Average health of 
health Stayers Withins Outs Stayers Withins Outs 
25-29 2.90 88.77 7.24 3.99 2.89 2.97 2.92 
30-34 2.72 90.38 6.12 3.50 2.71 2.77 2.85 
35-39 2.62 90.68 6.78 2.54 2.62 2.70 2.74 
40- 44 2.48 92.84 4.84 2.32 2.47 2.55 2.62 
45-49 2.37 93.76 4.24 2.00 2.35 2.47 2.71 
50-54 2.27 94.98 2.95 2.07 2.27 2.44 2.34 
overall 2.58 91.65 5.56 2.80 2.57 2.71 2.76 
Table 5.5: Age, health status and switching decisions of non-BKK members. 
Source: GSOEP 1995-2000, own calculations. 
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5.5 The empirical model 
We estimate a recursive two equation system with an ordered probit model 
for health status at the first stage and a multinomial logit model for switch-
ing behavior at the second stage. 18 The (self-assessed) health status can 
take 5 values, Y1 E {O, 1,2,3,4}, where y1 = 0 is bad health and y1 = 4 is 
very good health. As the order of different health outcomes can be inter-
preted but the distance cannot, we fit an ordered probit model, 
(5.1) 
The latent variable, Yi, is unobservable. Instead we observe y1 = j if µ,-1 < 
Yi::;µ,, j = 0, ... ,4, where µo = 0 is a convenient normalization. For this 
simple notation to be correct we have to set µ_ 1 = -oo and µ4 = oo. The 
probabilities are given by Prob(y1 = ilx1) = if>(µ; -cix1)-iP(µ;-t - o'x1), 
j = 0, ... , 4, where if> denotes the standard normal cumulative distribution 
function. Estimates for the parameter vector o as well as for the threshold 
values µ 1, µ2 and µ3 are obtained by maximum likelihood. This regression 
yields a continuous (fitted) health index that will be used as an explanatory 
variable at the second stage. 
The switching behavior of the non-BKK members is described by 
0 no switch 
1 switch to BKK (5.2) 
2 switch to non-BKK 
We fit a multinomial logit model, where the probabilities are given by 
(Greene (1997, p. 915)) 
Note that we consider the error terms to be uncorrelated. Unique param-
eterization requires a normalization and we set /3o = 'Yo = 0. For iden-
tification of the model, there must be at least one variable in x 1 that is 
not in x 2 in order to obtain some variation for the estimation of -y1 and 
-y2 . Our identifying assumption is that all objective measures of health, i.e. 
IMPAIR, DISAB, DOCTOR, VISITS, HOSPITAL, SICK6, SPORTS, only 
affect health status and do not directly affect switching behavior (see Table 
18For an excellent introduction to both models see, e.g., Wooldridge (2002, pp. 497-
509) 
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5.8 for the explanation of variables). x2 may contain a number of additional 
variables not included in x1 . 
Due to the arbitrarily chosen reference category, the absolute values 
of the parameter estimates are meaningless. Only the differences can be 
interpreted. The log-odds ratios are given by 
(5.4) 
where Yli denotes the fitted value of Yii• Nevertheless interpretation remains 
difficult. Things get easier when looking at the marginal effects. Define 
P' := (/3' -y) and X2 := (x2 y1 ), then the marginal effect of the attributes 
are given by (Ronning (1991, p. 42)) 19 
(5.5) 
Note that we use the 'standard' marginal effects of the multinomial logit 
model. We thus consider 8yif 8x2 = 0. Estimation is by maximum likeli-
hood yielding consistency. 
Let 6j denote the marginal health effect on the probability that a non-
BKK member chooses action j = 0, 1, 2. The marginal effects for BKK 
members are T/j. Note that for BKK members y2 = 1 also denotes an "out-
switch", i.e. a switch to a non-BKK. Then risk selection activities of BKKs 
are detected if 61 > 62 or 'f/2 > TJ1-
The main advantage of our model is the following: there is only one 
health variable to interpret in the second equation. One could estimate, 
and we do, a model with all health care utilization variables in the second 
equation as well as some health dummies. Then there would be 10 'health 
effects' and interpretation would require that the health effects of one choice 
dominate all the other. As can be seen from our estimates this is clearly 
not the case (see Tables 5.11 and 5.12 in the Appendix). There are sim-
ply too many dimensions. We reduce dimensions to 1 by using the health 
index obtained from an ordered probit regression. Note that we neverthe-
less use all the information available although the number of dimensions is 
dramatically reduced. 
In principle, our first stage estimates can suffer from a simultaneity 
bias if health status and the objective measures of health or health care 
19 Indexes: i = 1, ... , N is an index for individuals, j = 0, 1, 2 is an index for the choice 
at stage 2, and! = 1, ... , K is the !-th variable of x2. 
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utilization are determined at the same time. We are optimistic that this 
is not the case. Self-assessed health status measures health at present. At 
present in absolute terms means in February /March of the respective year 
(interviewers are in the field in that period of time). As can be seen from 
Table 5.8, the health care utilization measures, i.e., VISITS, DOCTOR, 
HOSPITAL, and SICK6, measure utilization within the last three months 
or, even further in the past, during the last year. So health status may be 
seen as the outcome of these variables. 20 It may indeed be the case that 
an individual is referred to a hospital due to his poor health status and 
that individual health is improved by hospital treatment. However, this 
is not the focus of the chapter as transitory health effects are measured. 
When analyzing risk selection the permanent component of health status is 
of particular interest. An individual with a hospital stay in the year prior to 
the interview may still have, and, as our analysis shows, does have a lower 
health status. We do not see any reason for why simultaneity should be a 
problem with IMPAIR and DISAB. We admit that this is less clear with 
SPORTS as poor health may prevent doing sports at all. We nevertheless 
included it in our analysis as active sport can also be interpreted from the 
health production perspective (Grossman (1972)). 
The health status variable itself requires some more discussion. On the 
one hand, we consider health to be exogenous in the transition equation. 
This seems plausible since health status is measured more than 6 months 
prior to the switching decision. Endogeneity would require some unobserv-
able variables that influence health and are somehow related to switching 
behavior. We do not see any variable that is linked to both. 21 On the other 
hand, and maybe more seriously, there is the potential measurement error 
of health. As nothing is known about the reliability of self-assessed health 
in the GSOEP we neglect that problem. 
5.6 Results 
Before interpreting the outcome of the recursive model, let us briefly exam-
ine the single equation results for non-BKK members where a multinomial 
logit model is fitted with 10 health related explanatory variables and a num-
ber of controls. Parameter estimates are shown in Table 5.11. The marginal 
20 Analyzing GSOEP data, Pohlmeier and Ulrich (1992) also use health care utilization 
measures as explanatory variables for individual health. 
21 Foster ( 1997) demonstrated for a binary logistic regression that the results of the 
'Pseudo Instrumental Variable' estimator that we use and the Generalized Methods of 
Moments estimator only differ little even if there is a substantial endogeneity problem. 
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effects, shown in Table 5.12, reveal that it is impossible to figure out a clear 
health effect (both tables are in the Appendix). At first glance, it seems 
as if the effect of health on within switchers (y2 = 2) is larger than for the 
out switchers (y1 = 2): the marginal effects are higher for all health dum-
mies.22 However, it is the other way round for the health care utilization 
measures DOCTOR, VISITS, and HOSPITAL as well as for the more per-
manent health characteristics IMPAIR and DISAB. SICK6 goes, like the 
health dummies, in the opposite direction. 23 The mixed picture motivates 
our recursive approach as it enables us to reduce health dimensions from 10 
to l. 
5.6.1 Health status 
As we can see from Table 5.6, all measures of health care utilization, i.e. 
DOCTOR, VISITS, HOSPITAL, and SICK6, have the expected negative 
sign. They all significantly reduce health. This also applies to the variables 
approximating the sickness history of an individual, IMPAIR and DISAB. 
Doing active sport (SPORTS) and the log of net income (LNNET) are 
means of health production.24 Actively doing sport significantly increases 
health. As already mentioned above, there could be the reverse causal-
ity. The effect of net income on health is positive measuring, although 
insignificant, the impact of improved access to economic resources of health 
production. 
The positive sign of education (EDU), measured in years spent in the 
education system, points to the complementarity between education and 
health. Its insignificance may stem from the positive correlation with in-
come: education is a major determinant of wage earning ability. 
Insured of non-German nationality (FOREIGN) significantly rate their 
health better than Germans, while gender (FEMALE) has no significant ef-
fect. Of course, one of the most important determinants of individual health 
is AGE. The elderly report a significantly lower health status. This points 
to the difficulty of disentangling health from age effects in the transition 
equation (see also Table 5.5). 
22 We use HEALTH0 and HEALTH! as reference category. As there is only 1 percent 
with health status 0, significance is lost when using HEALTH0 only. 
23 As DISAB and SICK6 are risk adjusters they are of little importance for risk selection 
distortions. Individuals are eligible for sick pay after 6 weeks of sickness. Before that the 
employer is obliged to pay the salary. 
24 We have excluded LNNET from the single equation multinomial logit specification 
because of its strong correlation with LNGROSS. 
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non-BKK members BKK members 
Variable Coeff. s.e. Coeff. s.e. 
Constant 4.2034 ... .1732 3.9306**• .5423 
IMPAIR -1.3377**• .0236 -1.4568**• .0677 
DISAB -.1732**• .0437 -.2435•• .1053 
DOCTOR -.1913*** .0207 -.2775*** .0564 
VISITS -.0551 ••• .0021 -.3528*** .0047 
HOSPITAL -.1551 ••• .0336 -.3408**• .0981 
SICK6 -.2522**• .0482 -.4514**• .1292 
SPORTS .1910**• .0198 .2359**• .0537 
EDU .0069 .0043 .0198 .0121 
FOREIGN .1020**• .0270 .1482** .0690 
FEMALE .0122 .0228 .0430 .0646 
AGE -.0254 ... .0011 -.1384**· .0032 
UNEMPL -.0846•* .0365 -.0879 .1531 
WHITEC .0600*** .0225 .0121 .0613 
LNNET .0264 .0212 .0003 .0667 
YEAR96 .0863**• .0327 .0570 .1000 
YEAR97 .0956**· .0337 .0453 .0990 
YEAR98 .1057**• .0336 .1371 .0982 
YEAR99 .0958**• .0334 .1306 .0961 
/1-1 1.3560**• .0347 1.3973••· .1011 
/1-2 2.8515••• .0370 2.9073**• .1115 
µ.3 4_7530••· .0399 4.7345*** .1182 
Observations 15,728 2,112 
Log likelihood -15,337.62 -2,085.42 
Pseudo R2 0.1771 0.1847 
LR chisq(l8) 6,602.96 944.78 
... p < 0.01, •• p < 0.05, • p < 0.10 
Table 5.6: First stage estimation results: ordered probit for health status. 
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Being unemployed (UMEMPL) has a negative impact on health status. 
The link may be indirect: all other things equal, the life satisfaction of un-
employed people is much lower than that of the employed (Frey and Stutzer 
(2002)). This may feedback into actual health or at least in the self-rating of 
it. Unemployment plays a minor role among BKK members (see Table 5.9), 
so, not surprisingly, this effect is insignificant. Like with active sports, there 
may be the reverse causality. However, we do not follow this route and sim-
ply include this variable as a control. White collar employees (WHITEC) 
are found to be significantly healthier on average. This seems plausible as 
their jobs are typically physically less demanding. Again, significance is 
lacking for BKK members. 
Finally, we included YEAR dummies in the regression in order to con-
trol for variation over time. For non-BKK members average health in all 
subsequent years is significantly higher than in 1995. No significant effects 
obtain for BKK members. 
5.6.2 Switching behavior of non-BKK members 
Using the fitted health index from the ordered probit regression we obtain 
the parameter estimates of the multinomial logit model as shown in Ta-
ble 5.13 in the Appendix. There is only one health variable left, namely, 
the fitted health index YlF. Comparing the impact of health on switching 
behavior is straightforward. It is tempting to simply compare the size of 
the estimated coefficient, but this would be misleading as the health effect 
does not only depend on this single coefficient (see equation (5.5)). For 
interpretation we will thus focus on the marginal effects shown in Table 5.7 
below. 
A marginal increase in the health index significantly reduces the prob-
ability of not switching, i.e., the sick are less likely to switch. As already 
argued above, sick people (bad risks) simply have higher switching costs. 
There is no significant health effect on the probability of switching within 
the non-BKK funds (y2 = 2). In contrast, better health significantly in-
creases the probability of switching to a BKK (y2 = 1). Comparing these 
types of switchers thus reveals a difference: there is a health effect on top 
of transaction costs for out switchers.25 We find 61 > 62 and thus some 
evidence for active risk selection by BKKs. Before drafting policy recom-
mendations we have to test whether this difference is actually significant. 
To address this, we analyze the change in the log-odds ratio given in equa-
tion (5.5) for a (marginal) change in health status YlF. From our parameter 
25 The p-values of the marginal health effects are .055, .086, and .278, respectively. 
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Prob(y2 = 0) Prob(y2 = 1) Prob(Y2 = 2) 
Variable Coeff. s.e. Coeff. s.e. Coeff. s.e. 
Constant 2.6579 ... .4313 -1.6482··· .2877 -1.0097••· .3587 
YlF -.0574* .0299 .0302* .0176 .0272 .0251 
WHITEC -.1166** .0547 .0742** .0318 .0424 .0460 
FULLTIME -.1546 .. .0725 .0205 .0418 .1341 ** .0613 
UNEMPL .0051 .0890 -.0824 .0603 .0773 .0683 
SUBST -.0111 . 0530 .0635 .. .0315 -.0523 .0441 
OTHER -.0983 .0705 .1684*** .0388 -.0701 .0620 
NOSINGLE .0104 .0445 -.0322 .0248 .0217 .0377 
FOREIGN _4923••· .0824 -.0193 .0392 -.4730*** .0849 
FEMALE -.0215 .0492 .0115 .0278 .0100 .0413 
AGE .0213••· .0030 -.0068*** .0018 -.0145••· .0027 
EDU -.0316*** .0090 -.0030 .0051 .0346··· .0079 
LNGROSS -.0510 .0549 .0971 *** .0333 -.0461 .0457 
YEAR96 -.1025 .0839 .1112• .0589 -.0087 .0639 
YEAR97 -.1524* .0832 .1864 ... .0590 -.0340 .0649 
YEAR98 -.3024 ... .0811 .2044 ••• .0592 .0980 .0628 
YEAR99 __ 3534••· .0804 .2778*** .0605 .0756 .0631 
••• p < 0.01, •• p < 0.05, • p < 0.10, all entries were multiplied by 10. 
Table 5.7: Second stage marginal effects for non-BKK members. 
estimates (see Table 5.13) we see that -y1 - 12 > 0. Thus the probability 
of switching to a BKK increases relatively to the probability of switching 
to a non-BKK. However, this difference is not significantly different from 
0, which can easily be seen when rerunning estimates with switchers to 
non-BKKs as a reference category. For non-BKK members we thus find no 
evidence for active risk selection by BKKs. 
White collar workers, WHITEC, are more likely to switch and, if they 
switch, it is more likely for them than it is for others to enroll with a BKK. 
Potentially there are some financial incentives operating in the background. 
White collar workers are more likely to be employed by large companies. 
As employers pay half of the contribution there might be some employer 
pressure to switch to a 'cheaper' fund. Unfortunately the data on firm 
size is very incomplete preventing us from including it as an explanatory 
variable.26 
26 Comparing the parameter estimates of the single equation approach with the outcome 
Robert Nuscheler - 978-3-631-75167-1
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 07:31:18AM
via free access
134 CHAPTER 5. RISK SELECTION IN GERMANY 
All other things equal (especially income), FULLTIME employed are sig-
nificantly more likely to switch. As there are no special financial incentives 
this might reflect better access to information. If they switch, non-BKK 
funds are the main beneficiaries. 
As unemployment insurance pays the contribution rate, there are no fi-
nancial incentives of switching for the unemployed. Consequently, a lower 
propensity to switch results. However, the model yields no significant ef-
fects. Insured enrolled with a substitute fund (SUBST), or with other funds 
(OTHER), are more likely to switch than regional fund members. As the 
contribution rates of the regional funds are, on average, the highest the neg-
ative signs, although not significant, are surprising. Members of the regional 
funds should have stronger financial incentives to switch. This may indeed 
be the case, but it appears as if our dummies are improper approximations 
of actual contribution rates. That may be due to the large variation of 
contribution rates within sickness fund types. However, if a switch occurs, 
regional fund members are less likely to switch to a BKK. Switching activity 
within the non-BKK funds follows no pattern. 
FOREIGN controls for the systematic difference between individuals 
of German nationality and non-German nationality. Being German in-
creases the probability of switching. This can mainly be attributed to the 
much lower tendency of non-Germans to switch within the non-BKK funds. 
Household size has no effect on switching behavior as single households do 
not significantly differ from NOSINGLE households. 
The following two variables, FEMALE and AGE, are of little interest 
from the risk selection perspective as they are risk adjusters in the German 
scheme. However, they offer some valuable insights. First, gender has no 
significant effect on switching behavior. Second, the probability of switching 
significantly decreases with AGE. A ten years increase in age yields a .02 
lower probability of switching. As already argued above, transaction costs 
are higher for the elderly. The age effect is about twice as high for within 
switchers than for out switchers, pointing to the relative appeal of BKKs. 
Note that we obtain a significant health effect although we control for age 
which is one of the major determinants of health. 
Higher education, measured in years spent in the education system, 
EDU, significantly increases the probability to switch. A three years increase 
in education increases the probability of switching by .01.27 A marginal in-
of the recursive model reveals only small differences, i.e. results are robust. 
27 In Germany compulsory education is 10 years. In general 13 years are required for 
a school leaving examination (Abitur). So this simulation approximates the impact of 
different school leaving certificates. 
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crease in gross income (LNGROSS) significantly increases the probability 
of switching to a BKK, pointing to the financial incentives of doing so ( con-
tributions are payroll taxes). 
Finally, as already anticipated from Table 5.3, the switching dynamics 
significantly increased over time. This pattern is mainly due the increasing 
flow towards the BKKs. Recall that the contribution rate differential in-
creased from 1998 onwards, i.e., BKKs became more and more financially 
attractive, while there was an adaptation of contribution rates of all other 
types of funds (see Figure 5.1).28 
5.6.3 Switching behavior of BKK members 
Although there is no evidence for risk selection activities when considering 
non-BKK members it is theoretically possible that there is evidence for it 
when looking at the BKK members. A complete analysis thus requires 
also analyzing these. Parameter estimates and marginal effects are given in 
Tables 5.14 and 5.15 in the Appendix. 
Our hypothesis of active risk selection of BKKs can clearly be rejected as 
ry1 > ry2 . Again, the difference is not significantly different from 0. Together 
with our result from the previous subsection we can conclude that there is 
no indication of any risk selection activities in the German public health 
insurance system. As already mentioned above, this interpretation relies on 
our homogeneity assumption. It may well be that there are some BKKs as 
well as some non-BKKs actively trying to select the low risks. If this were 
true, then our conclusion would be that BKKs and non-BKKs are equally 
successful in risk selection. However, given the development of members and 
contribution rates it is obvious directing attention to BKKs and non-BKKs 
rather than to other subgroups of funds. 
Only the following three variables require some further discussion: UN-
EMPL, AGE, and LNGROSS. People becoming unemployed may somehow 
be forced to leave the BKK of their employer. Being unemployed thus re-
duces the probability of staying. The flow is mainly directed towards the 
non-BKKs. Age is a rather unimportant determinant of switching behavior. 
The income effects are much more pronounced than for non-BKK members. 
BKK members may be more aware of the financial benefits of being enrolled 
with a BKK. It could also be argued that BKK members are better informed 
according to their higher propensity to switch (see Table 5.9). Finally, there 
is no time pattern in switching behavior. The important dynamics of com-
petition are in the switches from non-BKK members towards the BKKs. 
28Schut et al. (2003) found increasing price elasticities over time. 
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5. 7 Conclusion 
After the natural experiment in 1996 switching dynamics in the German 
statutory health insurance system have been on the increase. The company-
based sickness funds (BKKs) were the main beneficiaries of these dynamics. 
This is likely to be due to the remarkably lower contribution rates, even after 
risk adjustment. The increasing contribution rate differential from 1998 
onwards together with the different (additional) benefits packages of the 
BKKs gives rise to the conjecture that BKKs were actively, and successfully, 
engaged in risk selection. 
Using 1995 to 2000 GSOEP data we tested this hypothesis by analyzing 
switches within and between non-BKKs and BKKs. We set up a recursive 
model and estimated the self-assessed health status by an ordered probit 
model at the first stage and fitted a multinomial logit model for health plan 
choice at the second stage. This procedure enabled us, first, to come up 
with a single health coefficient that can easily be compared across switching 
types, and, second, to disentangle switching costs and active risk selection. 
We found that better health significantly increases the probability of 
switching. Sick people simply have higher switching costs. There is no sig-
nificant difference in the (positive) health effects on switching behavior. As 
this is true for both samples, non-BKK members and BKK members, there 
is no indication of any (successful) risk selection activities in the German 
public health insurance market. The benefit packages thus seem to be no 
means of selection. Instead, differences may simply map the preferences of 
the enrollees. Although there is anecdotal evidence of funds using other 
selection devices we found no evidence that these are actually successful. 
Due to the much larger flow towards the BKKs and lower switching costs 
of low risk consumers there is nevertheless risk separation. This originates in 
the historically better risk structures of BKKs together with incomplete risk 
adjustment. Public policy should thus be directed towards mitigating com-
parative advantages stemming from this asymmetry, i.e. an improvement 
of the risk adjustment mechanism is required. The planned consideration 
of morbidity measures as risk adjusters from 2007 onwards goes in that 
direction. 
5.8 Appendix 
In this Appendix we provide the explanation of variables and more detailed 
information on estimation results. 
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self-assessed health status, 0 = bad, 1 = not so good, 
2 = satisfactory, 3 = good, 4 = very good 
0 = no switch, 1 = switch to a BKK, 2 = switch to a non-BKK 
0 = no switch, 1 = switch to a non-BKK, 2 = switch to a BKK 
natural logarithm of net income 
natural logarithm of gross income 
years in the education system 
age in years 
number of visits to doctors during the last three months 
1 = health status is X=0, ... ,4, HEALTH0*, HEALTHI* 
1 = membership in a substitute fund 
1 = membership in other funds 
1 = membership in a regional fund 
1 = full time employed 
1 = short working hours, part time contract, maternity leave, ... 
1 = no single household 
I= year 19XX, YEAR95* 
1 = disability or incapacity to work 
1 = white collar employee 
1 = unemployed 
1 = female 
1 = non-German nationality 
1 = health status prevents from completing everyday tasks 
1 = at least one visit to a doctor during the last three months 
1 = hospital stay during the last year 
1 = work disability for longer than 6 weeks during the last year 
1 = active sport at least once a month 
137 
Table 5.8: Explanations of variables. Note: * indicates that the variable 
is a reference category in our estimation, a non-BKK members, b BKK 
members. 
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non-BKK members BKK members 
Variable Mean SD Mean SD 
HEALTH 2.5846 .8143 2.6013 .8351 
SWITCH= 1 .0280 - .0739 -
SWITCH= 2 .0556 - .0369 -
LNNET 7.7008 .4843 7.8975 .4233 
LNGROSS 8.1380 .5021 8.3385 .4244 
EDU 11.8831 2.4412 11.7083 2.4138 
AGE 38.4865 8.1378 38.5223 8.0558 
VISITS 2.0167 3.4027 2.1832 4.0595 
HEALTH0 .0114 .1064 .0118 .1082 
HEALTHl .0837 .2770 .0862 .2807 
HEALTH2 .3057 .4607 .2978 .4574 
HEALTH3 .5071 .5000 .4972 .5001 
HEALTH4 .0921 .2891 .1070 .3092 
SUBST .4796 .4996 .0000 .0000 
OTHER .0988 .2984 .0000 .0000 
FULLTIME .8361 .3701 .9096 .2869 
NOSINGLE .6804 .4663 .6908 .4623 
YEAR95 .1089 .3115 .1051 .3068 
YEAR96 .2270 .4189 .1965 .3974 
YEAR97 .2181 .4130 .2012 .4010 
YEAR98 .2202 .4143 .2386 .4264 
YEAR99 .2257 .4181 .2585 .4379 
DISAB .0451 .2075 .0559 .2297 
WHITEC .5238 .4995 .4446 .4970 
UNEMPL .0598 .2372 .0199 .1396 
FEMALE .4512 .4976 .3101 .4627 
FOREIGN .1307 .3371 .1544 .3614 
IMPAIR .2528 .4346 .2472 .4315 
DOCTOR .6285 .4832 .6383 .4806 
HOSPITAL .0828 .2556 .0715 .2577 
SICK6 .0408 .1977 .0417 .1999 
SPORTS .3384 .4732 .3561 .4789 
observations 15,728 2,112 
Table 5.9: Sample statistics. Source: GSOEP 1995-2000, own calculations. 
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Health status I Full sample Stayers 
N (%) I Pere. N (%) I Pere. 
Non-BKK members 
0 (bad) 180 (1.000) .0114 168 ( .933) .0117 
1 (not 50 good) 1,317 (1.000) .0837 1,273 (.967) .0883 
2 (satisfactory) 4,808 (1.000) .3057 4,435 ( .922) .3077 
3 (good) 7,975 (1.000) .5071 7,225 (.906) .5012 
4 (very good) 1,448 (1.000) .0921 1,313 (.907) .0911 
All 15,728 (1.000) 1.0000 14,414 ( .916) 1.0000 
Average health 2.58 2.57 
BKK members 
0 (bad) 25 (1.000) .0118 19 (.760) .0101 
1 (not 50 good) 182 (1.000) .0862 169 (.929) .0900 
2 (satisfactory) 629 (1.000) .2978 582 (.925) .3099 
3 (good) 1,050 (1.000) .4972 922 (.878) .4909 
4 ( very good) 226 (1.000) .1070 186 (.823) .0990 
All 2,112 (1.000) 1.0000 1,878 (.889) 1.0000 
Average health 2.60 2.58 
Within switchers 
N (%) I Pere. 
7 (.039) .0080 
29 (.022) .0332 
262 ( .054) .2998 
490 (.061) .5606 
86 (.059) .0984 
874 (.056) 1.0000 
2.71 
1 (.040) .0128 
5 (.027) .0641 
16 (.025) .2051 
48 (.046) .6154 
8 (.035) .1026 
78 (.037) 1.0000 
2.73 
Out switchers 
N (%) I Pere. 
5 (.028) .0114 
15 (.011) .0341 
111 (.023) .2523 
260 (.033) .5909 
49 (.034) .1114 
440 (.028) 1.0000 
2.76 
5 (.200) .0321 
8 (.044) .0513 
31 (.049) .1987 
80 (.076) .5128 
32 (.142) .2051 
156 (.074) 1.0000 
2.81 
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Prob(y2 == 1) Prob(y2 == 2) 
Variable Coeff. s.e. Coeff. s.e. 
Constant -7.5514*** 1.1153 -3.0056 ••• .7485 
HEALTH2 .5429** .2594 .8180*** .1898 
HEALTH3 .7694 ••• .2696 _9034••· .1977 
HEALTH4 .7173** .3065 .8155*** .2266 
IMPAIR -.0108 .1513 .0264 .1027 
DISAB .1569 .2637 .2633 .1800 
DOCTOR .0153 .1167 .0899 .0836 
VISITS .0008 .0201 .0240** .0120 
HOSPITAL -.1734 .2093 .1079 .1369 
SICK6 .4560* .2549 -.7297*** .2704 
SPORTS .1592 .1036 .1427* .0750 
WHITEC .3157** .1363 .0734 .0957 
FULLTIME .1053 .1829 .2997** .1269 
UNEMPL -.3580 .2610 .1753 .1420 
SUBST .2653* .1355 -.1121 .0918 
OTHER .7257*** .1568 -.1447 .1290 
NOSINGLE -.1331 .1082 .0377 .0790 
FOREIGN -.1234 .1710 -.9632*** .1616 
FEMALE .0624 .1228 .0109 .0869 
AGE -.0316*** .0070 -.0292*** .0050 
EDU -.0114 .0224 .0670*** .0159 
LNGROSS .4188*** .1412 -.0982 .0953 
YEAR96 .4812* .2522 .0469 .1334 
YEAR97 .8032*** .2446 .0033 .1355 
YEAR98 .8865*** .2429 .2784** .1306 
YEAR99 1.2069*** .2377 .2419* .1315 
Observations 15,728 
Log likelihood -5, 164.83 
Pseudo R2 0.0359 
LR chisq(50) 384.55 
••• p < 0.01, •• p < 0.05, * p < 0.10 
Table 5.11: Single equation estimates for switching behavior of non-BKK 
members. 
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Prob(y2 = 0) Prob(y2 = 1) Prob(Y2 = 2) 
Variable Coeff. s.e. Coeff. s.e. Coeff. s.e. 
Constant 2.9879··· .4248 -1.6674*** .2888 -1.3205*** .3569 
HEALTH2 -.4896··· .1025 .1131 * .0597 .3765 ... .0928 
HEALTH3 __ 5771 ••· .1067 .1631 *** .0629 _4140••· .0970 
HEALTH4 -.52ss••• . 1229 .1524 •• .0708 _3734••· .1093 
IMPAIR -.0097 .0581 -.0027 .0341 .0125 .0480 
DISAB -.1538 .1017 .0324 .0594 .1214 .0845 
DOCTOR -.0443 .0465 .0024 .0263 .0419 .0391 
VISITS -.0111 .0071 -.0001 .0045 .0112•• .0056 
HOSPITAL -.0121 .0783 -.0403 .0473 .0524 .0641 
SICK6 .2355· .1359 .1110• .0583 -.3466··· .1288 
SPORTS -.0992 .. .0417 .0342 .0235 .0649. .0353 
WHITEC -.1011• .0536 .0103•• .0313 .0308 .0448 
FULLTIME -,1594•• .0711 .0203 .0412 .1390** .0600 
UNEMPL -.0034 .0871 -.0826 .0593 .0861 .0666 
SUBST -.0056 .0519 .0610•• .0310 -.0555 .0430 
OTHER -.0892 .0690 .1651 *** .0382 -.0760 .0605 
NOSINGLE .0113 .0438 -.0304 .0245 .0192 .0370 
FOREIGN .4661 ••· .0807 -.0169 .0386 -.4493 ... .0825 
FEMALE -.0183 .0486 .0139 .0277 .0044 .0406 
AGE .0201 ••· .0027 -.0068*•• .0017 -.0133 ... .0025 
EDU -.0281 ••• .0089 -.0033 .0051 .0315 ... .0077 
LNGROSS -.0448 .0539 .0955 ... .0330 -.0507 .0447 
YEAR96 -.1244 .0823 .1079* .0579 .0165 .0624 
YEAR97 -.1134•• .0817 .1so9••• .0581 -.0076 .0634 
YEAR98 -.3168*•• .0797 .1966··· .0582 .1202• .0615 
YEAR99 -.3687**• .0790 .2692••· .0595 .0995 .0618 
••• p < 0.01, •• p < 0.05, • p < 0.10, all entries were multiplied by 10. 
Table 5.12: Single equation marginal effects for non-BKK members. 
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Prob(y2 = 1) Prob(y2 = 2) 
Variable Coeff. s.e. Coeff. s.e. 
Constant -7.3060*** 1.1034 -2.2789*** .7404 
YlF .1350* .0758 .0599 .0520 
WHITEC .3286** .1357 .0963 .0955 
FULLTIME .1038 .1822 .2813** .1262 
UNEMPL -.3514 .2610 .1519 .1418 
SUBST .2715** .1350 -.1020 .0915 
OTHER .7278*** .1566 -.1276 .1286 
NOSINGLE -.1381 .1075 .0417 .0784 
FOREIGN -.1354 .1708 -.9863*** .1614 
FEMALE .0512 .1212 .0220 .0859 
AGE -.0312*** .0074 -.0309*** .0053 
EDU -.0092 .0224 .0716*** .0158 
LNGROSS .4190*** .1402 -.0854 .0949 
YEAR96 .4846* .2517 -.0062 .1328 
YEAR97 .8101 ••· .2441 -.0506 .1349 
YEAR98 _9030••· .2425 .2260* .1300 
YEAR99 1.2212••· .2370 .1873 .1308 
Observations 15,728 
Log likelihood -5, 194.69 
Pseudo R 2 0.0303 
LR chisq(32) 324.84 
••• p < 0.01, •• p < 0.05, * p < 0.10 
Table 5 .13: Second stage parameter estimates for switching behavior of 
non-BKK members. 
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Prob(y2 = 1) Prob(y2 = 2) 
Variable Coeff. s.e. Coeff. s.e, 
Constant 5.8667··· 1.9054 -4.3067 2.9780 
YlF .2693 .. .1197 .2431 .1715 
WHITEC .2825 .2106 .5590* .2883 
FULLTIME .4698 .3776 -.2643 .5044 
UNEMPL 1.0754••· .4139 .5669 .7535 
NOSINGLE -.0526 .1936 -.0700 .2639 
FOREIGN .3039 .2343 -.8355* .4883 
FEMALE -.4486** .2243 -.0596 .2999 
AGE .0024 .0117 __ 0491 ••· .0182 
EDU .0253 .0420 -.0275 .0564 
LNGROSS -1.2144 ••• .2559 .0576 .3763 
YEAR96 -.1631 .3275 2.0567** 1.0407 
YEAR97 -.2200 .3289 2.1344** 1.0364 
YEAR98 .4965* .2952 2.4777** 1.0245 
YEAR99 -.4332 .3244 1.9892* 1.0308 
Observations 2,112 
Log likelihood -834.46 
Pseudo R2 0.0563 
LR chisq(28) 99.66 
••• p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, • p < 0.10 
Table 5.14: Second stage parameter estimates for switching behavior of 
BKK members. 
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Prob(y2 = 0) Prob(y2 = 1) Prob(Y2 = 2) 
Variable Coeff. s.e. Coeff. s.e. Coeff. s.e. 
Constant -2.3775* 1.3664 3.6243*** 1.2575 -1.2468 .8609 
YlF -.2184 ••• .0832 .1586** .0761 .0598 .0477 
WHITEC __ 3044•• .1474 .1610 .1289 .1434* .0829 
FULLTIME -.2104 .2609 .2888 .2318 -.0785 .1352 
UNEMPL __ 7719•• .3251 .6404** .2617 .1315 .2016 
NOSINGLE .0482 .1347 -.0306 .1169 -.0177 .0699 
FOREIGN .0286 .1854 .1985 .1443 -.2272 .1426 
FEMALE .2782* .1550 -.2703* .1405 -.0079 .0795 
AGE .0108 .0084 .0023 . 0071 -.0131 •• .0058 
EDU -.0080 .0291 .0158 .0254 -.0078 .0150 
LNGROSS .6988*** .1812 __ 7355••· .1847 .0367 .1002 
YEAR96 -.4139 .2996 -.1349 .1993 .5489* .3337 
YEAR97 -.3998 .2980 -.1707 .2007 .5705* .3358 
YEAR98 -.9055*** .2804 .2565 .1819 .6490* .3441 
YEAR99 -.2386 .2958 -.2971 .2017 .5357 .3298 
*** p < 0.01, •• p < 0.05, • p < 0.10, all entries were multiplied by 10. 
Table 5.15: Second stage marginal effects for BKK members. 
Robert Nuscheler - 978-3-631-75167-1
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 07:31:18AM
via free access
Chapter 6 
Summary (in German) 
In der Einleitung dieser Dissertationsschrift wurden zunachst einige Cha-
rakteristika des Gesundheitsmarktes des beschrieben. Das sich jeweils erge-
bende Marktversagen rechtfertigt staatliche Eingriffe in den Gesundheits--
markt. Da ein sozialer Planer in der Regel mehrere Probleme gleichzei-
tig angeht bzw. angehen muss, greifen regulierende MaBnahmen mitunter 
ineinander, konnen aber durchaus auch sich widersprechende Wirkungen 
auslosen. Die Multidimensionalitat macht es fiir einen Regulator schwer, 
wenn nicht sogar unmoglich, eine effiziente Politik zu implementieren. Die 
Multidimensionalitat setzt aber auch der Wissenschaft Grenzen. So wird 
sich die okonomische Analyse in der Regel auf Partialmodelle beschranken 
miissen. 
Anschliefiend wurden, den Inhalten der einzelnen Kapitel folgend, vier 
Teilaspekte isoliert betrachtet und problematisiert. Die nachfolgenden vier 
Abschnitte fassen die in diesen Kapiteln erzielten Resultate zusammen. 
6.1 lmpfungen (Kapitel 2) 
Das Standardbeispiel fiir externe Effekte im Gesundheitsmarkt sind lmp-
fungen. Entscheidet sich ein Individuum sich impfen zu lassen, so hat dies 
zwei Effekte. Einerseits kann er sich selber nicht mehr mit der Krankheit 
infizieren, d. h. er ist immun. 1 Andererseits kann er in der Regel andere 
Personen nicht mehr mit der Krankheit anstecken. Der zweite Effekt ist 
1 Aus Criinden der besseren Lesbarkeit des Textes, und nur aus diesen, wird fast 
ausschlieBlich die miinnliche Form verwendet. 
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die Quelle einer Ineffi.zienz, da ein Individuum bei seiner personlichen Imp-
fentscheidung diesen positiven externen Effekt seiner Impfung auf andere 
nicht beriicksichtigt. Statt <lessen wagt er seinen personlichen Vorteil aus 
der Impfung mit seinen individuellen Nachteilen, z. B. Zeitkosten, Schmer-
zen oder potentielle Nebenwirkungen, ab. Dies fuhrt zu einem zu geringen 
Immunisierungsgrad und rechtfertigt staatliche Eingriffe. 
In Kapitel 2 wurde ein Modell entwickelt, class die Externalitat des Imp-
fens <lurch einen negativen Einfl.uss der Immunisierungsrate auf die Zah-
lungsbereitschaft fur Impfungen, abbildet. Je hoher der Anteil der Immunen 
in der Bevolkerung, um so geringer ist die Wahrscheinlichkeit, class man auf 
einen Infizierten trifft und sich ansteckt. Zudem hangt die Zahlungsbereit-
schaft, empirischen Beobachtungen folgend, positiv vom Einkommen ab. In 
diesem Modellrahmen wurde das Preissetzungsverhalten eines Monopolisten 
fur Impfstoffe untersucht. 
Durch den bio-technologischen Fortschritt wurden wahrend des letzten 
Jahrzehnts eine Vielzahl neuer Impfstoffe entwickelt. Die aktuelle Politik 
des Europaischen Patentamtes erlaubt zudem die Patentierung von leben-
den Organismen oder genetischen Codes, so class die Firmen ihre neuen 
Produkte relativ leicht <lurch Patente schiitzen konnen. Die Annahme 
von Marktmacht auf der Anbieterseite wird also <lurch empirische Fakten 
gestiitzt. 
Ein Monopolist fur einen Impfstoff hat im Wesentlichen zwei Anreize. 
Erstens hat er cin Interesse, die Krankheit am Leben zu erhalten. Denn 
sollte die Krankheit ausgerottet werden, so gehen neben der Monopolstel-
lung auch die Monopolgewinne verloren. Zweitens wird der Monopolist die 
Abhangigkeit der Zahlungsbereitschaft vom Immunisierungsgrad strategisch 
nutzen. Er wird Individuen mit geringem Einkommen - und damit gerin-
gerer Zahlungsbereitschaft - ungeimpft lassen, um damit iiber die erhohte 
Ansteckungsgefahr die Zahlungsbereitschaft der Reichen zu erhohen. Das 
Angebot ist somit geringer als im Standardmonopolfall ohne Externalitat. 
Der Anreiz das Angebot zu verknappen ist um so groBer, je groBer der Ein-
fluss des extcrnen Effektes ist. Beachte, class die resultierende Ineffi.zienz 
zwei in dieselbe Richtung wirkende Ursachen hat, den externen Effekt und 
die Monopolmacht. 
Es wurde zudem gezeigt, class, im Gegensatz zum Standard-Monopol-
modell ohne Externalitat, ein perfekt preisdiskriminierender Monopolist 
nicht notwendiger Weise zu einer effizienten Allokation fuhrt. 2 Bietet der 
Monopolist dem marginalen ungeimpften Individuum die Impfung zu seiner 
2 In unserem Modellrahmen ist die vollstii.ndige Immunisierung der Bevolkerung, d. h. 
die Ausrottung der Krankheit, effizient. 
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individuellen Zahlungsbereitschaft an, so sinkt nicht nur der Preis an dieser 
Grenze, sondern auch die Zahlungsbereitschaft aller anderen Individuen, da 
die Ansteckungsgefahr <lurch den hoheren Immunisierungsgrad sinkt. Die 
Vereinten Nationen unterstiitzen mit ihrer UN Acceleration Access Initia-
tive Preisdiskriminierung, da sie den Zugang der dritten Welt zu Impfstoffen 
verbessert. Das Modell zeigt, class diese Einschii.tzung zwar richtig ist, aber 
auch, class dies mitunter nicht ausreicht um Effizienz herzustellen. In die-
sen Fallen wiiren weitere MaBnahmen erforderlich, beispielsweise konnten 
lmpfprogramme durchgefiihrt werden. 
Ein sozialer Planer sieht sich einem ,,doppelten" Marktversagen gegen-
iiber. Wie bereits oben erwii.hnt, wirken der externe Effekt und die Mono-
polmacht in dieselbe llichtung, d. h. sie reduzieren den Immunisierungs-
grad. Eine Subventionierung des Impfstoffes konnte nun fiir beide Ursachen 
korrigieren und Effizienz herstellen. Im Allgemeinen sind Subventionen im 
Impfmarkt von geringerer Wirkung als in Mii.rkten ohne Externalitii.t. Der 
reduzierte Preis fiihrt zu einem positiven Nachfrageeffekt. Dieser dii.mpft 
sich jedoch selbst, da <lurch die erhohte Nachfrage auch das Ansteckungsri-
siko und damit die Zahlungsbereitschaft fiir lmpfungen sinkt. Neben diesem 
negativen ,,Pri:ivalenzeffekt" ergibt sich noch ein zweiter negativer Effekt, 
wenn man die Finanzierung der Subventionen beriicksichtigt. Eine entspre-
chende Besteuerung der Individuen lost einen negativen Einkommenseffekt 
aus. 1st dieser hinreichend grof3, so kann eine positive Subvention das Mark-
tergebnis sogar verschlechtern, d. h. mit Subvention impfen sich weniger 
Individuen als ohne Subvention. In diesen Fallen ware eine Besteuerung 
von lmpfstoffen optimal. Die Angemessenheit von Subventionen ist also 
mit einem Fragezeichen zu versehen. 
Bei lmpfprogrammen verhii.lt es sich mitunter ii.hnlich. Liegt der Anteil 
der Bevolkerung, der <lurch das lmpfprogramm abgedeckt ist, unter 100 Pro-
zent, so senkt das lmpfprogramm die Zahlungsbereitschaft derer, die nicht 
Teil des Programms sind. Deshalb ist es schwierig volle Immunisierung zu 
erreichen, wenn nicht die gesamte Bevolkerung durch das Programm ab-
gedeckt ist. Diese Problematik entschii.rft sich, wenn der soziale Planer die 
individuellen Einkommen beobachten kann. In diesem Fall konnte er die Ar-
men (z. B. die Dritte-Welt-Li:inder) in das Programm einbeziehen und die 
Reichen (z. B. die Industrielii.nder) vom Monopolisten bedienen lassen. Die 
Zahlungsbereitschaft der Reichen wird zwar durch das Impfprogramm eben-
falls geschmiilert, jedoch bleibt sie wegen des Einkommenseffektes relativ 
hoch. Volle Immunisierung kann deshalb auch mit unvollstii.ndigen lmpf-
programmen erreicht werden. Diese Tatsache bietet eine effizienzbasierte 
Begriindung fiir lmpfprogramme, die typischer Weise von den Vereinten 
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Nationen, der Weltbank oder der Weltgesundheitsorganisation unterstiitzt 
werden. 
6.2 Preisregulierung (Kapitel 3) 
Wegen der Besonderheiten von Gesundheitsgiitern sind die Preise filr me-
dizinische Leistungen in der Regel reguliert. Zudem sind Patienten ge-
geniiber Preisen nicht sehr sensitiv, da die Kosten medizinischer Behandlun-
gen in der Regel (zum Grofiteil) von Krankenversicherungen getragen wer-
den. Im Wettbewerb um Patienten konnen .Arzte somit den Preis nicht stra-
tegisch nutzen. Dementsprechend verlagern die .Arzte den Wettbewerb auf 
Nicht-Preis-Variablen, beispielsweise die Qualitat medizinischer Behand-
lungen (vertikale Produktdifferenzierung) und die Spezialisierung auf be-
stimmte Krankheiten bzw. den Praxistandort (horizontale Produktdiffe-
renzierung). 
Die Anreizwirkungen von Preisregulierung wurden in einem 3-stufigen 
nicht kooperativen Spiel analysiert, in dem die Spieler die folgenden sequen-
tiellen Entscheidungen zu treffen batten: Markteintritt, Standortwahl und 
die Qualitat medizinischer Leistungen. Wir verwendeten das Kreismodell 
von Salop (1979) und beschrankten uns auf symmetrische Gleichgewichte, 
d. h. insbesondere, class sich die Standorte der .Arzte symmetrisch auf dem 
Kreis verteilen. Auch wenn wir die strategische Beziehung zwischen Stand-
ortwahl und medizinischer Qualitii.t detailliert untersuchten, kam der Stand-
ortwahl an sich wegen der Symmetrieannahme nur geringere Bedeutung zu. 
Stattdessen konzentrierte sich die Analyse auf die Qualitii.t medizinischer 
Versorgung und auf die Arztdichte. 
Zunii.chst untersuchten wir das strategische Verhalten der Arzte bei exo-
gen gegebenem Preis. Die im Gleichgewicht bereitgestellte Qualitii.t hii.ngt 
positiv vom Preis ab. Je hoher der Preis, desto hoher ist der Anreiz ei-
nes Arztes iiber eine Erhohung der Qualitii.t die Patienten der Konkurren-
ten zu gewinnen. Dieser Qualitatswettbewerb ist jedoch kostspielig. Die 
Arzte konnen diesem teilweise ausweichen bzw. diesen abschwachen, in-
dem sie ihre Standorte weit voneinander entfernt wahlen. Dies ist in einem 
Kreismodell mit endogenem Markteintritt nur dann moglich, wenn weniger 
Firmen in den Markt eintreten. Folglich fiihrt ein hoherer Preis filr medizi-
nische Leistungen zu einer niedrigeren Arztdichte. Genau dieses Phii.nomen 
lii.sst sich in Deutschland beobachten. Kapitel 3 liefert somit eine mogliche 
Erklarung filr die im deutschen Markt filr niedergelassene Arzte gemachten 
Beobachtungen. 
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AnschlieBend wurden verschiedene Szenarien der Preissetzung betrach-
tet. Zuniichst unterstellten wir das Gleichgewicht mit vollstandiger Selbst-
bindung des Regulators. In diesem Fall konnte sich der Regulator vor der 
Markteintrittsentscheidung der Arzte bindend auf einen Preis fiir medizi-
nische Leistungen festlegen. 1st der Preis sehr niedrig, so treten zu viele 
Firmen in den Markt ein und gleichzeitig ist die gleichgewichtige Qualitiit 
zu gering. Eine Preiserhohung steigert somit die soziale Wohlfahrt. In der 
second-best Losung lohnt sich eine weitere Preiserhohung nicht mehr. Das 
second-best Optimum ist <lurch eine zu hohe Arztdichte und iibermii.Bige 
Qualitii.tsbereitstellung charakterisiert. 
Im zweiten Szenario erfolgte die Preissetzung nach der Standortwahl je-
doch vor der Qualitiitsentscheidung der Arzte. Die Fii.higkeit des Regulators 
sich bindend auf einen Preis festzulegen war somit beschra.nkt. N achdem 
die Arzte ihren Standort gewii.hlt haben, kann der Regulator nur noch die 
Qualitii.t <lurch die Preissetzung beeinflussen. Folglich resultierte die effizi-
ente Qualitiit. Dies ging jedoch mit einer (viel) zu hohen Arztdichte einher. 
Da der Regulator nach den Qualitiitsentscheidungen keinen Anreiz hat den 
Preis zu iindern, bezeichneten wir dieses Szenario als zeitkonsistente Regu-
lierung. Da die soziale Wohlfahrt in dieser zeitkonsistenten Losung geringer 
ist als bei second-best Preisregulierung, wiirde sich der Regulator gerne 
bindend auf den second-best Preis festlegen. Dieser ist jedoch nicht zeit-
konsistent, da der Regulator nach Markteintritt und Standortwahl einen 
Anreiz hat, den Preis zu veriindern (zu senken), um die effiziente Qualitiit 
zu induzieren. 
Im Allgemeinen kann die effiziente Allokation nicht implementiert wer-
den, da der Regulator nur iiber eine Regulierungsvariable verfiigt (den 
Preis), jedoch zwei Regulierungsziele hat ( die optimale Arztdichte und die 
effiziente Qualitat). Verfiigt der Regulator iiber eine zweite Regulierungsva-
riable resultiert Effizienz. Es wurden verschiedene Variablen diskutiert und 
die jeweils optimale Politik ermittelt. Beispielsweise konnte der Regulator 
Lizenzen verkaufen oder Qualitiitsuntergrenzen vorschreiben. Auch variable 
Vergiitungen konnen Effizienz herstellen. 
Angesichts des Regulierungs- bzw. des Selbstbindungsproblems konnte 
der Regulator erwiigen, die soziale Wohlfahrt <lurch eine Starkung des Wett-
bewerbs zu steigern. Er konnte beispielsweise die Preise freigeben. Wahlen 
nun die Arzte Preise und Qualitaten simultan, so ergibt sich dieselbe Al-
lokation wie bei zeitkonsistenter Regulierung. Da sich auch Wahler einem 
Selbstbindungsproblem gegeniiber sehen, ist die strategische Delegation der 
Preissetzung an die Wahler nicht zielfiihrend. Im Gegenteil, das Markter-
gebnis verschlechtert sich gegeniiber der zeitkonsistenten Politik sogar noch. 
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6.3 Hausarztprinzip (Kapitel 4) 
Das Vereinigte Konigreich und Skandinavien sind Beispiele fiir Lander, die 
den Hausiirzten eine Lotsenfunktion im Gesundheitswesen zugewiesen ha-
ben, d. h. das ,,Hausarztprinzip" wird praktiziert. Patienten haben keinen 
direkten Zugang zu Fachiirzten oder Krankenhausern, sondern benotigen 
eine entsprechende Uberweisung von ihrem Hausarzt. Das Hausarztprin-
zip ist Teil der aktuellen deutschen Gesundheitsreform, die zum l. J anuar 
2004 in Kraft treten soll. Die Gesetzlichen Krankenkassen sollen verpflich-
tet werden, sogenannte Hausarztprogramme anzubieten. Patienten, die sich 
in einem solchen Programm einschreiben, sollen Beitragsnachliisse gewiihrt 
werden konnen. Im Gegensatz dazu gibt es in Schweden Uberlegungen, den 
direkten Zugang zu Krankenhiiusern, also ohne Uberweisung des Hausarz-
tes, zu ermoglichen. 
Im Allgemeinen werden dem Hausarztprinzip drei positive Wirkungen 
bescheinigt. Erstens, triigt das Hausarztprinzip zur Kostendampfung bei, 
da unnotige Behandlungen unterbleiben bzw. mit geringerer Rate auftre-
ten. Diese Behauptung trifft iiberraschender Weise auf breite Akzeptanz, 
obwohl jegliche empirische Evidenz fehlt. So findet beispielsweise Barros 
(1998) keinen signifikanten Einfluss des Hausarztprinzips auf die aggregier-
ten Gesundheitsausgaben.3 Zweitens steigt die Effi.zienz im System, da eine 
Verlagerung der Behandlungen von Facharzten bzw. Krankenhausern hin 
zu Hausiirzten stattfindet wann immer ein Patient besser vom Hausarzt 
behandelt werden kann (Hausiirzte kennen ihre Patienten und deren Kran-
kengeschichte typischer Weise besser als Facharzte oder Krankenhiiuser). 
Drittens steigt die Effi.zienz im Markt filr Facharzte und die Effi.zienz im 
stationaren Bereich, da die Hausarzte in der Regel besser ilber die ange-
botene Qualitiit in diesen Markten informiert sind als die Patienten. Es 
kommt so zu einer besseren Zuordnung von Patienten zu Fachiirzten bzw. 
Krankenhiiusern. In Kapitel 4 konzentrierten wir uns auf den dritten Effekt 
und analysierten die Auswirkungen auf Wettbewerb und soziale Wohlfahrt 
wenn <lurch das Hausarztprinzip mehr Informationen in den Markt gelan-
gen. Diese Wettbewerbseffekte blieben bisher unberiicksichtigt. 
Wie in Kapitel 3 auch unterstellten wir Preisregulierung und Nicht-Preis-
Wettbewerb. Im Unterschied zu Kapitel 3 betrachteten wir ein Hotelling 
(1929) Modell mit zwei Firmen (Facharzte oder Krankenhiiuser), die in Qua-
litatswettbewerb stehen und zudem ihre Spezialisierung (ihren Standort auf 
3 Abstrahiert man von Selektionseffekten, konnten Beitragsrabatte im Rahmen der 
Hausarztprogramme in der Gesetzlichen Krankenversicherung Deutschlands ab 2004 die 
bisher fehlende Evidenz liefern. 
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der Hotelling-Linie) strategisch wii.hlen konnen. Jeder Standort entspricht 
also einer Krankheit. Alternativ lii.sst sich die Spezialisierung als physischer 
Standort der Praxis oder des Krankenhauses interpretieren. 
Das Hauptanliegen von Kapitel 4 war <las Herausarbeiten der Wett-
bewerbswirkungen der <lurch <las Hausarztprinzip generierten Informatio-
nen. Wir unterstellten, <lass einige Patienten uninformiert sind, d. h. sie 
kennen weder ihre eigene Krankheit noch die Spezifika des Fachii.rztemark-
tes. Gehen diese Patienten direkt zum Facharzt oder ins Krankenhaus, 
konnen Fehlentscheidungen entlang von zwei Dimensionen auftreten. Ei-
nerseits konnte ein Patient den Anbieter wii.hlen, der die geringere Qualitii.t 
bereit stellt. Andererseits besteht die Gefahr, <lass er ein Krankenhaus 
wii.hlt, <lass nicht hinreichend fiir die eigene Krankheit spezialisiert ist bzw. 
schlechter in der Lage ist die Krankheit zu behandeln als <las andere Kran-
kenhaus. Es wurde unterstellt, <lass der Hausarzt alle relevanten Informa-
tionen beobachten kann, d. h. die Krankheit des Patienten, die Qualitii.t 
der Krankenhii.user und deren Spezialisierung, so dass die genannten Fehler 
nicht mehr auftreten. Zudem nahmen wir an, dass die Hausii.rzte keinerlei 
Kosten verursachen und ihre Informationen wahrheitsgemii.B den Patien-
ten offenbaren. Diese Annahmen entsprechen im Wesentlichen dem oben 
genannten dritten positiven Effekt des Hausarztprinzips. 
Wir untersuchten zwei Varianten des Grundmodells. In der ersten Vari-
ante konnte der Regulator wii.hlen, ob er auf Hausii.rzte gii.nzlich verzichtet 
oder ob er <las Hausarztprinzip fiir alle Versicherten bzw. Patienten verbind-
lich vorschreibt.4 Entscheidet er sich zur Einfiihrung des Hausarztprinzips, 
sind alle Patienten vollsta.ndig informiert. Folglich reagiert die gesamte Po-
pulation sensitiv auf Qualitii.tsinvestitionen seitens der Krankenhii.user. Im 
Vergleich zur Situation ohne Hausii.rzte wird der Qualitii.tswettbewerb er-
heblich gestii.rkt. Da dieser Wettbewerb mit substantiellen Kosten verbun-
den ist, versuchen die Krankenhii.user diesem auszuweichen indem sie ihre 
Produkte starker (horizontal) differenzieren. Implizieren die Parameter des 
Modells starken bzw. kostenintensiven Wettbewerb, fiihrt die Einfiihrung 
des Hausarztprinzips zu einer Verschlechterung des Marktergebnisses - und 
das obwohl das Hausarztprinzip keine direkten Kosten verursacht. Die Zah-
lungsbereitschaft fiir Informationen ist also negativ. 
Kann der Regulator zusiitzlich den Preis fiir Krankenhausbehandlungen 
4 Die Spielstufen sind wie folgt: 1. Der Regulator entscheidet iiber die Einfiihrung des 
Hausarztprinzips und Uber die Hohe der Vergiltung. 2. Die Krankenhauser wahlen ihre 
Spezialisierung. 3. Die Krankenhauser wahlen ihre Qualitat. 4. Die Patienten fragen 
Krankenhausleistungen nach. Unter Umstanden suchen sie vorher noch ihren Hausarzt 
auf. 
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festlegen, so ist das Hausarztprinzip immer wilnschenswert. Die potenti-
ell negativen Auswirkungen der zusatzlichen Informationen konnen <lurch 
Preissenkungen ausgeglichen werden. Die Informationen entfalten dann 
nicht mehr die beschriebenen negativen Effekte, da die Anreize in Qua-
litii.t zu investieren aufgrund des niedrigeren Preises verschwinden. Die 
Einfilhrung des Hausarztprinzips sollte demnach von einer geeigneten Preis-
regulierung begleitet werden. Dennoch ist eine effiziente Allokation in All-
gemeinen nicht erreichbar, da der Preis optimale Qualitii.t und optimale 
Spezialisierung induzieren muss. 
In der zweiten Version des Grundmodells entschieden die Patienten selbst, 
ob sie einen Hausarzt aufsuchen oder nicht.5 Die Endogenisierung des Haus-
arztbesuchs hat zur Folge, <lass der Regulator <lurch geeignete Wahl des 
Preises ein generelles Hausarztprinzip induzieren kann. 1st der Preis hoch, 
so sind nicht nur die bereitgestellten Qualitii.ten hoch sondern auch die Pro-
duktdifferenzierung. Die Wahl des falschen Krankenhauses ist somit mit 
hohen Kosten verbunden. Da diese Kosten <lurch einen Hausarztbesuch ver-
mieden werden konnen, suchen viele Patienten einen Hausarzt auf. 1st der 
Preis hinreichend groB, konsultieren alle Patienten vor einem Krankenhaus-
besuch ihren Hausarzt. Jedoch ist ein solcher Preis nicht notwendiger Weise 
optimal, da er ilbermii.Bige Qualitii.t und/oder ilbermii.Bige Spezialisierung 
implizieren kann. Dies ist, analog zur ersten Variante des Grundmodells, 
genau dann der Fall, wenn die Parameter des Modells starken Qualitats-
wettbewerb implizieren. Der optimale Preis balanciert dann die Information 
im Markt (Anteil der Hausarztpatienten) optimal gegen die Qualitii.ts- und 
Spezialisierungsanreize. Das Marktergebnis ist im Allgemeinen ineffizient, 
da der Regulator nur ilber eine Stellschraube verfilgt (den Preis), jedoch 
drei Regulierungsziele erreichen mochte (generelles Hausarztprinzip, opti-
male Qualitii.t und optimale Spezialisierung). Insbesondere wird das Ziel 
des generellen Hausarztprinzips verfehlt, wenn der Wettbewerb im Kran-
kenhausmarkt hinreichend intensiv ist. 
Auch wenn in Kapitel 4 wichtige Aspekte des Hausarztprinzips ver-
nachlii.ssigt wurden, so abstrahierten wir von den beiden erstgenannten 
positiven Wirkungen, dokumentiert die Analyse, <lass eine differenziertere 
Betrachtung dieses einschneidenden Reformschritts geboten erscheint. Die 
Ausblendung jeglicher Wirkungen von Informationen auf das Marktergebnis 
filhrt zu einer verzerrten Einschatzung der <lurch das Hausarztprinzip er-
5 Die Spielstufen sind wie folgt: 1. Der Regulator legt den Preis fest. 2. Die Kran-
kenhii.user wii.hlen ihre Spezialisierung. 3. Die Krankenhii.user wii.hlen ihre Qualitii.t. 4. 
Einige Patienten suchen einen Hausarzt auf und erhalten alle relevanten lnformationen. 
5. Alie Patienten fragen Krankenhausleistungen nach. 
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warteten Gewinne. Es wurde gezeigt, class, selbst wenn das Hausarztprinzip 
kostenlos ist, eine generelle Einftihrung iiber den verschi:i.rften Wettbewerb 
schlecht sein kann. Es ist theoretisch denkbar, class der Wettbewerbseffekt 
alle - d. h. inklusive der im Modell vernachlassigten - positiven Wirkungen 
des Hausarztprinzips iiberkompensieren. 
6.4 Risikoselektion (Kapitel 5) 
Im Rahmen des Gesundheitsstrukturgesetzes aus dem Jahre 1992 wurde 
der Wettbewerb in der Gesetzlichen Krankenversicherung (GKV) erheblich 
gestiirkt.6 Der Wettbewerbsdruck entsteht <lurch das den Versicherten seit 
1996 eingeraumte Recht, ihre Krankenkasse im Wesentlichen frei zu wahlen. 
In Kapitel 5 iiberpriiften wir, ob dieser Wettbewerb gut organisiert ist oder 
ob iiber die bestehenden Regulierungen hinausgehende Eingriffe erforderlich 
sind. Im Mittelpunkt stand dabei die Frage, ob Betriebskrankenkassen er-
folgreich Versicherte mit geringem Krankheitsrisiko selektieren konnen und 
sich damit gesellschaftlich unerwiinschte Wettbewerbsvorteile sichern. 
Okonomen sprechen dem Wettbewerb im Krankenversicherungsmarkt 
im Allgemeinen drei positive Effekte zu. Erstens verspricht man sich <lurch 
Wettbewerb eine erhohte Qualitiit medizinischer Versorgung. Zweitens er-
hofft man sich eine verbesserte Effizienz im System insgesamt und, drittens, 
eine starkere Kundenorientierung der Krankenkassen. Diirfen die Versiche-
rer mit den Anbietern medizinischer Leistungen Einzelvertrage schliefien, 
sind diese Effizienzgewinne leicht zu verwirklichen. So konnten die Kran-
kenkassen nur mit kostengiinstigen Anbietern hoher Qualitiit Versorgungs-
vertrage abschlieBen. Aber auch wenn die Versicherer nur Kollektivvertrage 
schlieBen konnen, wie es weitgehend in Deutschland <lurch das Monopol der 
Kassenarztlichen Vereinigungen der Fall ist, kann Wettbewerb wilnschens-
wert sein. So verlieren ineffiziente Krankenkassen, d. h. Krankenkassen mit 
hohen Verwaltungskosten, <lurch ihre hohen Beitragssatze Mitglieder. Im 
Extremfall werden sie aus dem Markt verdriingt. 
In der GKV gilt das sogenannte Diskriminierungsverbot, nach dem eine 
Krankenkasse allen Mitgliedern denselben prozentualen Beitragssatz abver-
langen muss. Anders als in der privaten Krankenversicherung sind dem 
individuellen Krankheitsrisiko angepasste Pramien verboten. Hinter die-
ser Regulierung verbirgt sich ein Gerechtigkeitsargument. Zurn groBen Teil 
wird das individuelle Krankheitsrisiko als jenseits der Verantwortung des ln-
dividuums angesehen. So miissten beispielsweise die Beitrage fur chronisch 
6 Dieser Abschnitt ist eine leicht verii.nderte Version von Nuscheler (2003}. 
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Kranke um ein Vielfaches hoher sein als die von nicht chronisch Kranken. 
Aus der Ex-ante-Sicht, d. h. wenn den Individuen ihr Krankheitsrisiko 
bei Abschluss der Versicherung noch nicht bekannt ist, ist <las Diskriminie-
rungsverbot auch aus Effizienzgriinden wiinschenswert. Es versichert die 
Individuen dagegen, sehr hohe Beitriige zahlen zu miissen, falls sich ein 
hohes Krankheitsrisiko herausstellt. 
Jedoch hat die Gerechtigkeit ihren Preis. Diirfen die Krankenkassen 
keine risikoabhiingigen Priimien verlangen, so erzielen sie mit Versicherten 
mit niedrigem Krankheitsrisiko Gewinne, <lurch Beitragszahler mit hohem 
Krankheitsrisiko dagegen Verluste. Die Krankenkassen haben also einen 
Anreiz, Risikoselektion zu betreiben, d. h. bevorzugt Beitragszahler mit 
geringem Krankheitsrisiko versichern zu wollen. Eine Krankenkasse konnte 
beispielsweise bewusst Vertrage ausschliefllich mit schlechten Arzten schlie-
Ben. Die geringe Qualitiit wiirde gerade Versicherte mit hohem Krankheits-
risiko abschrecken, da diese mit hoherer Wahrscheinlichkeit eine Behandlung 
benotigen. Die Moglichkeit Einzelvertriige zu schlieflen kann also zur Risi-
koselektion missbraucht werden und somit die erhofften Effi.zienzgewinne 
des Wettbewerbs in ihr Gegenteil verkehren. 
Um mogliche Gewinne der Krankenkassen <lurch Risikoselektion zu re-
duzieren, wurde 1994 ein Risikostrukturausgleich (RSA) eingefiihrt. Die 
Priimieneinnahmen einer Krankenkasse sollen so der tatsiichlichen Risiko-
struktur der Kasse angepasst werden. Im Optimalfall giibe es keine Selek-
tionsanreize mehr. Der deutsche RSA verwendet fiinf Variablen zur Anpas-
sung des Risikos: Einkommen, Alter, Geschlecht, Behinderung und Kran-
kengeldanspruch. Wie internationale Studien gezeigt haben, ist ein solch 
einfacher RSA hochgradig unvollstiindig, so <lass substanzielle Anreize zur 
Risikoselektion bestehen bleiben. 
Es ist somit wenig iiberraschend, <lass weitere Regulierungsmaflnahmen 
getroffen wurden. So miissen gesetzliche Krankenkassen jeden Bewerber 
aufnehmen (Kontrahierungszwang). Direkte Risikoselektion ist also nur 
schwer moglich, auch wenn gelegentlich behauptet wird, <lass Krankenkas-
sen Versicherungsvertriige wiihrend der Bearbeitung ,, verlieren". Indirekte 
Risikoselektion wird <lurch die weitgehende Regulierung der Leistungspa-
kete erschwert, da 95 Prozent der Leistungen reguliert sind. So konnen 
Krankenkassen beispielsweise nicht jegliche Krebstherapie verweigern. 
Trotz der den Wettbewerb begleitenden Regulierungen gibt es eine Viel-
zahl von Hinweisen, <lass die Krankenkassen sich aktiv um die Versicherten 
mit geringem Krankheitsrisiko bemiihen. So wird selektiv geworben, etwa in 
Universitiitsmensen und im Internet. Gut ausgebildete und gut informierte 
Personen sind in der Regel gesiinder und verursachen den Krankenkassen 
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daher geringere ( erwartete) Leistungsausgaben. Mitunter werden Leistun-
gen bzw. der Service <lurch Ausdtinnung des Geschii.ftsstellennetzes oder 
<lurch <las Verzogern von Kostenerstattungen reduziert. Auch dies schreckt 
vorwiegend die Versicherten mit hohem Krankheitsrisiko ab, da diese mit 
hoherer Wahrscheinlichkeit auf den Service angewiesen sind. Schliefilich 
werden auch gerade diese Versicherten gezielt von der Moglichkeit eines 
Wechsels informiert. Diese Liste liefie sich beliebig fortsetzen. 
Allerdings handelt es sich nur um Hinweise auf Risikoselektion und nicht 
um ,,harte Evidenz". Ein Blick auf die Entwicklung der Beitragssatze (siehe 
Abbildung 5.1) deutet jedoch darauf bin, <lass es im Verlauf des Wettbe-
werbs zu einer Trennung von Versicherten mit hohen und niedrigen Krank-
heitsrisiken gekommen ist. Wettbewerb und RSA ftihrten zu einer Annii.he-
rung der Beitragssii.tze der Nicht-Betriebskrankenkassen (z. B. Allgemeine 
Ortskrankenkassen und Ersatzkassen), wii.hrend die Betriebskrankenkassen 
(BKKs) deutlich geringere durchschnittliche Beitragssii.tze aufweisen. Es 
ist daher wenig verwunderlich, <lass die BKKs eine Vielzahl von Mitglie-
dern gewinnen konnten - seit Einftihrung des Wettbewerbs 1996 ca. vier 
Millionen. 
Eine Erkliirung ftir die niedrigen Beitragssatze der BKKs liefert die Un-
vollstiindigkeit des RSA zusammen mit der - historisch gewachsenen - bes-
seren Risikostruktur der BKKs. Die Divergenz der Beitragssiitze seit 1998 
deutet zudem darauf hin, <lass die BKKs insbesondere die Gesunden ftir sich 
gewinnen konnten. Und tatsiichlich sind die tiber <las regulierte Leistungs-
paket hinausgehenden Leistungen der BKKs eher fur Gesunde attraktiv (z. 
B. Vorsorgeuntersuchungen) und die der Nicht-BKKs eher ftir Kranke (z. 
B. Krebstherapie, Chiro-Therapie und Ernii.hrungsberatung). Es ware je-
doch verfrtiht, diese Befunde als Risikoselektion zu deklarieren und damit 
den Wettbewerb in der GKV zu diskreditieren. 
Die Beobachtungen stehen (auch) in Einklang mit einer anderen Erklii.-
rung: Gesunde haben geringere Wechselkosten und wechseln daher bei glei-
chen Vorteilen eines Wechsels hii.ufiger als Kranke. Die hoheren Wechsel-
kosten ftir Kranke haben mehrere Ursachen. So haben Kranke in der Regel 
wichtigere Dinge zu tun als ihre Krankenkasse zu wechseln, beispielsweise 
an Rehabilitationsmafinahmen teilzunehmen. Aufierdem weisen Kranke mit 
hoherer Wahrscheinlichkeit ein hohes Krankheitsrisiko auf als Gesunde und 
sind daher durch wiederholten Konsum medizinischer Leistungen besser 
tiber ihre Krankenkasse informiert als Gesunde (Wie bekomme ich meine 
Kosten erstattet? Welche Extraleistungen bieten Sie an?). Diese Informa-
tionen gingen im Falle eines Wechsels verloren. 
In Kapitel 5 wurden Daten des Sozio-Oekonomischen Panels (SOEP) 
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von 1995 bis 2000 verwendet, um zu testen, ob die BKKs tatsachlich erfolg-
reich Risikoselektion betreiben. Dabei war die Trennung von Risikoselek-
tion vom Transaktionskostenargument entscheidend. Als Annaherung des 
Risikotyps wurde ein auf Grundlage des selbsteingeschatzten Gesundheits-
zustands konstruierter Gesundheitsindex verwendet. Der Datensatz wurde 
in Nicht-BKK-Mitglieder und BKK-Mitglieder geteilt und alle relevanten 
Wechselbewegungen wurden untersucht. 
Allgemein zeigte sich, class Nichtwechsler einen signifikant schlechteren 
Gesundheitszustand aufweisen als Wechsler. Wie bereits oben ausgefuhrt, 
haben schlechte Risiken hohere Wechselkosten und wechseln dementspre-
chend seltener. Die Trennung von Risikoselektion von eben diesen Transak-
tionskosten erforderte die Betrachtung einer Wechslerreferenzgruppe. Fiir 
die Nicht-BKK-Mitglieder ergab sich ein starkerer Effekt des Gesundheitszu-
standes auf die Wechselwahrscheinlichkeit zu einer BKK als zu einer Nicht-
BKK. Mit anderen Worten, die Wechsler zu den BKKs sind gesilnder als 
die Wechsler innerhalb der Nicht-BKKs. Dieses Ergebnis deutet auf Risi-
koselektion seitens der BKKs hin, da es offensichtlich einen Uber die Trans-
aktionskosten hinausgehenden Gesundheitseffekt gibt. Jedoch ist der beob-
achtete Unterschied nicht statistisch signifikant. 
Dennoch konnte die Hypothese, class BKKs Risikoselektion betreiben, 
gestiltzt werden, wenn unter den BKK Mitgliedern die Gesunden innerhalb 
der BKKs wechseln, wahrend die Krankeren (oder die weniger Gesunden) 
eher zu einer Nicht-BKK wechseln. Aber auch hier lieB sich kein signifikanter 
U nterschied in den Gesundheitseffekten ausmachen. 
Es lieBen sich somit keine Hinweise auf ( erfolgreiche) Risikoselektion 
linden, weder seitens der BKKs noch seitens der Nicht-BKKs. Die Wechsel-
bewegungen begrilnden sich somit aus Transaktionskosten, d. h. aus dem 
positiven Zusammenhang von Wechselkosten und den erwarteten Kosten 
medizinischer Leistungen. Dennoch filhrt der unvollstandige Risikostruk-
turausgleich zu einem systematischen Wettbewerbsvorteil der BKKs. Da 
dieser den positiven Wirkungen des Wettbewerbs entgegenwirkt, ist eine 
Verbesserung des RSA zwingend. Die fur 2007 geplante Einfilhrung eines 
morbiditatsorientierten RSA, der die erwarteten Leistungsausgaben <lurch 
Einbeziehung zusatzlicher Variablen besser abbildet als bisher, zielt in diese 
Rich tung. 
Die Verzerrungen des Wettbewerbs sind somit weniger auf den Wettbe-
werb selbst zurilckzufuhren (Risikoselektion) als auf <lessen schlechte Orga-
nisation (unvollstandiger RSA). Dem Wettbewerb in der GKV sollte mithin 
mehr ,, Vertrauen" entgegen gebracht werden. Die Tatsache, class beispiels-
weise Geschaftsstellennetze ausgedilnnt werden oder <lass manche Extra-
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leistungen angeboten und manche nicht angeboten werden, kann durchaus 
den Vorstellungen der Versicherten entsprechen und ist damit ein positiver 
und deshalb gewiinschter Effekt des Wettbewerbs. Spatestens nach der Ver-
besserung des RSA sollte daher eine deutliche Starkung des Wettbewerbs 
angestrebt werden. Mogliche Dimensionen sind beispielsweise die Zulassung 
von Einzelvertragen, d. h. die Abschaffung des Monopols der Kassenarzt-
lichen Vereinigungen, und die Ausdehnung von Selbstbehalttarifen auf die 
Pflichtversicherten in der GKV. Die Einfiihrung von Bonusprogrammen ab 
Januar 2004 kann also nur als erster (kleiner) Schritt in Richtung mehr 
Wettbewerb verstanden werden. 
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Health care delivery systems in all major industrial countries approach a crisis 
and there is no panacea so far to rising health care costs, in particular as an 
aging population and advanced medical technology further drive these costs. 
This dissertation does not attempt to provide a solution to the macroeconomic 
debate about health care costs. It rather focuses on microeconomics and how 
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